UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
BOARD OF EDUCATION, MASSAPEQUA UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER -against- Case No. 07-CV-5009 (FB)
C.S., by her parent and natural guardian, RS., and R.S., individually,
Defendants. x
Appearances: For the Board of Education: For C.S. & R.S.: RANDY GLASSER, ESQ. HAROLD JEFFREY MARCUS, ESQ. Guercio & Guercio, LLP Law Offices of H. Jeffrey Marcus, P.C. 77 Conklin Street 5888 Main Street Farmingdale, New York 11735 Williamsville, New York 14221
BLOCK, Senior District Judge:
The Board of Education of the Massapequa Union Free School District (“the
District”) seeks review of an administrative decision of the New York State Review Office
(“the SRO”) pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (“the
IDEA”); the SRO found in favor of C.S, and her parent RS. (collectively, “the Child”), and
directed that the Child be classified as a student with an emotional disturbance entitled to
special educational services. Currently before the Court are the parties’ respective motions
for summary judgment.
The Court cannot determine, on the state of the record, whether the
controversy remains a live one; according to the submissions of both parties, the Child has
graduated high school and thus, as far as the Court can discern, is no longer a student in
the District.
a gf AUTHENTICATED2” US. GOVERNMENT. “4 bon
cs" “It has long been settled that a federal court has no authority to give opinions
upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which
cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.” Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United
States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (internal marks and citations omitted); see also Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S, 452, 459 n.10 (1974) (“The rule in federal cases is that an actual
controversy must be extant at all stages . . . not merely at the time the complaint is filed.”)
(internal citations omitted).
The District’s complaint, by way of relief, seeks a judgment “annulling each
and every conclusion of law of the SRO, which is adverse to plaintiff; and finding that [the
Child] should not be classified as a disabled student, including but not limited to being
classified as a student with an emotional disturbance[.]” Compl. at 6.
In light of the Child’s graduation from high school, and exit from the
District’s educational system, reversal of the SRO’s findings would appear to have no
consequence.
The District also claims money damages in the form of “reasonable attorneys’
fees, costs, and disbursements reasonably incurred in their prior proceedings before the
[Independent Hearing Officer] and SRO and in this litigation[.]” Compl. at 7 (Dec. 3, 2007).
The Child makes a similar demand by way of a counterclaim. See Ans. at 4 (Feb. 22, 2008).
Claims for money damages — including, insome circumstances, attorneys’ fees and costs —
“automatically avoid mootness, so long as the claim remains viable.” See Stokes v. Vill. of
Wurtsboro, 818 F.2d 4, 6 (2d Cir. 1987) (internal quotation omitted); see also 13C Wright,
Miller & Kane, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 3533.3 (3d ed. 2009) (“A damages claim suffices to avoid mootness only if viable’; “[i]f the action is mooted before any decision on the merits ...a eo
statute that awards fees to the prevailing party does not justify decision on the merits in
order to determine whether that party would have prevailed absent mootness.”).
Therefore, in light of the Child’s graduation from high school and
presumptive exit from the District’s educational system, the parties are ordered to address
what claims remain justiciable apart from the dueling demands for attorneys’ fees and
costs.’ The District shall file and serve a letter brief no longer than seven pages by
March 12; the Child shall file and serve a responsive letter brief of similar length by
March 19; and the District shall file and serve a reply letter brief no longer than three pages
by March 24.
SO ORDERED.
s/Frederic Block , FREDERIC BLOC Senior United States District Judge
Brooklyn, New York March 3, 2010
* Whether the District’s claims are mooted has no bearing on the Child’s claim for attorneys’ fees and costs; the IDEA permits such awards to “a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(b)(i)(D).. The Court will entertain a properly documented application for attorneys’ fees and costs from the Child if the District’s complaint is dismissed.