UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK --------------------------------------------------------------- X
JERRY TOTH, individually and on behalf of T.T.,
Plaintiff, : MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
– against – 21-CV-4245 (AMD) (JAM)
NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF : EDUCATION,
Defendant. : --------------------------------------------------------------- X
ANN M. DONNELLY, United States District Judge:
Before the Court are the parties’ objections to the Honorable Joseph A. Marutollo’s
February 21, 2024 report and recommendation. For the reasons that follow, I adopt the report
and recommendations subject to the modifications discussed below.
BACKGROUND
Familiarity with the facts is assumed. (See generally ECF No. 27 at 1–5 (detailing the
factual background of this case).) The plaintiff commenced this action individually and on
behalf of his minor child against the New York City Department of Education, alleging
violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et
seq. (See ECF No. 1.) Then-Magistrate Judge Ramon E. Reyes 1 granted the plaintiff leave to
amend the complaint to allege violations of a prior pendency order, due process violations under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§
12101 et seq., Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794a, the New York State
1 Judge Reyes was sworn in as a United States District Judge on November 14, 2023, and the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Marutollo.
Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290 et seq., and the New York City
Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-101 et seq. (See ECF No. 11-1;
ECF Order dated Mar. 21, 2022.) On January 5, 2023, the Court denied the defendant’s motion
to dismiss the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) for failure to state a claim. (See ECF No. 27.)
On July 1, 2023, the plaintiff moved again for leave to amend, and filed a proposed
Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). (ECF No. 44.) The plaintiff seeks to add nine additional
plaintiffs — parents of minor children with disabilities who missed school from March through
June 2020 because of pandemic school closures. (Id.; see ECF No. 44-1.) In the proposed SAC,
the plaintiff seeks an injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and the
NYCHRL ordering the defendant to provide compensatory education to “New York City’s
children with disabilities.” (See ECF No. 44-1 at 26 (Request for Relief).) The SAC also brings
claims specific to T.T. only under the IDEA, § 1983, the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. (Id.)
The defendant cross-moved for partial judgment on the pleadings, seeking dismissal of
all claims except the IDEA claims. (ECF Nos. 63, 64.) The Court referred the cross-motion to
Judge Reyes. (ECF Order dated Oct. 18, 2023.)
In a February 21, 2024 report and recommendation, Magistrate Judge Marutollo
recommended that the Court grant the defendant’s cross-motion for partial judgment on the
pleadings and grant in part and deny in part the plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the FAC.
(ECF No. 74.) Both sides filed timely objections to the report and recommendation. (See ECF
Nos. 79, 80.)
LEGAL STANDARD
In reviewing a report and recommendation, a district court “may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A party’s objections must be specific; where a party “makes only
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conclusory or general objections, or simply reiterates [the] original arguments, the Court reviews
the [R & R] only for clear error.” Pall Corp. v. Entegris, Inc., 249 F.R.D. 48, 51 (E.D.N.Y.
2008) (quoting Barratt v. Joie, No. 96-CV-324, 2002 WL 335014, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4,
2002)). The district judge must evaluate proper objections de novo and “may accept, reject, or
modify the recommended disposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
“[E]ven in a de novo review of a party’s specific objections, [however,] the court will not
consider ‘arguments, case law and/or evidentiary material which could have been, but were not,
presented to the magistrate judge in the first instance.’” Brown v. Smith, No. 09-CV-4522, 2012
WL 511581, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2012) (alterations omitted) (quoting Kennedy v. Adamo,
No. 02-CV-1776, 2006 WL 3704784, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2006)). Moreover, “the district
court is ‘permitted to adopt those sections of a magistrate judge’s report to which no specific
objection is made, so long as those sections are not facially erroneous.’” Sasmor v. Powell, No.
11-CV-4645, 2015 WL 5458020, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2015) (quoting Batista v. Walker,
No. 94-CV-2826, 1995 WL 453299, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1995)).
DISCUSSION
Meritless Objections
a. Facial Plausibility of the NYCHRL Claims
Judge Marutollo recommended that the Court grant the defendant’s cross-motion because
the plaintiff’s FAC and SAC did not plausibly allege a NYCHRL claim. (ECF No. 74 at 10–11.)
Judge Marutollo concluded that the FAC and SAC did not plausibly allege a NYCHRL claim
because the complaints present “a scattershot collage of various sections of NYCHRL,
unsupported legal conclusions, and various citations to non-probative case law that facially fail[]
to give notice of the nature of the claims.” (Id.) The plaintiff objects to Judge Marutollo’s
finding that the plaintiffs “‘fail to allege any specific facts to establish facial plausibility
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regarding Plaintiffs’ NYCHRL claim.’” (ECF No. 80 at 2.) The plaintiff argues that “at all
times the Plaintiffs have based their claims on facts, evidence and testimony.” (ECF No. 80 at
2.)
The plaintiff does not explain why he believes that Judge Marutollo was mistaken; he
merely states his general disagreement with the decision and reiterates arguments already made.
(See ECF No. 70 at 15, 18, 39 & n.5 (the plaintiff’s opposition to the defendant’s cross-motion
for judgment on the pleadings).) Accordingly, the Court reviews this objection for clear error.
See Entegris, 249 F.R.D. at 51. The Court has reviewed Judge Marutollo’s recommendation and
finds no error. Therefore, the Court adopt Judge Marutollo’s recommendation to grant the
defendant’s cross motion. 2
b. Monell Claim
The plaintiff objects to Judge Marutollo’s recommendation that the Court dismiss the
plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim for failure to state a claim under Monell v. Dept. of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). (See ECF No. 80 at 11–16.)
“[W]hile there is no federal constitutional right to an education, New York State’s
education laws create a property interest in education protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Patrick v. Success Acad. Charter Sch., Inc., 354 F. Supp. 3d 185, 211 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting
Handberry v. Thompson, 446 F.3d 335, 353 (2d Cir. 2006)). An individual cannot be deprived
of that right without due process of law. See Horton v. Bd. of Educ. of Sherburne-Earlville Cent.
Sch. Dist., No. 17-CV-45, 2017 WL 1437186, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2017); see also C.T. v.
Valley Stream Union Free Sch. Dist., 201 F. Supp. 3d 307, 317–18 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
2 Judge Marutollo also recommends that the plaintiff be permitted to amend the complaint only to withdraw his NYSHRL claim. Neither party objects to that recommendation, and the Court finds no error in this recommendation.
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Under Monell, a municipal entity like the defendant “may be held liable under [Section]
1983 where a plaintiff demonstrates that the constitutional violation complained of was caused
by a municipal ‘policy or custom.’” Reyes v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 995 F. Supp. 2d 215, 224
(E.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). In order to impose liability, a plaintiff must
“show two basic elements: (1) ‘the existence of a municipal policy or custom . . .’ and (2) ‘a
causal connection—an affirmative link—between the policy and the deprivation of his
constitutional rights.’” Harper v. City of New York, 424 F. App’x 36, 38 (2d Cir. 2011)
(summary order) (quoting Vippolis v. Vill. of Haverstraw, 768 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1985)).
The plaintiff alleges that the defendant deprived T.T. of his property interest in a public
education without due process by failing to provide compensatory education for class instruction
he missed during the COVID-19 closures. (See ECF No. 10 ¶¶ 74–77 (FAC).) Judge Marutollo
recommends that the Court dismiss this claim because the “the determination not to award T.T.
compensatory education was made through a series of fact-specific administrative inquiries and
decisions” and the plaintiff does not allege that the defendant had a “‘policy or custom’ of
denying compensatory education.” (ECF No. 74 at 13.) In addition, Judge Marutollo
recommends that the Court dismiss the plaintiff’s Monell claim because the plaintiff “does not
allege that any [defendant] employee was acting as a municipality policymaker.” (Id.)
The plaintiff argues that the FAC and the proposed SAC “challenge a system wide policy
violation” because the pleadings “do not limit themselves to T.T.’s individual claim” and they
“address[] an issue of public policy.” (ECF No. 80 at 13.) But the plaintiff does not allege the
existence of any municipal policy or custom of denying compensatory education. Instead, he
cites declarations of individuals who “attest[] that they are parents of children with disabilities,
that their children missed instruction, [and] that DOE provided no compensatory instruction.”
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(Id. at 14.) Merely alleging that other students missed instruction does not establish a policy or
custom. Indeed, if the defendant conducted fact-specific inquiries in the cases that the plaintiff
cites, that would be evidence that there was no policy or custom. Accordingly, the plaintiff
cannot sustain a claim under Monell. See Reyes, 995 F. Supp. 2d at 224 (citing Monell, 436 U.S.
at 694).
The plaintiff also objects to Judge Marutollo’s conclusion that the FAC and SAC fail to
allege that any of the defendant’s employees acted as a municipal policymaker. According to the
plaintiff, the defendant’s counsel “express[ed] the nonsensical policies of [the defendant]
decisionmakers,” and “contrived insubstantial, nonsensical, . . . specious, pretexts to deny
compensatory education;” and the plaintiff says that “[a]ttorneys follow directions from their
clients.” (ECF No. 80 at 18–19.) Lawyers representing their clients are not municipal
policymakers merely because they represent a particular client. Nor are a lawyer’s arguments in
support of a client’s position evidence of a municipal policy or custom of denying compensatory
education.
Accordingly, the plaintiff’s objections are without merit, and the Court adopts Judge
Marutollo’s recommendation to dismiss the plaintiff’s Monell claim.
c. Rehabilitation Act and ADA Claims
The plaintiff makes only general objections to Judge Marutollo’s recommendation that
the Court dismiss the plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims. Accordingly, the Court
reviews these objections for clear error. (Id. at 19–24.) Williams v. Geraci, No. 14-CV-5742,
2016 WL 7376969, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2016).
Generally, the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are subject to the same standards —
“[u]nder both statutes, schools are required to provide a free appropriate public education
through special education and related services.” Eskenazi-McGibney v. Connetquot Cent. Sch.
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Dist., 84 F. Supp. 3d 221, 231 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); see Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 73–74 (2d Cir.
2009). A plaintiff claiming a violation these statutes must demonstrate (1) that he is a qualified
individual with a disability; (2) that the defendant is subject to one of the statutes; and (3) that he
was denied the opportunity to participate in or benefit from defendant’s services, programs, or
activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the defendant by reason of his disability.
See Eskenazi-McGibney, 84 F. Supp. 3d at 231. To support a claim of discrimination, the
plaintiff must “plausibly assert that (1) [he] [was] treated differently from other similarly situated
individuals and (2) such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations.”
Kajoshaj v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 543 F. App’x 11, 15 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order).
The plaintiff alleges that T.T. is a qualified individual with a disability, that the defendant
is subject to the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, and that T.T. was denied the opportunity to
participate in or benefit from the defendant’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise
discriminated against by the defendant, by reason of T.T.’s disabilities. (See ECF No. 10 ¶ 91
(FAC).) The plaintiff also alleges that “[b]y denying T.T. compensatory education, the
[defendant] failed to accommodate a disability.” (Id. ¶ 92.)
Judge Marutollo recommended that the Court dismiss the plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act
and ADA claims because the plaintiff’s “conclusory allegations are not sufficient to support a
claim of discrimination under the Acts” and the plaintiff “has not alleged any facts that suggest
that T.T. was purposefully treated differently than other similarly situated parties, or that he is
even aware of any other students similarly situated to T.T., with disabilities and prior pendency
orders, who were denied compensatory education.” (ECF No. 74 at 16.)
The plaintiff cites four paragraphs in the FAC. (See ECF No. 80 at 19–24.) The first is a
statement that “[f]or handicapped students in T.T.’s category, a gap or disruption of schooling
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causes regression.” (ECF No. 10 ¶ 28.) The second is a statement from T.T.’s tutor that T.T.
“cannot afford to miss school” and would “benefit a lot from these compensatory hours since he
has missed a lot because of the pandemic.” (Id. ¶ 19.) The next is a conclusory statement that
“[t]he District’s denial of compensatory education, a facially neutral policy or practice, produced
a disparate impact on a protected group, children with disabilities.” (Id. ¶ 67.) Finally, the
plaintiff points to his claim that “[a] school closure can create an injury which may last for a
child’s entire life.” (Id. ¶ 22.) None of these statements plausibly plead that the defendant
treated T.T. differently from other similarly situated students based on his disability. See
Kajoshaj, 543 F. App’x at 15.
The plaintiff also asserts that in denying T.T.’s request for compensatory education, the
Impartial Hearing Officer (“IHO”) “conduct[ed] a discriminatory hearing” by “discredit[ing] the
parents by making them look unreasonable” and “willfully disregard[ing] professional
evaluations of the student’s educational needs.” (ECF No. 80 at 22–24.) The plaintiff argues
that this shows the defendant acted with bad faith or gross misjudgment. (Id.) As an initial
matter, the plaintiff made this argument to Judge Marutollo, who considered and rejected it. (See
ECF No. 74 at 17.) Thus, it is reviewed only for clear error.
As Judge Marutollo explained, the “[p]laintiff’s assertion that the IHO ‘exhibited
unfairness’ and made errors in denying T.T.’s request for compensatory education” is not
relevant because as the “[p]laintiff recognizes,” the “IHO’s denial of additional compensatory
education for the pandemic-related school closures was based on a finding of res judicata.” (Id.
(citing ECF No. 10 ¶ 46).) The Court finds no error in Judge Marutollo’s analysis of this issue.
See Wenger v. Canastota Cent. Sch. Dist., 979 F. Supp. 147, 152 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (dismissing
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plaintiffs’ claim of disability discrimination where plaintiffs failed to show that defendant acted
in bad faith or gross misjudgment in making “IDEA-type educational decisions”).
Accordingly, the Court adopts Judge Marutollo’s recommendation to dismiss the
plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims.
Modifications
a. Representation of the Proposed Class
The plaintiff objects to Judge Marutollo’s recommendation that the plaintiff’s motion to
amend be denied, among other reasons, because the plaintiff “cannot represent both T.T. in a pro
se capacity and also the proposed class” in asserting NYCHRL claims. (ECF No. 74 at 19–20;
see ECF No. 80 at 2.) The plaintiff is now represented by counsel, so the report and
recommendation is modified to reflect that the plaintiff’s NYCHRL claims are not barred for this
reason. This modification, however, does not affect Judge Marutollo’s ultimate recommendation
that the Court deny the motion for leave to amend because the proposed NYCHRL claims are
futile. There is no error in Judge Marutollo’s reasoned analysis in recommending that the Court
deny the plaintiff’s motion to amend, and I therefore adopt that recommendation. 3
b. NYCHRL Statute of Limitations
The defendant raises one objection to the report and recommendation. While the
defendant agrees with Judge Marutollo’s ultimate conclusion that the plaintiff’s claims under the
NYCHRL must be dismissed, the defendant asserts that Judge Marutollo “misapplie[d] the
tolling provision of the executive orders 9 NYCRR 8.202.8, and 8.202.67” when he concluded
that only the claims that accrued prior to April 13, 2020 are time-barred. (ECF No. 79 at 2–3.)
3 As stated above, the motion to amend is granted in part only to allow the plaintiff to withdraw his NYSHRL claim.
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On March 20, 2020, then-Governor Andrew Cuomo issued Executive Order No. 202.8,
which stated:
I hereby temporarily suspend or modify, for the period from the date of this Executive Order through April 19, 2020 the following: In accordance with the directive of the Chief Judge of the State to limit court operations to essential matters during the pendency of the COVID-19 health crisis, any specific time limit for the commencement, filing, or service of any legal action, notice, motion, or other process or proceeding, as prescribed by the procedural laws of the state, including but not limited to the criminal procedure law, the family court act, the civil practice law and rules, the court of claims act, the surrogate’s court procedure act, and the uniform court acts, or by any other statute, local law, ordinance, order, rule, or regulation, or part thereof, is hereby tolled from the date of this executive order until April 19, 2020.
Government Cuomo subsequently issued nine additional executive orders — the last of which
was issued on October 5, 2020, extending the tolling period through November 3, 2020. See
Brash v. Richards, 195 A.D.3d 582, 583–84 (2d Dep’t 2021); 9 NYCRR 8.202.67.
The plaintiff first brought NYCHRL claims arising out of “missed classes from March 1,
2020 to June 30, 2020” in the FAC, which was filed on January 26, 2022. (ECF No. 10 at 18.)
These NYCHRL claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. See Sotomayor v. City of
New York, 862 F. Supp. 2d 226, 249 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Plaintiff’s claims against the DOE under
the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL are subject to the one year statute of limitations.”), aff’d, 713
F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2013).
Because of then-Governor Cuomo’s executive orders, the plaintiff’s NYCHRL claims
arising out of missed classes from March 20, 2020 through June 30, 2020 were tolled, and the
limitations period began to run after November 3, 2020. See Murphy v. Harris, 210 A.D.3d 410,
411 (1st Dep’t 2022) (applying the tolling executive orders to a statute of limitations on a
wrongful death claim). Accordingly, these NYCHRL claims were time-barred as of November
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4, 2021. 4 The plaintiff’s January 26, 2022 amended complaint was filed months after that date.
All the plaintiff’s NYCHRL claims are therefore time-barred.
Judge Marutollo concluded that only the claims that accrued before April 13, 2020 were
time-barred. (ECF No. 74 at 10.) In fact, all of the claims were untimely. Judge Marutollo
made this recommendation in the alternative, so it was not dispositive. In any event, the Court
modifies the disposition to reflect that all of the plaintiff’s NYCHRL claims are time-barred. 5
c. Notice-of-Claim Requirement
Under New York law § 3813, a plaintiff bringing state law claims against a school district
must first file a notice of claim and plead and prove compliance with the notice-of-claim
requirement. Edwards v. Jericho Union Free Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 2d 294, 302 (E.D.N.Y.
2012) (citation omitted); Farrell v. Smithtown Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 20-CV-450, 2022 WL
687124, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 420435
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2022). However, the notice-of-claim requirement does not apply if the
plaintiff seeks only equitable relief or “commences a proceeding to vindicate a public interest.”
McGovern v. Mount Pleasant Cent. Sch. Dist., 114 A.D.3d 795, 795 (2d Dep’t 2014), aff’d, 12
N.Y.S.3d 11 (2015).
Judge Marutollo reasoned that the plaintiff’s “fail[ure] to allege that ‘the governing body
of the district’ was served with a notice of claim in compliance with Section 3813(1)” was “a
4 The statute of limitations for the NYCHRL claims based on missed classes from March 1, 2020 through March 19, 2020 — before then-Governor Cuomo issued his first tolling order — ran for one through nineteen days (i.e., one day for the claim arising out of March 19, 2020, to nineteen days for the claim arising out of March 1, 2020) before being tolled starting on March 20, 2020. See Murphy, 210 A.D.3d at 411. The statute of limitations began to run again for these claims on November 4, 2020. See id. Accordingly, these NYCHRL claims were time-barred as of October 16, 2021 through November 3, 2021. 5 The plaintiff also objects to Judge Marutollo’s conclusion that some of his NYCHRL claims were not timely. (ECF No. 80 at 9–11.) As explained above, the plaintiff’s NYCHRL claims were time-barred by the time he brought them.
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fatal defect requiring dismissal.” (ECF No. 74 at 9 (citing Gehlaut v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No.
22-CV-7862, 2024 WL 456822, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2024)).)
The plaintiff objects, arguing that the § 3813 requirement does not apply to this case, as
he is seeking only equitable relief, not money damages. (See ECF No. 80 at 5–9.) The
defendant responds that the plaintiff’s claims are still subject to the notice-of-claim requirement
because “the crux of the FAC is to seek to vindicate the private interest of the Plaintiff-student
T.T;” “the FAC seeks an order directing the [defendant] to provide T.T. with a certain number of
hours of compensatory educational services, which is clearly a private interest.” (ECF No. 84 at
9.) In addition, the defendant argues that the relief sought is “not equitable in nature” because
the FAC and the proposed SAC also request costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. (Id.)
The “private interest” cases to which the defendant cites are distinguishable because
those cases did not involve requests solely for equitable relief. For example, in McClellan v.
Alexander Cent. Sch. Bd. of Educ., the Fourth Department found that the plaintiff’s claims were
subject to the notice-of-claim-requirement because the plaintiff requested not only equitable
relief, but also “other and further relief as may be just and proper,” and “the Supreme Court[]
grant[ed] back pay and benefits” — in other words, money damages — in addition to equitable
relief. 201 A.D.2d 898, 898–99 (4th Dep’t 1994). (See ECF No. 84 at 8–9 (citing McClellan).)
In this case, the plaintiff requests only equitable relief and attorneys’ fees and costs, not “other
and further relief as may be just and proper.” (See ECF Nos. 10 (FAC), 44-1 (proposed SAC).)
Nor does the plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs mean that the plaintiff was
subject to the notice-of-claim requirement. Attorney’s fees and costs in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 cases
are not properly categorized as money damages and do not otherwise change the nature of the
relief requested. See Brown v. City of New York, 56 Misc. 3d 1218(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017)
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(“[A]ttorney’s fees cannot fairly be characterized as an element of relief indistinguishable from
other elements because unlike other judicial relief, the attorney’s fees allowed under § 1988 are
not compensation for the injury giving rise to an action.”), aff’d, 170 A.D.3d 596 (2019).
Accordingly, the plaintiff’s NYCHRL claims are not subject to the notice-of-claim
requirement. See McGovern, 114 A.D.3d at 795. The report and recommendation is therefore
modified to reflect that the plaintiff’s NYCHRL claims are not barred by his failure to file a
notice of claim. However, as discussed above, this holding was not dispositive to Judge
Marutollo’s report and recommendation — and is not dispositive here — because it was made in
the alternative. Although the plaintiff’s NYCHRL claims are not barred for noncompliance with
the notice-of-claim requirement, they are still properly dismissed because they are time-barred
and fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Kahn v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 79
A.D.3d 521, 522 (1st Dep’t 2010), aff’d, 18 N.Y.3d 457 (2012).
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CONCLUSION
For these reasons, I adopt the report and recommendation subject to the modifications
discussed above. The plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend is granted in part only to allow the
plaintiff to withdraw his NYSHRL claim, and is otherwise denied. The defendant’s cross-
motion for partial judgment on the pleadings is granted, and the plaintiff’s NYCHRL, Section
1983, Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims are dismissed with prejudice. 6 The only remaining
claim in this lawsuit is the plaintiff’s IDEA claim.
SO ORDERED.
s/Ann M. Donnelly
ANN M. DONNELLY United States District Judge
Dated: Brooklyn, New York July 26, 2024
6 “An action dismissing a claim on statute of limitations grounds is a final decision on the merits unless it is specifically stated to be without prejudice.” Pentagen Techs. Int’l Ltd. v. United States, No. 01-CV- 3078, 2002 WL 465308, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)).
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