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Navarro Carrilo v. New York City Department of Education et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -------------------------------------------x

MARIA NAVARRO CARRILO and JOSE GARZON, on behalf of M.G. as p.n.g., and MARIA NAVARRO CARRILO and JOSE GARZON, individually, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Plaintiffs, 20-CV-1707(EK)(CLP)

-against-

RICHARD CARRANZA, in his official capacity as Chancellor of the NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, et al.,

Defendants.

-------------------------------------------x ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:

Plaintiffs, parents and their child, commenced this

action on April 6, 2020. Upon identifying a related case

proceeding before Judge Colleen McMahon in the Southern District

of York, this Court issued an Order to Show Cause on May 15,

2020 as to why this case should not be transferred to the

Southern District for further proceedings. After reviewing the

parties’ responses, this Court finds that the action should be

transferred to the Southern District of New York pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

I. Background

Plaintiffs’ complaint is one of the many actions filed

in New York courts challenging DOE’s refusal to grant

educational funding under the Individuals with Disabilities

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Education Act (IDEA) for students who transferred from iHope to

iBrain in recent years without prior authorization from DOE. 1

IDEA obligates the DOE to offer special-needs children a “free

and appropriate public education” (FAPE). 20 U.S.C.

§ 1400(d)(1)(A); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,

207 (1982) (FAPE must be “reasonably calculated to enable the

child to receive educational benefits”). If parents believe DOE

failed to offer a FAPE for a given year, they may transfer their

child to a nonpublic school and then file an administrative

complaint seeking reimbursement for that year. 20 U.S.C. §

1412(a)(10)(C). Because these complaints take time to process,

students are entitled to receive interim funding during the

pendency of their application under Section 1415(j), provided

the student remains in their “then-current educational

placement.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j).

DOE reimbursed Plaintiffs for their child’s 2017-18

year at iHope. Compl. at ¶ 11, ECF No. 1. The following year,

Plaintiffs unilaterally transferred their child to iBrain. Id.

at ¶¶ 12-13. As they had done the previous year at iHope,

Plaintiffs sought to secure both pendency funding and

reimbursements for the upcoming 2018-19 term at iBrain. Id. at

¶ 16. On July 9, 2018, Plaintiffs filed an administrative

1iHope and iBrain are private schools for special-needs children. Complaint at ¶¶ 9-10, 13-15, ECF No. 1 (Compl.). 2

complaint claiming DOE failed to offer a FAPE and that the

child’s appropriate placement was at iBrain. Id. The complaint

also requested pendency funding under Section 1415(j). Id. DOE

ultimately denied both of Plaintiffs’ requests – for pendency

funding, and on the merits of final reimbursement for the year.

Those denials are the subject of this action.

On March 5, 2019, the initial hearing officer (IHO)

assigned to Plaintiffs’ case rejected Plaintiffs’ request for

pendency funding, finding the child’s educational program at

iBrain was not substantially similar to the one at iHope.

Complaint at ¶ 17, Navarro Carrilo v. New York City Dep’t of

Educ., 19-cv-2944, ECF No. 1 (Navarro I). Shortly thereafter,

Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Southern District of New York

seeking a preliminary injunction vacating DOE’s decision with

respect to pendency funding at iBrain for the 2018-19 year.

Navarro I, Complaint at 5, ECF No. 1. The case was assigned to

Judge McMahon. On June 13, 2019, Judge McMahon granted the

preliminary injunction, finding that iHope and iBrain were

“substantially similar . . . such that [the child’s] enrollment

in iBrain did not constitute a ‘change in educational

placement.’” Navarro I, Memorandum Decision & Order at 34, ECF

No. 19. Following Judge McMahon’s decision, on June 18, 2019,

DOE filed a notice of appeal to the Second Circuit and requested

that Judge McMahon stay the injunction while their appeal was

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pending. Navarro I, Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 21; Navarro I,

Letter Motion to Stay, ECF No. 22. Judge McMahon granted the

stay on June 26, 2019. Navarro I, Order, ECF No. 29.

Meanwhile, DOE continued to process Plaintiffs’

request to be reimbursed for the 2018-19 schoolyear at iBrain.

On September 21, 2019, the IHO concluded that DOE was not

obligated to fund Plaintiffs’ tuition for the 2018-2019

schoolyear but ordered DOE to reimburse the parents for certain

expenses. Compl. at ¶ 19. Both parties appealed to the state

review officer (SRO). Id. at ¶ 20. On December 4, 2019, the

SRO sustained DOE’s appeal and dismissed Plaintiff’s cross-

appeal, granting total victory to DOE with respect to

reimbursement for the 2018-2019 schoolyear. Id. at ¶ 21.

Plaintiffs did not bring any legal action in immediate response

to DOE’s final decision on their 2018-19 application.

In the meantime, however, Plaintiffs brought two

additional complaints concerning pendency funding for the

following schoolyear, 2019-20. First, Plaintiffs filed an

action in the Southern District of New York seeking equitable

relief and damages arising from the “delay and/or failure” by

DOE to provide pendency funding for the 2019-20 schoolyear.

Complaint at 7, Navarro Carrilo v. Carranza, 19-cv-8077, ECF No.

11 (Navarro II). This action was referred to Judge McMahon as

related to Navarro I. See Navarro II, Related Case Affirmation

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at 1, ECF No. 6. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the action as

moot once DOE granted Plaintiffs’ request for pendency funding.

Navarro II, Letter at 1, ECF No. 48; Navarro II, Notice of

Voluntary Dismissal at 1, ECF No. 49.

With their remaining claim stayed before Judge McMahon

in the Southern District, Plaintiffs then turned to the Eastern

District of New York. After the DOE indicated that it would

appeal DOE’s decision to grant 2019-20 pendency funding to an

SRO, Navarro II, Letter at 1, ECF No. 50, Plaintiffs filed a

third complaint on April 1, 2020, which was assigned to Judge

Allyne R. Ross. Complaint, Navarro Carrilo v. New York City

Dep’t of Educ., 20-cv-1657, ECF No. 1 (Navarro Carrilo III).

Navarro III sought an injunction immediately implementing DOE’s

March 20, 2020 decision to grant pendency funding for the 2019-

20 schoolyear. Navarro III, Complaint at 8, ECF No. 1; Order to

Show Cause at 1-2, ECF No. 11. This claim has since been

dismissed, for reasons explained below.

Five days after commencing Navarro III, Plaintiffs

brought this action, also in the Eastern District (Navarro IV).

Unlike Navarro II and III, Navarro IV concerns the 2018-19

schoolyear – the same one at issue in Navarro I, which remains

stayed in the Southern District. While Navarro I challenged the

DOE’s refusal to grant pendency funding for 2018-19, Navarro IV

seeks to reverse DOE’s December 4, 2019 decision denying

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Plaintiffs’ request for reimbursement for the 2018-19 term,

Compl. at 7-8, including the SRO’s failure to “find reversible

error” in DOE’s refusal to grant pendency funding for the same

year. Id. at ¶ 24. Navarro I and IV thus challenge two points

in the same administrative process.

On May 18, 2020 the Second Circuit decided DOE’s

appeal in Navarro I in tandem with a similar appeal from another

case. Ruling in DOE’s favor, the Court reversed the injunction

in Navarro I, finding that parents who unilaterally transferred

their children from iHope to iBrain are not entitled to Section

1415(j) pendency funding. Opinion, de Paulino v. New York City

Dep’t of Educ., 19-cv-1662, ECF No. 149 (de Paulino).

Accordingly, Judge Ross dismissed Navarro III for failure to

state a claim, rather than transfer the case to the Southern

District. Navarro III, Order at 1, 3-4, ECF No. 24. Plaintiffs

then petitioned the Second Circuit for rehearing. See de

Paulino, Petition for Rehearing, ECF No. 162. The proceedings

in Navarro I, therefore, remain stayed.

II. Analysis

“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the

interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil

action to any other district or division where it might have

been brought. . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In deciding whether

to transfer an action under Section 1404, courts conduct a two-

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part test. See Ahmed v. TJ Maxx Corp., 777 F. Supp. 2d 445, 448

(E.D.N.Y. 2011). First, the Court must find that the action

“might have been brought” in the transferee court. See id.; see

also Schertenleib v. Traum, 589 F.2d 1156, 1161 (2d Cir. 1978).

Second, courts consider whether the transfer would promote

convenience and justice. See Ahmed, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 448. In

doing so, courts weigh several factors, including “(1) the

plaintiff’s choice of forum, (2) the convenience of witnesses,

(3) the location of relevant documents and relative ease of

access to sources of proof, (4) the convenience of parties, (5)

the locus of operative facts, (6) the availability of process to

compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses, [and] (7) the

relative means of the parties.” D.H. Blair & Co., Inc. v.

Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 106-07 (2d Cir. 2006).

Given the close physical proximity of the Southern and

Eastern Districts, courts typically find that convenience

considerations pose no bar to transfers between them. See

Ahmed, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 449 (“[M]ost courts ordinarily find

. . . that due to the close proximity” of the Eastern and

Southern Districts of New York, most convenience factors “are

relatively neutral with regard to transfer.”). Likewise, when a

plaintiff files related claims in multiple districts, the first

factor – the plaintiff’s choice of forum – will not be

dispositive. See Williams v. City of New York, 03-cv-5342(RWS),

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2006 WL 399456, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2006) (noting that the

plaintiff’s choice of forum “is not at issue” because the

plaintiff “brought identical claims” in both districts).

This action is clearly related to the one pending

before Judge McMahon. Although the claims – one concerning

pendency funding, the other final reimbursement for the year –

are “conceptually distinct,” Doe v. Lyme Bd. of Educ., 790 F.3d

440, 447 (2d Cir. 2015), both actions contest the adequacy of a

single administrative process for the same child, for the same

year. Moreover, this action challenges the SRO’s refusal to

review DOE’s pendency determination for 2018-19, which is the

subject of Navarro I. These cases are therefore related, even

if they are not identical. See, e.g., Moskowitz v. La Suisse,

2006 WL 8439147, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 6, 2006) (deeming cases

related despite the fact that the actions “present[] new and

different claims”); see also MASTR Asset Backed Sec. Tr. 2007 v.

WMC Mortg. LLC, 880 F. Supp. 2d 418, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)

(finding actions related because, although they were “not

identical,” they involved “the same parties,” the “same or very

similar” underlying issues, and “nearly identical fact

patterns”).

There is no doubt that Plaintiffs could have brought

this action in the Southern District, where their other action

is pending. Moreover, the “strong policy favoring the

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litigation of related claims in the same tribunal,” Wyndham

Assocs. v. Bintliff, 398 F.2d 614, 619 (2d Cir. 1968), militates

in favor of transfer. See also Cont’l Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-

585, 364 U.S. 19, 26 (1960) (“To permit a situation in which two

cases involving precisely the same issues are simultaneously

pending in different District Courts leads to the wastefulness

of time, energy and money that § 1404(a) was designed to

prevent.”). The proper tribunal to hear Plaintiffs’ complaint

is the Southern District of New York, where Plaintiffs filed

first. See First City Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Simmons, 878 F.2d

76, 80 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting the “well-settled principle

favoring the forum wherein a [related] suit was first filed”).

III. Conclusion

For these reasons, this action is transferred to the

United States District Court for the Southern District of New

York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The Clerk of Court is

directed to transfer this case to the Southern District of New

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York. Local Rule 83.1 of the Eastern District of New York,

which requires a seven-day delay between the date of this Order

and transfer, is waived.

SO ORDERED.

_____/s Eric Komitee_________ ERIC KOMITEE United States District Judge

Dated: Brooklyn, New York June 12, 2020

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E.D.N.Y.: Navarro Carrilo v. New... | Special Education Law