UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
M.F., individually and on behalf of her minor child, V.G., 5:17-cv-1385 Plaintiff, (GLS/ATB)
v.
NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT,
Defendant.
SUMMARY ORDER
Pending is defendant New York State Education Department’s
(SED) motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. (Dkt. No. 35.) For the reasons that follow, the motion is
granted.
The court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts 1
and its prior Memorandum-Decision and Order. (Dkt. No. 28 at 3-9.)
Plaintiff M.F.’s sole remaining claim—brought on behalf of herself and her
minor son, V.G.—against SED is a systemic violation claim under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). (Am. Compl., Dkt.
1 The amended complaint, which was filed in accordance with the March 29, 2019 Memorandum-Decision and Order, (Dkt. No. 29), does not alter the underlying facts.
No. 29 at 40-41.2)
M.F. alleges that SED’s policies “prohibit parents appealing due
process decisions before the [state review officer (SRO)] from challenging
the record on appeal produced by school districts and” that “there is no
uniform standard for what records on appeal should look like, how . . .
exhibits should be labeled, or how what [sic] the copy the district serves on
the parent should look like.” (Id. at 35.) She claims that there is “no
avenue for parents to challenge the sufficiency of records on appeal
produced by [the district] to the SRO,” and, as a result, parents “are left at a
disadvantage when citing to documents in the record.” (Id.) In sum,
according to M.F., SED’s “current policies prevent parents from properly
litigating appeals to the SRO and thereby deprive parents of due process
rights.” (Id.)
In its now-pending motion, SED seeks dismissal on the following
grounds: (1) M.F.’s conclusory allegations fail to identify the existence of a
systemic problem; (2) M.F. fails to specifically identify which SED
policy/policies allegedly result in a systemic violation of the IDEA; (3) M.F.
fails to plausibly allege that SED’s policies “actually prejudiced [M.F.]
2 This citation refers to the CM/ECF-generated page numbers, because M.F. duplicates paragraph numbers and lists them out of order. (Dkt. No. 29.)
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during the administrative review process,” and any prejudice allegedly
suffered is belied by her own allegations that the documents she sought to
produce to the SRO were, in fact, produced by the district; and (4) general
compensatory and punitive damages are unavailable under the IDEA.
(Dkt. No. 35, Attach. 1 at 1-2.)
In response, M.F. maintains that she has sufficiently pleaded a
deprivation of parents’ due process rights when challenging the sufficiency
of records on appeal. (Dkt. No. 42 at 2-3.) As to her identification of SED’s
policies that allegedly result in a systemic violation of the IDEA, M.F.
appears to maintain, rather confusingly, that SED’s citations, in its
memorandum of law, to 8 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 200.5, 200(j)(5)(vi), and 279.9
establish that M.F. herself has identified these policies. (Id. at 2.) Next, as
to the prejudice suffered, M.F. asserts that she was “unable to properly cite
to the record on appeal and this prejudiced her ability to properly appeal,”
and that “[i]t is not a far reach for any finder of fact to conclude that a
record on appeal that was ‘lacking documents and tabbed in a confusing
manner with numbers and letters’ would be prejudicial to a party on
appeal.” (Id. at 3, 6.) Lastly, as to damages, M.F. maintains that the IDEA
allows for awards of attorney’s fees, and that her complaint asks the court
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to “grant further and different relief as [the court] deems equitable and
proper.” (Id. at 4.)
The standard of review under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is well settled
and will not be repeated here. For a full discussion of the standard, the
court refers the parties to its prior decision in Ellis v. Cohen & Slamowitz,
LLP, 701 F. Supp. 2d 215, 218 (N.D.N.Y. 2010).
As applicable here, a claim is “systemic” where the complaint
“implicates the integrity of the IDEA’s dispute resolution procedures
themselves, or requires restructuring the education system itself in order to
comply with the dictates of the IDEA.” French v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Educ.,
No. 5:04-CV-434, 2010 WL 3909163, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010)
(internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted). Systemic claims
under the IDEA have been recognized where the plaintiff has alleged a
“pattern and practice of systematic IDEA violations unable to be addressed
at the due process hearings provided in New York.” Id. (internal quotation
marks, alterations, and citation omitted).
Here, M.F.’s allegations are too conclusory and implausible to
support a systemic violation claim. For example, despite M.F.’s contention
that her claim “affects all similarly situated parents,” and that “the current
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policy allows unscrupulous school districts, like [her child’s] school district,
to take unfair advantage over parents during appeals,” (Dkt. No. 42 at 5),
she seeks relief on behalf of her and her son, and her allegations focus on
her individual experience during the appeals process, (Am. Compl. at 35-
37, 40-41). More specifically, M.F. asserts that “[t]he record sent to [her]
here was lacking documents and tabbed in a confusing manner with
numbers and letters, forcing [her] to cite to documents as entitled and not
as tabbed in the record presented before the SRO.” (Id. at 36.) There is
no basis for the court to plausibly infer from these allegations that a SED
policy systemically contributes to a deprivation of all parents’ due process
rights. See Canton Bd. of Educ. v. N.B., 343 F. Supp. 2d 123, 128 (D.
Conn. 2004) (“To sustain a claim of a systemic violation, [p]laintiff would
have to allege that a lack of training has rendered the process of handling
IDEA claims non-compliant with due process hearing in a substantial
number of other proceedings, thus calling into question the resolution
process in general. Without more, there is no reason to assume that such
training is necessary or that its lack systemically contributes to due process
violations.” (emphasis added)). 3
3 Successful “systemic” violations are often found “when the conduct alleged to have violated IDEA affected all students in a given program,” as opposed to its affect on an
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Further, as noted by SED, M.F.’s argument that SED’s policy “leaves
open the possibility for unscrupulous school districts to tilt the appeals
process in their favor thereby prejudicing parents and depriving them of
their rights to due process,” (Dkt. No. 42 at 5), is entirely conclusory and
conjectural, and the amended complaint provides no factual allegations to
support such an inference, (Dkt. No. 44 at 4). Rather, the amended
complaint asserts only that “[s]chool districts can be selective in the
documents they produce as part of the record and deprive the SRO of
crucial information needed to decide an appeal.” (Am. Compl. at 36
(emphasis added).) Further emphasizing the conjectural nature of the
allegations, M.F. concedes that the SRO ordered the district to submit all
required documents, which contradicts her assertions that the district “can
be selective” and “deprive the SRO of crucial information.” (Id.)
Because M.F.’s conclusory allegations fail to state a claim, dismissal
is appropriate. See Mr. & Mrs. “B” ex rel. “C.B.” v. Bd. of Educ. of Syosset
individual. Kalliope R. ex rel Irene v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 827 F. Supp. 2d 130, 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (emphasis added). For example, in Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, the Second Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs sufficiently plead a “systemic” violation because the plaintiffs’ complaint, brought by the parents of handicapped children and Connecticut Legal Services, on their own behalf and on behalf of others similarly situated, “allege[d] a pattern and practice of systematic . . . violations” regarding all handicapped children in its school system. 832 F.2d 748, 757 (2d Cir. 1987). However, here, M.F.’s allegations refer to her individual experience, whereby it was difficult for her to make persuasive arguments to the SRO because of the confusing nature of how the record was assembled and served on her. (Am. Compl. at 36-37.)
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Sch. Dist., No. 96-CV-5752, 1998 WL 273025, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15,
1998) (“The allegations of the complaint fall well short of demonstrating a
systemic violation of federal or state law. . . . [and] the [c]ourt is persuaded
by those cases that have held that broad and conclusory allegations that
SED has failed to meet its statutory responsibilities do not state a claim
under the IDEA.”).
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that SED’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 35) is GRANTED;
and it is further
ORDERED that M.F.’s amended complaint (Dkt. No. 29) is
DISMISSED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk close this case; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide a copy of this Summary Order to
the parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
April 10, 2020 Albany, New York
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