STATE OF NEW YORK
OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW
26-215
Application of a STUDENT WITH A DISABILITY, by his parents, for review of a determination of a hearing officer relating to the provision of educational services by the Board of Education of the Webster Central School District
Appearances: Ferrara Fiorenza, PC, attorneys for respondent, by Susan T. Johns, Esq.
I. Introduction
This proceeding arises under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482) and Article 89 of the New York State Education Law. Petitioners (the parents) appeal from a decision of an impartial hearing officer (IHO), in an expedited due process hearing pursuant to 8 NYCRR Part 201, which upheld a manifestation determination review (MDR) team's determination that the student's behavior was not a manifestation of his disability and upheld respondent's (the district's) school imposed disciplinary suspension. The appeal must be dismissed.
II. Overview—Administrative Procedures
When a student in New York is eligible for special education services, the IDEA calls for the creation of an individualized education program (IEP), which is delegated to a local Committee on Special Education (CSE) that includes, but is not limited to, parents, teachers, a school psychologist, and a district representative (Educ. Law § 4402; see 20 U.S.C. § 1414[d][1][A]-[B]; 34 CFR 300.320, 300.321; 8 NYCRR 200.3, 200.4[d][2]). If disputes occur between parents and school districts, incorporated among the procedural protections is the opportunity to engage in mediation, present State complaints, and initiate an impartial due process hearing (20 U.S.C. §§ 1221e-3, 1415[e]-[f]; Educ. Law § 4404[1]; 34 CFR 300.151-300.152, 300.506, 300.511; 8 NYCRR 200.5[h]-[l]).
New York State has implemented a two-tiered system of administrative review to address disputed matters between parents and school districts regarding "any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of a student with a disability, or a student suspected of having a disability, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such student" (8 NYCRR 200.5[i][1]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[b][6]-[7]; 34 CFR 300.503[a][1]-[2], 300.507[a][1]). First, after an opportunity to engage in a resolution process, the parties appear at an impartial hearing conducted at the local level before an IHO (Educ. Law § 4404[1][a]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j]). An IHO typically conducts a trial-type hearing regarding the matters in dispute in which the parties have the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel and certain other individuals with special knowledge or training; present evidence and confront, cross-examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses; prohibit the introduction of any evidence at the hearing that has not been disclosed five business days before the hearing; and obtain a verbatim record of the proceeding (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][2][A], [h][1]-[3]; 34 CFR 300.512[a][1]-[4]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][3][v], [vii], [xii]). The IHO must render and transmit a final written decision in the matter to the parties not later than 45 days after the expiration period or adjusted period for the resolution process (34 CFR 300.510[b][2], [c], 300.515[a]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5]). A party may seek a specific extension of time of the 45-day timeline, which the IHO may grant in accordance with State and federal regulations (34 CFR 300.515[c]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5]). The decision of the IHO is binding upon both parties unless appealed (Educ. Law § 4404[1]).
A party aggrieved by the decision of an IHO may subsequently appeal to a State Review Officer (SRO) (Educ. Law § 4404[2]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[g][1]; 34 CFR 300.514[b][1]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[k]). The appealing party or parties must identify the findings, conclusions, and orders of the IHO with which they disagree and indicate the relief that they would like the SRO to grant (8 NYCRR 279.4). The opposing party is entitled to respond to an appeal or cross-appeal in an answer (8 NYCRR 279.5). The SRO conducts an impartial review of the IHO's findings, conclusions, and decision and is required to examine the entire hearing record; ensure that the procedures at the hearing were consistent with the requirements of due process; seek additional evidence if necessary; and render an independent decision based upon the hearing record (34 CFR 300.514[b][2]; 8 NYCRR 279.12[a]). The SRO must ensure that a final decision is reached in the review and that a copy of the decision is mailed to each of the parties not later than 30 days after the receipt of a request for a review, except that a party may seek a specific extension of time of the 30-day timeline, which the SRO may grant in accordance with State and federal regulations (34 CFR 300.515[b], [c]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[k][2]).
III. Facts and Procedural History
The parties' familiarity with this matter is presumed and, therefore, the facts and procedural history of the case and the IHO's decision will not be recited here in detail. Briefly, in elementary and middle school, the student received response to intervention (RtI) support for reading and writing and had a plan pursuant to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (504 plan) to support his academic and management needs (Dist. Ex. 6 at p. 2). According to the hearing record, the student has received diagnoses of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), anxiety, and unspecified mood disorder (Parent Ex. M at p. 4; Dist. Ex. 6 at pp. 2, 3).
A CSE convened on April 8, 2025, found the student eligible for special education and related services as a student with an other health impairment, and recommended that he receive integrated co-teaching (ICT) services in science, English-language arts (ELA), social studies, and math classes during the 2025-26 school year (ninth grade) in his "[h]ome [p]ublic [s]chool [d]istrict" (Dist. Ex. 3 at pp. 1-2, 11, 16).
A direct electronic message between the parent and district staff dated October 7, 2025, reflected that "someone called in the support line to share that [the student] may be suicidal" (Parent Ex. J at p. 1). The parent indicated that she did not believe there was a "self-harm concern at this time" and that she would "like to sign a release form so the school can communicate with [the student's private therapist] if/when necessary" (id.). The parent requested that the district "check in on [the student] that day and informed the district that she would be "reaching out to [the student's private therapist]" (id.).[1]
In an email to the district dated October 21, 2025, the parents formally requested a meeting "to discuss significant challenges with the implementation" of the student's IEP (Parent Ex. H at p. 1). The email indicated that the student's IEP stated that he had "significant executive functioning deficits and require[d] specific organizational support" (id.). The parents asserted that the student's current teachers were inconsistent with providing those supports (id.). Attached to the parents' email, were eight additional emails and a letter setting forth the parents' concerns in more detail (see Parent Exs. H; I).
In a December 9, 2025 behavior detail report and a report of suspension of pupil, the district documented that the student was found "in possession of 2 knives on school property" and was assigned five days of out-of-school suspension for the period December 10, 2025 to December 16, 2025 (Dist. Exs. 4; 5).
In a December 9, 2025 prior written notice, the CSE indicated that the student "received a suspension that potentially constitutes a disciplinary change in placement" and that "a manifestation determination" would occur (Dist. Ex. 9 at p. 1). The notice added that, as a superintendent's hearing was occurring, that might result in the district issuing a suspension of more than ten days, the "manifestation determination team" was required to convene and determine whether the student's behavior was a manifestation of the student's disability (id.).
In a December 10, 2025, "Committee Invitation for a Manifestation Determination," the parents were informed of and requested to attend an MDR meeting on December 16, 2025 (see Dist. Ex. 7).
In a prior written notice dated December 16, 2025, the CSE stated that an MDR meeting was held in conjunction with a superintendent's hearing and that the team determined that the student's conduct "was not caused by his disability, was not directly and substantially related to his disability, and that there was no failure to implement his IEP which caused or was substantially related to the conduct" (Dist. Ex. 10 at p. 1). The notice provided information that was discussed at the MDR meeting (id. at pp. 1-2).
A. Due Process Complaint Notice
In a due process complaint notice dated January 13, 2026, the parents requested an impartial hearing to challenge the MDR conducted by the district on December 16, 2025 (see Parent Ex. A).[2] The parents asserted that the district failed to recognize that the incident on December 9, 2025 "was a direct manifestation of [the student's] documented disability" and that the district failed to implement the student's mandated IEP supports (id. at p. 4).
The parents alleged that the district failed to address the student's deteriorating mental state and academic decline since the start of the 2025-26 school year (Parent Ex. A at p. 6). According to the parents, the district's failures were not "passive oversight, but a systematic failure to provide" a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to the student (id.). The parents asserted that they had formally requested a program review, but the CSE did not convene until January 2026, nearly three months after the parents' request and a few weeks after the December incident (id.). The parents contended that had the district convened a meeting earlier, the district could have addressed the student's needs and the December 2025 incident could have been prevented (id.). The parents argued that the district failed to implement the student's IEP because it failed to provide the mandated electronic working organizational system which was required to manage the student's deficits (id.).
Regarding the December 2025 incident, the parents argued that the student's "decision to place the knives in his bag was a direct, impulsive manifestation of his clinical profile, characterized by an inability to inhibit safety-seeking behaviors during a state of high-alert" (Parent Ex. A at p. 6). The student's working memory deficit caused him "to lose conscious awareness" that the knives were still in his bag, which demonstrated a lack of intent (id. at p. 7). Moreover, following a October 2025 threat made I relation to the student, the district never provided a safety plan for the student (id.). The parents argued that the district MDR attempted to recycle old information to prove current intent, which demonstrated the district's lack of due diligence and "their focus on securing a 'guilty'" (id.).
Turning to alleged procedural defects with the manifestation hearing, the parents contended that the district failed to comply with the notification requirements because the invitation failed to list the names of the individuals who were expected to attend the meeting (Parent Ex. A at p. 7). The parents argued that the omission was a direct violation of state law and "effectively stripped" the parents of their "right to object to the presence of biased participants or to request the conclusion of additional committee members who could [have] provide[d] a neutral prospective" (id.). The parents asserted that the district participants had a "significant vested interest" and had previously dismissed their documented concerns (id.). Moreover, according to the parents, the presence of these individuals created a conflict of interest because they would have had to acknowledge their own failure to implement the student's IEP and provide emotional support after the October 2025 threat incident (id. at p. 8). The parents alleged that they would have asked for different members, had they known that they could have (id.).
In addition, the parents asserted that statements by the principal and assistant principal led them to decline legal counsel, believing the district's actions would not be punitive and that medical documentation would be key in the committee's decision (Parent Ex. A at p. 9). The parents further argued that the district misled and persuaded them to decline legal counsel (id.). The parents contended that a student can be physically guilty yet neurologically innocent as to intent (id.). The parents alleged that the MDR team dismissed the neurological report which diagnosed the student with a mood disorder (id.). According to the parents, the MDR team labeled it a "home problem, not a school problem", failed to conduct due diligence prior to the meeting, and predetermined the outcome of the meeting (id. at p. 10).
The parents requested that the MDR decision be overturned, and that it be found that the December 2025 incident was a manifestation of the student's disability (Parent Ex. A at p. 11). The parents requested that the student be immediately returned to school, that his disciplinary records be expunged, and that his full eligibility for school activities and athletics be restored (id.). The parents also requested that the district be ordered to fund an independent comprehensive neuropsychological assessment and immediately conduct a functional behavioral assessment (FBA) and develop a behavioral intervention plan (BIP) (id.).
The district submitted a response dated January 22, 2026 to the parents' due process complaint notices (Dist. Due Process Response). The district acknowledged that the MDR invitation failed to identify all the participants at the meeting, but that such omission was a "nonprejudicial error" (id. at p. 1). The district further alleged that the parents sought relief outside the permissible scope of a due process hearing, including the expungement of the student's disciplinary records (id. at pp. 1-2).
B. Impartial Hearing Officer Decision
An impartial hearing convened before an IHO on January 15, 2026, and concluded on February 6, 2026, after three days of proceedings (see Jan. 15, 2026 Tr. pp. 1-56; Jan. 26, 2026 Tr. pp. 1-37; Feb. 6, 2026 Tr. pp. 1-125). In a decision dated February 10, 2026, the IHO upheld the MDR team's determination that the student's conduct was not a manifestation of his disability or the result of the district's failure to implement the student's IEP (IHO Decision at p. 28).
More specifically, the IHO rejected the parents' allegations of misdirection, paranoia, and conflict of interest (IHO Decision at pp. 8-9, 24-25). The IHO held that the February 2024 psychoeducational evaluation did not support the parents' argument that the student's paranoia or neurological issues prevented him from making proper decisions, such as not bringing knives to school (id. at pp. 8-9). The IHO noted that the evaluation which diagnosed the student with a mood disorder was not disclosed by the parents until the hearing process (id. at p. 12). The IHO further found no evidence of any diagnoses or behaviors to support the parents' allegations regarding the student's paranoia (id. at p. 24).
Further, the IHO found that the parents' allegations of "misdirection" did not go to whether the MDR team made a proper finding (IHO Decision at p. 24). The IHO noted that the MDR meeting notice omitted names of attendees; however, the IHO held that the omission did not prejudice the parents (id.). The IHO found that the actual MDR meeting included the relevant parties and noted the facts of the incident were not in dispute (id.). The IHO determined that there was no evidence that supported "linking [the s]tudent disability to the behavior" (id.). Notably, the IHO acknowledged that the student's characteristics asserted by the parents existed but held that the "mere existence of the characteristics does not tie any individual characteristic, or all of them viewed together, directly to the Student behavior" (id.).
The IHO also found that there was no evidence of a conflict of interest and that it was necessary for an MDR team to be composed of district staff (IHO Decision at p. 25). The IHO again highlighted that the student's actions were not in dispute and that the student brought two knives to school (id.). The IHO referenced the IEP, which stated that the student did not have any social development skills that needed to be addressed through special education, and noted that the IEP focused on the student's organization and executive functioning needs (id.). The IHO held that the parents' request for a new CSE meeting was related to their concerns about the student's executive functioning and organization needs as well as implementation issues (id.).
The IHO credited the district witness and found the witness' testimony supportive of the MDR determination (IHO Decision at p. 25). The IHO concluded that the MDR team correctly determined that there was "a lack of evidence of any social-emotional or behavioral needs in the school setting" and that the student's conduct was "not an impulsive act, but a repeated act" (id.). According to the IHO, the MDR team properly concluded that the student's needs were in organization and executive functioning skills and that "there was not a direct and substantial relationship between Student's disability and the behavior leading to suspension" (id.).
Regarding the incident, the IHO found that the student's decision to bring the knives to school was made at home and he continued to have the knives in his possession for several days (IHO Decision at p. 26). The IHO concluded that the student's disability was not shown to "have affected his decision to bring the knives to school" (id.). Based on the above, the IHO determined that the student's "conduct, possession of the two knives on school property, was not caused by, nor did the behavior have a direct and substantial relationship to, the child's disability; and the conduct was not the direct result of the district's failure to implement the Student's IEP" (id. at p. 27). The IHO dismissed the parents' due process complaint claims (id. at p. 28).
IV. Appeal for State-Level Review
The parents appeal. The parents contend the IHO erred by finding that the December 2025 incident was not a manifestation of the student's disability. The parents raise six issues for review: (1) whether the IHO committed evidentiary and statutory failures during the impartial hearing; (2) whether the IHO deprived the parents of due process by not allowing them to cross examine witnesses, interrupting the proceedings, altering the evidentiary record by rephrasing the parents' inquiries, and supplying testimony on behalf of district's witnesses; (3) whether the IHO erred by upholding the "prong one" determination by operating under a fundamental misapprehension of the student's disability; (4) whether the IHO erred by upholding the "prong two" determination by failing to conduct "a fidelity analysis" of the district's conceded failure to implement the IEP; (5) whether the IHO erred by excusing the district's procedural notice defect; and (6) whether the IHO erred by misapplying case law.
For relief, the parents request that the SRO overturn both the IHO decision and the MDR determination, and find that the student's actions were a direct manifestation of his disability as well as a direct result of the district's failure to implement the student's IEP. The parents request that the district return the student to school without restriction and expunge the manifestation determination from the student's educational file. The parents request the district be ordered to reconvene the CSE within 10 school days to conduct an FBA and develop a BIP, fund an independent neuropsychological educational evaluation, provide behavior intervention services, mandate the district to "strictly enforce the existing 'management needs' mandate, add executive functioning and social emotional behavior supports, and develop a school-based safety plan. Finally, the parents request that the district be ordered to provide compensatory education for any instruction that was denied to the student due to the erroneous MDR determination and disciplinary removal. Alternatively, the parents request that the SRO remand the case to the IHO with strict directives to admit specified parent exhibits, require explicit factual findings, and direct the district to convene a new MDR with proper procedural compliance.
In an answer, the district admits that the notice for the MDR meeting did not identify all the participants in the meeting but that it was a procedural error that did not result in a denial of a FAPE or prejudice the parents. The district notes that the parents were free to invite anyone they chose to the MDR meeting. Further, the district asserts that the parent failed to file a notice of request for review. Moreover, the district contends that the student was in possession of weapons in school and could have been suspended for up to 45 days whether or not the conduct was a manifestation of his disability.[3] Therefore, the district contends that to "a significant extent" the matter is moot.[4]
The parents filed a reply, asserting that the matter should not be dismissed due to the lack of a notice of request for review or on the grounds of mootness as there continued to be a live controversy where meaningful relief could be granted.[5]
V. Applicable Standards
The IDEA includes specific protections with regard to the process by which school officials may seek to effectuate a disciplinary change in placement of a student with a disability who violates a code of student conduct (see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[k]; Educ. Law §§ 3214[3][g]; 4404[1]; 34 CFR 300.530-300.537; 8 NYCRR Part 201). State regulations provide that a disciplinary change in placement means a "suspension or removal from a student's current educational placement that is either: (1) for more than 10 consecutive school days; or (2) for a period of 10 consecutive days or less if the student is subjected to a series of suspensions or removals that constitute a pattern because they cumulate to more than 10 school days in a school year" (8 NYCRR 201.2[e]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[k][1][B]; 34 CFR 300.530[b][2], [c]).
If a district is considering a disciplinary change in placement for a student with a disability, the district must conduct an MDR "within 10 school days of any decision to change the placement of a child with a disability because of a violation of a code of student conduct" (20 U.S.C. § 1415[k][1][E][i]; 34 CFR 300.530[e][1]; 8 NYCRR 201.4[a]). The participants in an MDR must include a district representative, the parents, and the "relevant members" of the CSE, as determined by the parent and the district (20 U.S.C. § 1415[k][1][E][i]; Educ. Law § 3214[3][g][2][ii]; 34 CFR 300.530[e][1]; 8 NYCRR 201.4[b]). The manifestation team must "review all relevant information in the student's file including the student's IEP, any teacher observations, and any relevant information provided by the parents to determine if: "(1) the conduct in question was caused by or had a direct and substantial relationship to the student's disability; or (2) the conduct in question was the direct result of the school district's failure to implement the IEP" (8 NYCRR 201.4[c]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[k][1][E]; 34 CFR 300.530[e][1]).
If the result of the MDR is a determination that the student's behavior was not a manifestation of his or her disability, "the relevant disciplinary procedures applicable to children without disabilities may be applied to the child in the same manner in which they would be applied to children without disabilities" (20 U.S.C. § 1415[k][1][C]; 34 CFR 300.530[c]; see Educ. Law § 3214[3][g][vi]; 8 NYCRR 201.7[d]). However, if the result of an MDR is a determination that the student's behavior was a manifestation of his or her disability, the CSE is required to conduct a functional behavioral assessment (FBA) and implement a behavioral intervention plan (BIP) or, if the student already has a BIP, review the BIP and modify it as necessary to address the behavior (20 U.S.C. § 1415[k][1][F][i]-[ii]; 34 CFR 300.530[f][1][i]-[ii]; 8 NYCRR 201.3). Except under "special circumstances," the district must also return the student to the placement from which he or she was removed or suspended, unless agreed otherwise by the parent and district as part of the modification of the BIP (20 U.S.C. § 1415[k][1][F][iii]; Educ. Law § 3214[3][g][3][viii]; 34 CFR 300.530[f][2]; 8 NYCRR 201.4[d][2][ii]).[6]
As part of a disciplinary proceeding, a superintendent may remove a student with a disability to an IAES (interim alternative educational setting) if the student's conduct involved serious bodily injury, weapons, illegal drugs or controlled substances (20 U.S.C. § 1415[k][1][G][i]-[iii]; 34 CFR 300.530[g]; 8 NYCRR 201.7[e]).[7] Additionally, if a district requests an expedited hearing, an IHO may order a placement to an IAES even if the student is not subject to a disciplinary proceeding if the IHO determines "that maintaining the current placement of the student is substantially likely to result in injury to the student or to others" (8 NYCRR 201.8[a], [c]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[k][3][A]-[B]; Educ. Law § 3214[3][g][3][vii]; 34 CFR 300.532[c]; 8 NYCRR 201.11). An MDR meeting must be conducted within 10 school days after a superintendent or IHO decides to place a student in an IAES (see 8 NYCRR 201.4[a][1]-[2]). A student who is placed in an IAES shall "continue to receive educational services so as to enable that student to continue to participate in the general education curriculum . . . and to progress toward meeting the goals set out in the student's IEP" (8 NYCRR 201.2[k][1]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[k][1][D][i]; 34 CFR 300.530[d][1][i]; 8 NYCRR 201.10[d]).
If the parent of a student with a disability disagrees with a school district's decision regarding the student's placement, or a determination of the manifestation team, the parent may request an expedited impartial hearing (20 U.S.C. § 1415[k][3][A]; 34 CFR 300.532[c]; 8 NYCRR 201.11[a][3]-[4]; see Coleman v. Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 503 F.3d 198, 201-02 [2d Cir. 2007]).
VI. Discussion
A.IHO Bias/Conduct
The parents allege that the IHO demonstrated bias and denied them their due process rights by preventing them from cross-examining the district witness, not granting their request to call witnesses, interrupting and/or rephrasing their questions, and supplying testimony for the district witness.
It is well settled that an IHO must be fair and impartial and must avoid even the appearance of impropriety or prejudice (see, e.g., Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 12-066). Moreover, an IHO, like a judge, must be patient, dignified, and courteous in dealings with litigants and others with whom the IHO interacts in an official capacity and must perform all duties without bias or prejudice against or in favor of any person, according each party the right to be heard, and shall not, by words or conduct, manifest bias or prejudice (e.g., Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 12-064). An IHO may not be an employee of the district that is involved in the education or care of the child, may not have any personal or professional interest that conflicts with the IHO's objectivity, must be knowledgeable of the provisions of the IDEA and State and federal regulations and the legal interpretations of the IDEA and its implementing regulations, and must possess the knowledge and ability to conduct hearings and render and write decisions in accordance with appropriate, standard legal practice (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][3][A]; 34 CFR 300.511[c][1]; 8 NYCRR 200.1[x]).
State regulations set forth the procedures for conducting an impartial hearing and address, in part, minimal process requirements that shall be afforded to both parties (8 NYCRR 200.5[j]). Among other process rights, each party shall have an opportunity to present evidence, compel the attendance of witnesses, and to confront and question all witnesses (8 NYCRR 200.5[j][3][xii]). Furthermore, each party "shall have up to one day to present its case" (8 NYCRR 200.5[j][3][xiii]). State regulation provides that the IHO "shall exclude any evidence that he or she determines to be irrelevant, immaterial, unreliable, or unduly repetitious" and "may limit examination of a witness by either party whose testimony the impartial hearing officer determines to be irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious" (8 NYCRR 200.5[j][3][xii][c], [d]). At all stages of the hearing, an IHO may assist an unrepresented party by providing information relating only to the hearing process (8 NYCRR 200.5[j][3][vii]). State regulations do not impair or limit the authority of an impartial hearing officer to ask questions of counsel or witnesses for the purpose of clarification or completeness of the record (id.)
Generally, unless specifically prohibited by regulation, IHOs are provided with broad discretion, subject to administrative and judicial review procedures, in how they conduct an impartial hearing, so long as they "accord each party a meaningful opportunity" to exercise their rights during the impartial hearing (Letter to Anonymous, 23 IDELR 1073 [OSEP 1995]; see Impartial Due Process Hearing, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,704 [Aug. 14, 2006] [indicating that IHOs should be granted discretion to conduct hearings in accordance with standard legal practice, so long as they do not interfere with a party's right to a timely due process hearing]). At the same time, the IHO is expected to ensure that the impartial hearing operates as an effective method for resolving disputes between the parents and district (Letter to Anonymous, 23 IDELR 1073). State and federal regulations balance the interests of having a complete hearing record with the parties having sufficient opportunity to prepare their respective cases and review evidence.
Here, while noting the broad discretion of IHOs in how they manage due process hearings and acknowledging that the IHO's conduct in this particular hearing, standing alone, did not rise to the level where a reversal of his determinations would be warranted on that basis, I nonetheless am troubled by aspects of the IHO's treatment of the parents and the impact of certain rulings by the IHO on their due process rights. In the interest of encouraging best practices and reminding the IHO that while much leeway is afforded to IHOs in their conduct of a hearing, such discretion must take place within certain overarching mandates and with an eye toward enhancing both parties' access to due process, I have included the below examples as part of this decision.
First, the IHO limited the parents from fully presenting their case regarding the MDR team not having sufficient information at the time of the meeting and failing to conduct due diligence prior to the meeting. Notably, the IHO explicitly stated that he would not review what information the MDR team had for the meeting and stated that the lack of information at the time of the MDR meeting was "not going to matter to me" (Jan. 26, 2026 Tr. p. 16). While it may not have been the IHO's intention, statements like this tend to create the impression that the parents were being unduly curtailed from presenting their case even though the IHO may have been trying to establish the relevance, or lack thereof, of the parents' proffered evidence. After all, the crux of the impartial hearing was to determine whether the MDR procedurally and substantively reached the correct determination regarding the disciplinary incident in question and whether the incident was a manifestation of the student's disability and, accordingly, more clarity as to why certain aspects of the MDR team's process were or were not relevant to the due process proceeding was preferable.
Next, the IHO precluded the parents from presenting witness testimony and conducting a full cross-examination of district witnesses although both are contemplated by State regulation as part of a party's due process rights (see 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][3][xii]). At the January 26, 2026 hearing, the IHO asked the parties about the witnesses they intended to present during the hearing (Jan. 26, 2026 Tr. p. 18). The district's attorney stated she intended to call witnesses but could not identify them at that time because she did not know who attended the MDR meeting (Jan. 26, 2026 Tr. pp. 18-19). The IHO then informed the parents they could present rebuttal evidence and witnesses (Jan. 26, 2026 Tr. pp. 20-21). However, during the parents' cross-examination of the district's witness, the IHO frequently interrupted or rephrased the parents' questions and sometimes prevented them from finishing before the district objected or the IHO rephrased the question (Feb. 6, 2026 Tr. pp. 70-91). Further, the IHO did not allow the parents to ask questions about documents outside of the IEP (Feb. 6, 2026 Tr. pp. 77-78). The IHO also answered a question for the district witness (Feb. 6, 2026 Tr. pp. 87-89). The IHO also denied the parents the ability to call particular witnesses, claiming that they would not add more information to the hearing record (Feb. 6, 2026 Tr. pp. 96-98, 105-06).
Thus, while an IHO may properly limit an examination of a witness whose testimony involves irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence (8 NYCRR 200.5[j][xii][d]), here, there was a troubling lack of explanation on the record as to how the testimony sought through the parents' cross-examination fell within these categories. Likewise, while an IHO may ask questions of a witness for purposes of completeness or clarification (8 NYCRR 200.5[j][3][vii]), this authority is limited by due process requirements and a careful balancing of both parties' rights to present their case fully. However, by limiting the parents' ability to present specific aspects of their case and present testimony at various times during the hearing, without adequate explanation on the record, the IHO ran the risk of ultimately undermining the due process protections of the proceeding. Accordingly, while I do not find, as the parents urge, that the IHO's determinations should be reversed on the ground of bias or impropriety in the conduct of the hearing, I remind the IHO of the importance of adhering to the general principles of due process while making rulings on evidentiary matters during the impartial hearing.
- MDR
Turning to the incident in December 2025, which resulted in the student's suspension until March 23, 2026, the IHO, in a decision dated February 10, 2026, determined that the MDR team correctly found that the student's conduct was not a manifestation of his disability and denied the parents' requested relief (IHO Decision at p. 28).
As noted, among other procedural requirements for an MDR as set forth in State regulation, the MDR team must "review all relevant information in the student's file including the student's IEP, any teacher observations, and any relevant information provided by the parents to determine if: "(1) the conduct in question was caused by or had a direct and substantial relationship to the student's disability; or (2) the conduct in question was the direct result of the school district's failure to implement the IEP" (8 NYCRR 201.4[c]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[k][1][E]; 34 CFR 300.530[e][1]). Here, assessing whether the MDR team considered all relevant information is challenging given that the IHO precluded certain aspects of the parents' presentation of evidence and did not allow additional information in the hearing record.[8] Nonetheless, a brief summary of the evidence in the hearing record is warranted.
According to the hearing record, the student was suspended for a period of five days on December 10, 2025, and was referred to the superintendent of schools for a disciplinary proceeding to determine whether a longer suspension should be considered (see Dist. Ex. 5). The district witness (CSE chairperson), who led the MDR meeting, testified that she attended the "beginning" of the superintendent's hearing where the student's misconduct was explained and took notes so she could "give recap of it" during the MDR meeting (February 6, 2026 Tr. p. 46).
The hearing record further shows that during the subsequent December 16, 2025 MDR meeting, the MDR team, comprised of the assistant principal, school social worker, the student's case manager, the CSE chairperson, and the parents determined that the student's misconduct was "not caused by his disability, was not directly and substantially related to his disability, and that there was no failure to implement his IEP which caused or was substantially related to the conduct" (Parent Ex. J; Dist. Ex. 10 at p. 1).[9] According to a December 16, 2025 letter of prior written notice, the MDR team specifically found that:
due to the lack of evidence of any social-emotional or behavioral needs in the school setting, the fact that this was not an impulsive act, but a repeated act, and that [the student's] primary needs are around academic organization and executive functioning skills, the chair determined that there was not a direct and substantial relationship between [the student's] disability and the behavior leading to suspension (Dist. Ex. 10 at p. 2).
The December 16, 2025 prior written notice noted that when determining that the student's conduct was not related to his disability, the MDR team relied on the student's discipline records, "most recent evaluation," April 2025 IEP, and input from the members of the MDR team, including the parents (Dist. Ex. 10 at p. 2).
Recounting the process of the MDR meeting, the chairperson testified that she first reviewed the reason for the student's suspension and then recapped what was discussed during the superintendent's hearing (Feb. 6, 2026 Tr. p. 47). According to the chairperson, during the MDR meeting, she discussed the student's "eligibility" classification and the "summary of why the student has a disability and receives special education services," which she opined was "one of the most important things to consider" during the meeting (Feb. 6, 2026 Tr. pp. 47, 52). The chairperson further testified that during the MDR meeting, she asked for additional information from the parents and the school team and asked the school team to "present anything they kn[e]w either about the day specifically and the event and the student in general" (Feb. 6, 2026 Tr. p. 48). Once the MDR team had "all the information" they proceeded to a "team discussion" with two questions to answer: "was there a failure of the school district to implement the IEP that directly and substantially led to this behavior occurring"; and, was "the behavior directly and substantially related to the [student's] disability" (Feb. 6, 2026 Tr. p. 51).
The chairperson testified that during the MDR meeting, she "read relevant portions of the IEP, anything that relate[d] to a behavioral need at school … [which] in general would cover any information, the social/emotional present levels of performance, goals, if there [was] a behavior plan … or an absence of information about social/emotional needs at school" (Feb. 6, 2026 Tr. p. 48). The chairperson testified that the IEP included "statements saying [the student] did [not] really have social emotional needs … he had executive functioning needs …he did [not] receive related services or have any plans or goals related to that … [i]t was really largely the executive functioning related to other health impairments" (id.). The chairperson further testified that she focused on the student's needs identified in the April 2025 IEP and there was "nothing really related to social-emotional needs or behavior … it was really largely executive functioning " (Feb. 6, 2026 Tr. p. 52). According to the chairperson, the social development needs section of the student's April 2025 IEP stated that "there [we]re no social development skills that need[ed] to be addressed through special education at [that] time" (Feb. 6, 2026 Tr. p. 54).
A review of the student's April 2025 IEP reveals that, as noted by the chairperson, the IEP focused largely on the student's needs related to difficulties with executive functioning (see Dist. Ex. 3). However, the IEP also identified the student's social development needs, including that he "continued to feel overwhelmed with school demands and react[ed] with negative self-talk" (id. at p. 7). The IEP included the results of the BRIEF-2 and BASC-3 administered as part of the student's February 2024 psychoeducational evaluation which identified areas that the student reported as "clinically significant" included attitude toward teachers, social stress, sense of inadequacy, interpersonal relationships, self-reliance, and relations with parents (id.). The IEP also related that the student's responses on the BASC-3 presented the student as "being dissatisfied with his ability to perform a variety of tasks, having low confidence in his ability to make decisions, being isolated/lonely and feeling frustrated with his parents as they try to help him navigate his weaknesses" (id.). According to the IEP, the student's BASC-3 results additionally reflected his "dislike for school, worrying/nervousness, difficulty maintaining attention and engaging in restless/disruptive behaviors" (id.).[10] The IEP also reported that the student was "highly sensitive and this often present[ed] as negative behavior when it c[a]me[] to taking things personally and reacting to a situation before finding out all the facts" (id.).
The December 16, 2025 prior written notice related that the student reported that he "started getting paranoid that the other student might attack him and this [was] why he brought the knives to school" (Dist. Ex. 10 at p. 1). According to the December 16, 2025 prior written notice, the parents shared that the student had been overwhelmed and struggling at home due to an "emotional downward spiral stemming from not having an electronic organizing system" which caused the student to impulsively bring knives to school and further indicated that the student's mood disorder diagnosis impacted this choice (id. at pp. 1-2). The December 16, 2025, prior written notice further stated that the parents saw a direct and substantial relationship between the student's social/emotional needs and mood disorder diagnosis, executive functioning difficulties, and the act of bringing knives to school; however, the school team did not see a connection (id. at p. 2). When asked during the impartial hearing whether the MDR team considered the student's mood disorder diagnosis, the chairperson testified that "per the IEP, that was not indicated," but the "parents did bring that up; so we did discuss that" (Feb. 6, 2026 Tr. p. 56). The chairperson testified that the parents read a "written statement and talked about within that that [the student] had been getting some private support services, therapy, [etcetera] … and due to that, he had received the diagnosis of a mood disorder" (id.). The chairperson testified that "when the parents shared that … I did take that into consideration" (id.). According to the chairperson, when asked, the student's case manager and the school social worker who had interacted with the student, responded that they did not see anything in the student's behavior other than "typical executive functioning needs" (Feb. 6, 2026 Tr. pp. 56-57).
The chairperson additionally testified that "to [her] knowledge," the school did not have the report that identified the student's mood disorder diagnosis (Feb. 6, 2026 Tr. pp. 57-58). The chairperson testified that the parent read a "written statement" during the MDR meeting, but there was no "report handed and turned in or turned over" and the parent did not share the written statement or "ask to have it submitted or anything … so [the MDR team] listened, and that was that" (Feb. 6, 2026 Tr. p. 58). According to the chairperson, she asked if anyone on the MDR team saw concerns at school and "it was pretty clear from the answers that people provided that they really just saw executive functioning needs … [t]hey did [not] see the extent of the concerns that [the] parents ha[d] reported in the statement and [were] seeing at home" and it "wasn't something that anybody at the school was seeing as a need educationally" (Feb. 6, 2026 Tr. pp. 61-62).
The chairperson further testified that "granted, there was a mood disorder, but we did [not] see evidence of it at school … there were no real social, emotional, or behavioral needs that anybody reported" (February 6, 2026 Tr. p. 62). According to the chairperson, the team acknowledged the student's diagnosis of unspecified mood disorder, and during the MDR meeting she had stated that the student could have "social emotional concerns or behaviors, and they [could] be exhibited in different settings, but an IEP is to address educational needs and what we see at school" and it did not "seem like anybody was seeing that as a need that would need to be addressed by an IEP at that time" (February 6, 2026 Tr. p. 62). The chairperson reiterated that the MDR team discussed that the student's "eligibility was other health impairment and that [effect of student] needs statement … [and] again, brought in the context of there [was] this additional diagnosis; but again, people were [not] really seeing that at school," noting that while there was a mention of impulsivity in the April 2025 IEP, the "vast majority" of the IEP "addresse[d] executive functioning related to organization and work" (February 6, 2026 Tr. pp. 62-63).
According to the chairperson, the MDR team ultimately determined that the student bringing knives to school "was [not] an impulsive act" but rather an "intentional conscious choice that [the student] acknowledged" and was not "tied to the impulsivity that was mentioned in the IEP" (Feb. 6, 2026 Tr. p. 63). The chairperson added that even if the MDR team had seen a connection between the student's noted impulsivity and his choice to bring knives to school, the team would have discussed whether the behavior was "directly and substantially" related because "most of the IEP [wa]s due to executive functioning related to material organization" (id.).
While there were some admitted procedural infirmities in the conduct of the MDR meeting, such as the lack of notice of the participants prior to the meeting, the MDR team nonetheless relied on sufficient current and relevant information concerning the student during the meeting, including the student's discipline records, "most recent evaluation," April 2025 IEP, and input from the members of the MDR team, as well as the student's parents, to determine that the disciplinary incident in question was not a manifestation of his disability (Dist. Ex. 10 at p. 2). Although the parents asserted at the meeting and continue to assert on appeal that the student's mood disorder and "paranoia" were areas of his disability, and his possession of knives in school was a direct manifestation of same, the parents' claim in this regard is argued more as a lack of evaluative information issue, similar to that which would be raised in the context of a FAPE claim, than a colorable claim that the MDR team reached an incorrect determination. Specifically, the parents argue that the student's social-emotional deficits extended beyond the category of executive functioning, and the MDR team’s analysis focused more on the contents of the student's most recent IEP and evaluation to the exclusion of more specific material related to his mood disorder diagnosis. However, it is well settled that an MDR review is not a proper mechanism by which a student with a disability can be reevaluated as the MDR team does not have an obligation to determine the adequacy of the student's IEP, but rather the MDR team is tasked solely with determining if the conduct in question was caused by or had a direct and substantial relationship to the student's disability and that the conduct in question was not the direct result of the school district's failure to implement the IEP as written (8 NYCRR 201.4[c]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415 [k][1][E]; 34 CFR 300.530 [e][1]).
That being said, it is understandable that the parents would find MDR determinations made without reference to current evaluative material reflecting the student's needs as related to his mood disorder, as of the time of the incident leading to the disciplinary action, to be lacking. Here, the student's needs may have changed over time, and he may have emerging needs pertaining to feelings of paranoia about his social interactions and related to his mood disorder that are not adequately captured by his current IEP and most recent evaluations, and also may not have registered yet with staff, teachers and providers who worked with him at the time of the disciplinary incident and MDR meeting. Given the tight time frame and limited mandate of an MDR, the failure of a district to sufficiently evaluate a student, if at issue, is more properly remedied within the conceptual framework of the district's obligations to provide the student with a FAPE, including the duty to reconvene to consider new evaluative assessments and reports if requested to do so by the parents. I certainly urge the parents and CSE to discuss any and all issues related to the student's social-emotional functioning, including any necessary updated evaluations and consideration of any current or updated assessments or information related to the student's social emotional needs and mood disorder diagnosis at the next IEP meeting for him to the extent this has not already occurred. However, given the limited confines of the MDR inquiry, the hearing record does not provide an adequate basis to disturb the IHO’s finding that the MDR team did not err in its determination that the disciplinary incident in question was not a manifestation of the student's disability.
VII. Conclusion
Having determined that the evidence in the hearing record supports the IHO's finding that the district did not violate federal or State law, and her upholding of an MDR team's determination that the student's behavior was not a manifestation of his disability, the necessary inquiry is at an end.
I have considered the remaining contentions and find it is unnecessary to address them in light of my determinations above.[11]
THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED.
Dated: May 18, 2026
Carol H. Hauge
STATE REVIEW OFFICER
Footnotes
[1] Two district employees responded to the parent that someone would talk to the student that day (Parent Ex. J at pp. 1-2).
[2] At all relevant times, the parents have appeared pro se. The parents filed an amended due process complaint notice dated January 14, 2026, which the IHO did not accept because it was an expedited hearing (see Tr. pp. 6-8; IHO Ex. II at p. 1; Amended Due Proc. Compl).
[3] It is noted that the district claims that it had the ability to suspend the student for 45 days because the student possessed a weapon in school (Jan 15, 2026 Tr. pp. 22). However, the statute allows for up to 45 days, this is not mandatory (8 NYCRR 201.7[e][1]). Moreover, it is also noted that the student was first suspended on December 9, 2025, and per the district's own answer, the student was to be reinstated on March 23, 2026 (see Dist. Ex. 5; Answer). It is also noted that the district appeared to allow the student on campus during his suspension for his interim alternative educational setting (Jan. 15, 2026 Tr. pp. 27-28; Jan. 26, 2026 Tr. p. 31). Moreover, despite the alternative regulatory rationale for the student's suspension, the district did hold an MDR meeting and issue a determination which is the subject of this appeal.
[4] As to mootness, the dispute between parties must at all stages be "real and live," and not "academic," or it risks becoming moot (Lillbask v. State of Conn. Dep't of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 84 [2d Cir. 2005]; see Toth v. City of New York Dep't of Educ., 720 Fed. App'x 48, 51 [2d Cir. Jan. 2, 2018]; F.O. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 899 F. Supp. 2d 251, 254 [S.D.N.Y. 2012]; Patskin v. Bd. of Educ. of Webster Cent. Sch. Dist., 583 F. Supp. 2d 422, 428 [W.D.N.Y. 2008]; Student X v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2008 WL 4890440, at *12 [E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008]; J.N. v. Depew Union Free Sch. Dist., 2008 WL 4501940, at *3-*4 [W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2008]; see also Coleman v. Daines, 19 N.Y.3d 1087, 1090 [2012]; Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 714 [1980]). Here, even if the student was returned to his classroom after the suspension, and the suspension was sustainable on other regulatory grounds, the parents' appeal is not moot because, in the event that the parents were to prevail in reversing the IHO's decision and the MDR's determination, for the sake of argument—to find that the student's behavior was a manifestation of his disability—under federal and State law and regulations as noted above, the CSE would be required to conduct an FBA and implement a BIP as necessary to address the student's behavior. In other words, the parent's claim is not moot because there is the potential for obtaining meaningful relief in the form of an FBA and BIP if the parent were to prevail on appeal
[5] It is noted that the district correctly states that the parent did not file a notice of request for review. However, there is no evidence that the district was prejudiced by this omission as it was able to serve an answer.
[6] A district and parents may agree to a change in the student's placement (20 U.S.C. § 1415[k][1][F][iii]; 34 CFR 300.530[f][2]; 8 NYCRR 201.4[d][2][ii]).
[7] An IAES is "a temporary educational placement, other than the student's current placement at the time the behavior precipitating the IAES placement occurred" (8 NYCRR 201.2[k]).
[8] The IHO did not allow the parents to enter three proffered exhibits into the hearing record because the parents did not physically provide a copy of such documents to the MDR team (see Feb. 6, 2026 Tr. pp. 13-16). These proffered exhibits demonstrate that there was evidence in the student's educational record and/or that the parents brought additional information to the MDR meeting for consideration; however, the exhibits are not part of the hearing record and therefore cannot be reviewed on appeal.
[9] The district witness acknowledged that the district did not provide proper notice of the participants in the MDR meeting to the parents, stating that it "was not an intentional omission"(Feb. 6, 2026 Tr. p. 72).
[10] The IEP also included a teacher report that the student "does not demonstrate a dislike for school anymore but just becomes frustrated with his weakness in organizing his material and thoughts" (Dist. Ex. 3 at p. 7).
[11] To the extent the parents also request expungement of the student's suspension from his school records, while an IHO or SRO may rectify any flawed change in the student's special education placement due to an error within the IDEA's MDR process, the parents' request related to the disciplinary process including modification of the student's educational records in the form of expungement must first be brought according to the appeals process set forth in the district's code of conduct and/or properly appealed to the Commissioner of Education (see Educ. Law § 310; 34 CFR 99.22, 300.621).