UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ---------------------------------X JENN-CHING LUO,
Plaintiff,
-against- MEMORANDUM & ORDER 12-CV-3073(JS)(AKT) BALDWIN UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT and MICHELLE GALLO,
Defendants. ---------------------------------X APPEARANCES For Plaintiff: Jenn-Ching Luo, pro se P.O. Box 261 Bircheunville, PA 19421
For Defendants: Jeltje DeJong, Esq. Kelly E. Wright, Esq. Devitt Spellman Barrett, LLP 50 Route 111 Smithtown, NY 11787
SEYBERT, District Judge:
Pro se plaintiff Jenn-Ching Luo (“Plaintiff”) brought
this action to redress perceived shortcomings in the way defendant
Baldwin Union Free School District (the “District”) and several
individual defendants addressed the educational needs of B.L.,
Plaintiff’s disabled child. The remaining defendants are the
District and Michelle Gallo, the Director of Pupil Services for
the District (“Gallo” and collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff
claims violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. (“IDEA”); and Section 1983 of Title
42 of the United States Code, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”).
Currently pending before the Court are: (1) Plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration of the Court’s November 13, 2014 Order under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b) and Local Civil
Rule 6.3 (Docket Entry 100), and (2) Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment (Docket Entry 102). For the following reasons,
Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED, and Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND1
The Court assumes familiarity with the background of
this case, which is chronicled in its earlier Orders. (See, e.g.,
Docket Entries 34, 85, 99.) The salient details are discussed
below.
I. Factual Background
Plaintiff’s child, B.L., has autism and a pervasive
developmental disorder with issues in language and communication.
(Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt., Docket Entry 92-1, ¶ 1.) Since preschool,
B.L. had been receiving special education services from the
District. (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 2.)
On April 16, 2011, the District’s Committee on Special
Education (“CSE”) met to review B.L.’s progress and to develop an
Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) for the 2011-12 school year.2
1 The following facts are drawn from Defendants’ 56.1 Statement, the Administrative Record, and any other supporting documents.
2 In New York, the IEP team is referred to as the CSE. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4402(1)(b)(1) (McKinney’s 2015). 2
Ultimately, the CSE recommended that B.L. be placed in an 8:1+1
special class3 with individual speech therapy five times per week.
The CSE also recommended that B.L. receive direct consultant
teacher services four times per week in B.L.’s home. (Defs.’ 56.1
Stmt. ¶ 3.)
Previously, Plaintiff visited Camphill Special School
(“Camphill”) in Pennsylvania. (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 4, 6.)
Plaintiff believed that Camphill was a good fit for B.L., in part,
because the school had an open space without school buildings or
fences and used natural methods in lieu of Applied Behavioral
Analysis (“ABA”). (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 7.)
In May 2011, Plaintiff requested that the District
convene a CSE meeting to consider B.L.’s placement in Camphill or
a similar special school. (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 8, 10; see R. at
1274.)4 In response, the District scheduled a meeting and told
Plaintiff to download a certain list of at least 100 schools
approved by New York State. (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 11-12.) But
Plaintiff did not call or visit any of these schools. (Defs.’
3 An 8:1+1 special class is one that has a maximum of eight students with one teacher and one paraprofessional. See, e.g., http://www.uft.org/teaching/special-classes.
4 Due to the volume of documents, Defendants submitted a hard copy of the Administrative Record (“R.”) to the Court.
3
56.1 Stmt. ¶ 15 (citing Pl.’s Dep. 149:24-150:6).)5 Instead, he
disregarded all of the listed schools, believing that they “‘most
likely provided ABA which he did not want.’” (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt.
¶ 14 (quoting Pl.’s Dep. 145:24-146:10).) Plaintiff had determined
that Camphill was the only appropriate school for B.L. (Defs.’
56.1 Stmt. ¶ 15 (citing Pl.’s Dep. 149:8-16).)
On July 13, 2011, the CSE held another meeting. (Defs.’
56.1 Stmt. ¶ 18.) There, Plaintiff learned that the CSE could not
send an application to Camphill immediately because the proper
procedure was to (1) apply to state approved day schools, (2) apply
to in-state residential groups, and (3) then to apply to out-of-
state unapproved schools, including Camphill. (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt.
¶ 19; see R. at 1274.) The CSE identified potential programs and
created a list of twenty-two schools that accepted males with
autism in B.L.’s age group. (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff
was asked to provide his parental consent to allow the District to
send an application to each of the listed schools. (Defs.’ 56.1
Stmt. ¶ 21; R. at 1275).
Apparently unsatisfied with the results of the CSE
meeting, Plaintiff filed a due process complaint with the New York
State Education Department, to enjoin the District from sending
5 Plaintiff’s Deposition Transcripts can be found at Docket Entries 102-4 (pp. 1-50); 102-5 (pp. 51-100); 102-6 (pp. 101- 150); and 102-7 (pp. 151-201). 4
applications to the listed schools. (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 22; see
R. at 1.) A hearing was held, and an independent hearing officer
(“IHO”) determined that Plaintiff failed to provide sufficient
and the needs of the students who attended. (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt.
¶ 23.)6 The IHO also found that Plaintiff failed to satisfy his
burden of showing that Camphill was an appropriate placement for
B.L. (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 23.) Of particular relevance is that
Plaintiff never identified any other students from the District
who enrolled in out-of-state unapproved schools at the District’s
expense. (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 27; see Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ 56.1
Stmt., Docket Entry 92-2, ¶ 27.)
Plaintiff then appealed the IHO’s decision to the state
review officer (“SRO”). (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 24; see R. at 1209-
27). The SRO upheld the decision and dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal.
(Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 25.)7 In September 2012, Plaintiff enrolled
B.L. in Camphill at his own expense. (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 26
(citing Pl.’s Dep. 118:14-18).)
II. Procedural History
Plaintiff commenced this action against Defendants on
June 20, 2012. (Compl., Docket Entry 1.) After extensive motion
6 The decision of the IHO is available at R. 1185-1208.
7 The decision of the SRO is available at R. 1272-87. 5
practice, three claims remain: (1) an IDEA claim that Defendants
failed to consider information regarding B.L.’s placement at
Camphill or a Camphill-like setting and conducted administrative
proceedings in which erroneous arguments were made and adopted;
(2) an IDEA-based Section 1983 claim that Defendants deprived
Plaintiff of his rights under the IDEA for the same reasons; and
(3) a Monell claim against the District. (Mar. 2013 Order, Docket
Entry 34, at 22.) The Court notes that these claims are similar
to claims Plaintiff raised in another case previously before this
Court: Luo v. Baldwin Union Free School District, et al., No. 10-
CV-1985, 2011 WL 941263, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2011) (“Luo I”).8
Thus, the Court may periodically refer to its previous rulings in
that action.
DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration
Motions for reconsideration may be brought under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b) and Local Civil Rule 6.3.
See Wilson v. Pessah, No. 05-CV-3143, 2007 WL 812999, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2007). A motion for reconsideration is
appropriate when the moving party believes that the Court
overlooked important “‘matters or controlling decisions’” that
would have influenced the prior decision. Shamis v. Ambassador
8 Luo I involves a previous school year and this current action involves the 2011-12 school year. 6
Factors Corp., 187 F.R.D. 148, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (quoting LOCAL
CIVIL RULE 6.3). Reconsideration is not a proper tool to repackage
arguments and issues already considered by the Court in deciding
the original motion. United States v. Gross, No. 98-CR-0159, 2002
WL 32096592, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2002) (citing PAB Aviation,
Inc. v. United States, No. 98-CV-5952, 2000 WL 1240196, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2000)). Nor is it proper to raise new arguments
and issues. Lehmuller v. Inc. Vill. of Sag Harbor, 982 F. Supp.
132, 135 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (collecting cases). In other words,
reconsideration “will generally be denied unless the moving party
can point to controlling decisions or data that . . . might
reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the
court.” Wechsler v. Hunt Health Sys., 186 F. Supp. 2d 402, 410
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Davidson v. Scully, 172 F. Supp. 2d 458,
461 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)); see also Schrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70
F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that the standard for
reconsideration is “strict”) (collecting cases).
Plaintiff requests that the Court reconsider its
November 13, 2014 Order permitting the District to file its answer
after the deadline to do so expired (Nov. 2014 Order, Docket Entry
99). (Pl.’s Recons. Mot., Docket Entry 100, at 1.) Briefly,
Plaintiff moved to strike the District’s answer for lateness in
June 2013. (Pl.’s Mot. to Strike, Docket Entry 63, at 1.) In an
Order dated August 12, 2014, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion
7
because the District had appropriately shown good cause and
excusable neglect. (Aug. 2014 Order, Docket Entry 91, at *10-12
(finding that the District’s untimely answer was due to confusion
and that the delay did not prejudice Plaintiff because discovery
was ongoing and motions for summary judgment had not yet been
filed).) Plaintiff then filed a motion for reconsideration, and
the Court denied that motion in its November 2014 Order. (See
Nov. 2014 Order.) Plaintiff now seeks reconsideration of the
November 2014 Order, arguing that the District’s late Answer is
inexcusable. (Pl.’s Recons. Mot. at 2.) The Court, however, finds
that this argument is meritless, and thus reconsideration is
denied.9
Simply stated, Plaintiff has not cited any controlling
law or factual matters that the Court overlooked. See Wechsler,
186 F. Supp. 2d at 410 (citation omitted). Instead, Plaintiff
rehashes the same argument that this Court rejected in its August
2014 Order. See Gross, 2002 WL 32096592, at *4. Thus, Plaintiff’s
motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
9 The Court notes that in his letter, Plaintiff uses offensive and insulting language. The Court warns Plaintiff that he will be subject to sanctions if he continues to disparage the Court in any subsequent matters. 8
II. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
A. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV.
P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-
48, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986); Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.
Ed. 2d 265 (1986). “In assessing the record to determine whether
there is a genuine issue to be tried as to any material fact, the
court is required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all
permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom
summary judgment is sought.” McLee v. Chrysler Corp., 109 F.3d
130, 134 (2d Cir. 1997).
“The burden of showing the absence of any genuine dispute
as to a material fact rests on the party seeking summary judgment.”
Id.; see Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S. Ct.
1598, 1608, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970). A genuine factual issue
exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248,
106 S. Ct. at 2510. To defeat summary judgment, “the non-movant
must ‘set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial.’” Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41
(2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256). “[M]ere
9
speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts” will
not overcome a motion for summary judgment. Knight v. U.S. Fire
Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986) (citation omitted); see
also Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 323 (2d Cir. 1986) (“Mere
conclusory allegations or denials will not suffice.” (citation
omitted)); Weinstock, 224 F.3d at 41 (“[U]nsupported allegations
do not create a material issue of fact.”) (citations omitted).
Because Plaintiff is litigating pro se, the Court reads
his Complaint liberally and interprets his papers to “raise the
strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau
of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (collecting cases).
B. IDEA Claims
Plaintiff argues that the District: (1) failed to
consider information regarding a Camphill-like setting and thus
deprived Plaintiff of “a meaningful opportunity to recommend an
educational placement” for B.L. and (2) “conduct[ed]
administrative proceedings in which erroneous arguments were made
and adopted.” (Pl.’s Letter, Docket Entry 103, at 1.) The Court
finds that these arguments are meritless.
As an initial matter, a district court’s role in
“‘reviewing state educational decisions under the IDEA is
circumscribed.’” T.Y. & K.Y. ex rel. T.Y. v. N.Y. City Dep’t of
Educ., 584 F.3d 412, 417 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Gagliardo v.
10
Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2007)).
Indeed, the Court “‘must give due weight to the administrative
proceedings, mindful that the judiciary generally lacks the
specialized knowledge and experience necessary to resolve
persistent and difficult questions of educational policy.’” Id.
(quoting A.C. ex rel. M.C. v. Bd. of Educ., 553 F.3d 165, 171 (2d
Cir. 2009)). “Therefore, as the Supreme Court has concluded,
courts may not ‘substitute their own notions of sound educational
policy for those of the school authorities which they review.’”
Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206, 102 S. Ct.
3034, 3051, 73 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1982)).
The Court also acknowledges that IDEA claims can often
be resolved at the summary judgment stage because the Court must
afford a certain degree of deference to the administrative
findings. See id. at 418. In fact, “[u]nlike with an ordinary
summary judgment motion, the existence of a disputed issue of
material fact will not necessarily defeat a motion for summary
judgment in the IDEA context.” J.S. v. Scarsdale Union Free Sch.
Dist., 826 F. Supp. 2d 635, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citations
omitted). “Instead, summary judgment in IDEA cases such as this
is ‘in substance an appeal from an administrative determination,
not a summary judgment.’” Id. (quoting Lillbask ex rel. Mauclaire
v. Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 83 n.3 (2d Cir. 2005)). The
11
Court has reviewed the administrative findings in this case and
concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are meritless.
1. Failure to Consider a Camphill-Like Setting
As noted above, Plaintiff’s first argument is that the
District committed a procedural violation under the IDEA when it
failed to consider a Camphill-like setting and thus impeded
Plaintiff’s ability to participate in the decision-making process.
(Pl.’s Letter at 1.) Based on the administrative record, however,
the Court finds that this argument is unpersuasive.
Congress enacted the IDEA “to ensure that all children
with disabilities are provided a free appropriate public
education” (“FAPE”) and “to assure that the rights of such children
and their parents or guardians are protected.” Forest Grove Sch.
Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 239, 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2491, 174 L.
Ed. 2d 168 (2009) (internal quotation marks, alteration, and
citation omitted); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) (noting that
the IDEA offers federal funding to states that provide a FAPE to
children with disabilities). The term FAPE means “special
education and related services,” including preschool, elementary
school, and secondary school, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9), that is
“reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks
and advance from grade to grade.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 204, 102 S.
Ct. at 3049. It is important to note that the “IDEA does not
itself articulate any specific level of educational benefits that
12
must be provided . . . ,” Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist.,
142 F.3d 119, 130 (2d Cir. 1998), and not every procedural
inadequacy deprives a student of a FAPE. A.C. ex rel. M.C. v. Bd.
of Educ. of The Chappaqua Cent. Sch. Dist., 553 F.3d 165, 172 (2d
Cir. 2009) (citing Grim v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d
377, 381 (2d Cir. 2003)). Sure enough, procedural violations
amount to a denial of a FAPE in three situations:
[I]f the procedural inadequacies--
(I) impeded the child's right to a free appropriate public education;
(II) significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process regarding the provision of a free appropriate public education to the parents’ child; or
(III) caused a deprivation of educational benefits.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii); accord Scruggs v. Meriden Bd. of
Educ., No. 03-CV-2224, 2007 WL 2318851, at *10 (D. Conn. Aug. 10,
2007) (“A FAPE denial has occurred where procedural irregularities
result in the loss of educational opportunity or seriously infringe
upon the parent’s opportunity to participate in the development or
formulation of the IEP.”) (citation omitted). Moreover, section
1414(b)(2) of the IDEA describes which factors must be considered
when developing a FAPE for a specific child:
In conducting the evaluation, the local educational agency shall--
13
(A) use a variety of assessment tools and strategies to gather relevant functional, developmental, and academic information, including information provided by the parent, that may assist in determining--
(i) whether the child is a child with a disability; and
(ii) the content of the child's individualized education program, including information related to enabling the child to be involved in and progress in the general education curriculum, or, for preschool children, to participate in appropriate activities;
(B) not use any single measure or assessment as the sole criterion for determining whether a child is a child with a disability or determining an appropriate educational program for the child; and
(C) use technically sound instruments that may assess the relative contribution of cognitive and behavioral factors, in addition to physical or developmental factors.
20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2).
Plaintiff argues that the CSE failed to consider
important factors, including B.L.’s physical condition and his
social and cultural background. (Pl.’s Letter at 3.) The Court
disagrees. The CSE considered a litany of factors, including
“parent observations, annual review recommendations from [B.L.’s
“language, speech, and hearing”] teacher, progress summaries from
[B.L.’s] classroom teacher and consultant teacher, an independent
speech-language evaluation,” a Board of Cooperative Educational
14
Services evaluation, standardized testing results, and a February
2009 psychoeducational evaluation. (See R. at 1282.) And the CSE
meeting was attended by a number of individuals who are
knowledgeable about B.L. and his condition, including “the CSE
chairperson, a psychologist, a regular education teacher, [B.L.’s]
special education teacher, his speech-language therapist, an
occupational therapist,” and Plaintiff himself. (R. at 1282); see
also 34 C.F.R. § 104.35(c) (describing the placement procedures
and requiring, in part, “that the placement decision [be] made by
a group of persons, including persons knowledgeable about the
child”).
Plaintiff also cites 34 C.F.R. § 104.34 to discuss the
educational placement of B.L., (Pl.’s Letter at 2), but that
section supports Defendants, not Plaintiff. 34 C.F.R. § 104.34
provides that:
A [school] shall educate, or shall provide for the education of, each qualified handicapped person in its jurisdiction . . . to the maximum extent appropriate to the needs of the handicapped person. A [school] shall place a handicapped person in the regular educational environment operated by the [school] unless it is demonstrated by the [school] that the education of the person in the regular environment with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily. Whenever a [school] places a person in a setting other than the regular educational environment . . . it shall take into account the proximity of the alternate setting to the person's home.
15
34 C.F.R. § 104.34(a). Thus, as Defendants correctly note, “there
is a recognized preference for educating special education
students in their home District.” (Defs.’ Reply Br., Docket Entry
104-1, at 5.) And despite Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary,
Camphill was considered. But the CSE advised Plaintiff that they
had to first apply to in-state programs and then out-of-state
approved programs before applying to Camphill or a Camphill-like
setting, which are out-of-state unapproved programs. (See Defs.’
56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 9, 19; R. at 1274). And the CSE identified twenty-
two out-of-District schools that would provide B.L. with a FAPE.
(Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 20.) All in all, Plaintiff has a procedural
right in the educational placement of his child but not a specific
location, such as Camphill. See F.L. ex rel. F.L. v. N.Y. City
Dep’t of Educ., No. 11-CV-5131, 2012 WL 4891748, at *11 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 16, 2012) (“Parents are entitled to participate in any
decision regarding the educational placement of their child.
Parents are not, however, procedurally entitled to participate in
the decision regarding school placement.”) (citing T.Y., 584 F.3d
at 420).
It appears that Plaintiff could only be satisfied with
Camphill. In fact, he refused to visit other schools because “[n]o
one is similar to Camphill.” (Pl.’s Dep. 145:22-23.) But the
IDEA only guarantees an “appropriate” education, “not one that
provides everything that might be thought desirable by loving
16
parents.” Walczak, 142 F. 3d at 132 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Based on the thorough administrative record,
the Court endorses the decision of the SRO and rejects this portion
of Plaintiff’s IDEA claim. Id. at 129 (“Deference is particularly
appropriate when, as here, the [SRO’s] review has been thorough
and careful.”).
2. Administrative Proceedings in Which Erroneous Arguments Were Made and Adopted
Plaintiff’s second argument, construed liberally,
relates to Dr. John Suozzi’s psychoeducational report dated
February 2, 2009 (the “Suozzi Evaluation”)10. (See Pl.’s Letter
at 3; see also R. at 1278-80 (discussing how Plaintiff appears to
be relitigating the appropriateness of the Suozzi Evaluation).)
In opposition, Defendants argue, and the Court agrees, that
collateral estoppel prevents Plaintiff from litigating this issue.
(Defs.’ Br., Docket Entry 102-10, at 15-16.)
The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion,
prevents parties from “‘relitigating issues that were or could
have been raised’” in a prior proceeding. Monahan v. N.Y. City
Dep’t of Corr., 214 F.3d 275, 284-85 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Allen
v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S. Ct. 411, 414, 66 L. Ed. 2d 308
(1980)). Courts in this Circuit have applied the doctrine to
10The Suozzi Evaluation dated February 2, 2009 is available at R. 341-51. 17
“administrative proceedings when the agency is acting in a judicial
capacity.” K.B. v. Pearl River Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 10-CV-
9170, 2012 WL 234392, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2012) (collecting
cases).
The related doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes
parties from relitigating a “legal or factual issue already decided
in an earlier proceeding.” Perez v. Danbury Hosp., 347 F.3d 419,
426 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Boguslavsky v. Kaplan, 159 F.3d 715,
719-20 (2d Cir. 1998)). To find collateral estoppel, four factors
must be met:
(1) the identical issue was raised in a previous proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated and decided in the previous proceeding; (3) the party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; and (4) the resolution of the issue was necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits.
Grenon v. Taconic Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 05-CV-1109, 2006 WL
3751450, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2006) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
Plaintiff is merely repackaging the same arguments
already rejected by this Court in Luo I, even though they relate
to a different school year. Luo I, 2012 WL 728173, at *7; (see
also R. at 1279 (“Although [Plaintiff] had not previously asserted
the claim . . . for the 2011-12 school year, [Plaintiff] is basing
his claim in part on the assertion that the 2009 psychoeducational
18
evaluation was inappropriate . . . .).) In its March 5, 2012
Order, the Court endorsed the decision of the IHO and SRO finding
that “Suozzi gathered adequate, relevant information about B.L.”
Id. at *5 (citation omitted). Plaintiff, a party in Luo I, had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and resolution of
that issue was necessary to support a final judgment on the merits.
As a result, all four factors have been met, and collateral
estoppel precludes Plaintiff from relitigating this issue. Perez,
347 F.3d at 426. Thus, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s IDEA claims.
C. IDEA-Based Section 1983 Claims
Next, Defendants move for summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s IDEA-based Section 1983 claims. (Defs.’ Br. at 14-
20.) Plaintiff’s opposition letter, construed liberally, appears
to assert claims related to B.L.’s placement in Camphill or a
Camphill-like setting and the allegedly flawed administrative
proceedings. (Pl.’s Letter at 1.)
Section 1983 provides a means for redress for
constitutional violations by a person acting under color of state
law. The statute states, in pertinent part, that:
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
19
privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under this law, a plaintiff
must allege: (1) that the defendant acted under color of state law
and (2) that as a result of the defendant’s actions, the plaintiff
suffered a deprivation of his or her rights or privileges as
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See Am.
Mfr. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50, 119 S. Ct.
977, 985, 143 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1999). If an IDEA claim and an IDEA-
based Section 1983 claim are brought simultaneously, a plaintiff
must prove that a constitutional violation occurred “outside the
scope of the IDEA.” Evans v. Bd. of Educ. of Rhinebeck Cent. Sch.
Dist., 930 F. Supp. 83, 102-103 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Bonar v.
Ambach, 771 F.2d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1985)).
But Plaintiff has not done so. The record indicates
that the claims are duplicitous, and Plaintiff has not proven a
constitutional violation “outside the scope of the IDEA.” Id. As
a result, since Plaintiff’s IDEA claims have been dismissed, his
Section 1983 claims for IDEA violations must fail as well. See
Streck v. Bd. of Educ. of E. Greenbush Sch. Dist., 280 F. App’x
66, 68 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Plaintiffs fail to allege a denial of
procedural safeguards or administrative remedies; they were
afforded a hearing before an impartial hearing officer and review
by [an SRO]. Therefore, plaintiffs may not rely on § 1983 to
20
pursue monetary damages for violations of the IDEA.”) (collecting
cases). Thus, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED
as to Plaintiff’s IDEA-based Section 1983 claims.
D. Municipal Liability under Section 1983
Finally, Defendants move for summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s additional Section 1983 claim against the District for
municipal liability under Monell. (Defs.’ Br. at 20-22.)
Plaintiff alleges that the District had a policy of circulating a
flawed evaluation report and depriving B.L. of a FAPE. (Compl. at
¶¶ 32-37.) Defendants argue in opposition that Plaintiff has
failed to raise an issue of fact that a policy or custom existed.
(Defs.’ Br. at 21-22.) The Court agrees.
To prevail on a Section 1983 claim against a
municipality, a plaintiff must show “an injury to a
constitutionally protected right . . . that . . . ‘was caused by
a policy or custom of the municipality or by a municipal official
responsible for establishing final policy.’” Hartline v. Gallo,
546 F.3d 95, 103 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Skehan v. Vill. of
Mamaroneck, 465 F.3d 96, 108-09 (2d Cir. 2006), overruled on other
grounds by Appel v. Spiridon, 531 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2008)); see
also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658,
690-91, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2035-36, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). “For
purposes of § 1983, school districts are considered to be local
governments and are subject to similar liability as local
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governments under Monell.” Booker v. Bd. of Educ., 238 F. Supp.
2d 469, 475 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 696-97, 98
S. Ct. at 2039).
Although a policy or custom need not be explicitly
stated, Kern v. City of Rochester, 93 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1996)
(citing Sorlucco v. N.Y. City Police Dep’t, 971 F.2d 864, 870 (2d
Cir. 1992)), isolated incidents will not suffice. See City of
Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24, 105 S. Ct. 2427, 2436,
85 L. Ed. 2d 791 (1985). Rather, a plaintiff may provide
circumstantial evidence that “‘the municipality so failed to train
its employees as to display a deliberate indifference to the
constitutional rights of those within its jurisdiction.’” Kern,
93 F.3d at 44 (quoting Ricciuti v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 941
F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1991)). Put another way, the
“discriminatory practice must be so manifest as to imply the
constructive acquiescence of senior policy-making officials.”
Sorlucco, 971 F.2d at 871 (citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that the
District had a policy of circulating a flawed evaluation report
and depriving B.L. of a FAPE. See, e.g., Green v. City of N.Y.,
No. 06-CV-1836, 2009 WL 3319356, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2009)
(granting summary judgment where plaintiff’s “conclusory
allegations” did not support the existence of a policy or practice
adopted by the defendant); Torino v. Rieppel, No. 07-CV-1929, 2009
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WL 3259429, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2009) (granting summary
judgment because the plaintiffs “provided no evidence whatsoever
that the [defendant] had a policy, custom, or practice of allowing
the alleged constitutional violations”) (citations omitted). In
fact, Plaintiff does not even address this argument in his
opposition papers. (See generally Pl.’s Letter.) As Defendants
aptly note, Plaintiff failed to identify “any other persons who
were treated more favorably” or “any persons who were similarly
treated so as to support a finding that the District had a policy
or practice of depriving students of a FAPE.” (Defs.’ Reply Br.
at 1.) Thus, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED
as to Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Monell claim.
III. Litigation Injunction
Under the All Writs Act, a federal court “may issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). The All Writs Act “grants district courts
the power, under certain circumstances, to enjoin parties from
filing further lawsuits.” MLE Realty Assocs. v. Handler, 192 F.3d
259, 261 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). But even when a sua
sponte injunction is warranted, the Court must provide plaintiff
“with notice and an opportunity to be heard” before imposing a
filing injunction. Moates v. Barkley, 147 F.3d 207, 208 (2d Cir.
1998) (per curiam) (collecting cases).
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Plaintiff’s course of conduct suggests that he may file
a motion for reconsideration to this Order. (See, e.g., Docket
Entries 37, 94, 100.) Plaintiff’s continued filing of these
motions constitutes an abuse of the judicial process. The Court
has an “obligation to protect the public and the efficient
administration of justice from individuals who have a history of
litigation entailing vexation, harassment and needless expense to
other parties and an unnecessary burden on the courts and their
supporting personnel.” Lau v. Meddaugh, 229 F. 3d 121, 123 (2d
Cir. 2000) (brackets, internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). The Court warns Plaintiff that similar, future motions
for reconsideration will not be tolerated. If Plaintiff persists
in this course of action, the Court will require that Plaintiff
first seek leave of the Court before submitting such filings.
Finally, Plaintiff is cautioned that Rule 11 of the Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure applies to pro se litigants, see Maduakolam v.
Columbia Univ., 866 F.2d 53, 56 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Rule 11 applies
both to represented and pro se litigants.”), and should he file
another frivolous motion, it is within the Court’s authority to
consider imposing sanctions upon him. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (Docket Entry
100) is DENIED, and Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Docket
Entry 102) is GRANTED. The Court warns Plaintiff that if he
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continues to file frivolous motions for reconsideration, the Court
will impose sanctions or require Plaintiff to seek leave of the
Court before submitting such filings.
The Court certifies that under 29 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3),
any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith, and
thus in forma pauperis status is denied for purpose of an appeal.
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 443-45, 82 S. Ct. 917,
919-21, 8 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1962).
The Clerk of the Court is directed to mark this matter
CLOSED and mail a copy of this Order to the pro se Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
Dated: January 12 , 2016 Central Islip, New York
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