STATE OF NEW YORK
OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW
25-093
Application of a STUDENT WITH A DISABILITY, by her parent, for review of a determination of a hearing officer relating to the provision of educational services by the New York City Department of Education
Appearances:
Law Office of Philippe Gerschel, attorneys for petitioner, by Philippe Gerschel, Esq.
Liz Vladeck, General Counsel, attorneys for respondent, by Sabrina Rafi, Esq.
I. Introduction
This proceeding arises under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482) and Article 89 of the New York State Education Law. Petitioner (the parent) appeals from a decision of an impartial hearing officer (IHO) which denied her request that respondent (the district) fund the costs of her daughter's private services delivered by Limud, Inc. (Limud) for the 2023-24 school year. The district cross-appeals. The appeal must be sustained in part, the cross-appeal must be dismissed, and the matter remanded to the IHO for further proceedings.
II. Overview—Administrative Procedures
When a student who resides in New York is eligible for special education services and attends a nonpublic school, Article 73 of the New York State Education Law allows for the creation of an individualized education services program (IESP) under the State's so-called "dual enrollment" statute (see Educ. Law § 3602-c). The task of creating an IESP is assigned to the same committee that designs educational programing for students with disabilities under the IDEA (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482), namely a local Committee on Special Education (CSE) that includes, but is not limited to, parents, teachers, a school psychologist, and a district representative (Educ. Law § 4402; see 20 U.S.C. § 1414[d][1][A]-[B]; 34 CFR 300.320, 300.321; 8 NYCRR 200.3, 200.4[d][2]). If disputes occur between parents and school districts, State law provides that "[r]eview of the recommendation of the committee on special education may be obtained by the parent or person in parental relation of the pupil pursuant to the provisions of [Education Law § 4404]," which effectuates the due process provisions called for by the IDEA (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2][b][1]). Incorporated among the procedural protections is the opportunity to engage in mediation, present State complaints, and initiate an impartial due process hearing (20 U.S.C. §§ 1221e-3, 1415[e]-[f]; Educ. Law § 4404[1]; 34 CFR 300.151-300.152, 300.506, 300.511; 8 NYCRR 200.5[h]-[l]).
New York State has implemented a two-tiered system of administrative review to address disputed matters between parents and school districts regarding "any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of a student with a disability, or a student suspected of having a disability, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such student" (8 NYCRR 200.5[i][1]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[b][6]-[7]; 34 CFR 300.503[a][1]-[2], 300.507[a][1]). First, after an opportunity to engage in a resolution process, the parties appear at an impartial hearing conducted at the local level before an IHO (Educ. Law § 4404[1][a]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j]). An IHO typically conducts a trial-type hearing regarding the matters in dispute in which the parties have the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel and certain other individuals with special knowledge or training; present evidence and confront, cross-examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses; prohibit the introduction of any evidence at the hearing that has not been disclosed five business days before the hearing; and obtain a verbatim record of the proceeding (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][2][A], [h][1]-[3]; 34 CFR 300.512[a][1]-[4]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][3][v], [vii], [xii]). The IHO must render and transmit a final written decision in the matter to the parties not later than 45 days after the expiration period or adjusted period for the resolution process (34 CFR 300.510[b][2], [c], 300.515[a]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5]). A party may seek a specific extension of time of the 45-day timeline, which the IHO may grant in accordance with State and federal regulations (34 CFR 300.515[c]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5]). The decision of the IHO is binding upon both parties unless appealed (Educ. Law § 4404[1]).
A party aggrieved by the decision of an IHO may subsequently appeal to a State Review Officer (SRO) (Educ. Law § 4404[2]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[g][1]; 34 CFR 300.514[b][1]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[k]). The appealing party or parties must identify the findings, conclusions, and orders of the IHO with which they disagree and indicate the relief that they would like the SRO to grant (8 NYCRR 279.4). The opposing party is entitled to respond to an appeal or cross-appeal in an answer (8 NYCRR 279.5). The SRO conducts an impartial review of the IHO's findings, conclusions, and decision and is required to examine the entire hearing record; ensure that the procedures at the hearing were consistent with the requirements of due process; seek additional evidence if necessary; and render an independent decision based upon the hearing record (34 CFR 300.514[b][2]; 8 NYCRR 279.12[a]). The SRO must ensure that a final decision is reached in the review and that a copy of the decision is mailed to each of the parties not later than 30 days after the receipt of a request for a review, except that a party may seek a specific extension of time of the 30-day timeline, which the SRO may grant in accordance with State and federal regulations (34 CFR 300.515[b], [c]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[k][2]).
III. Facts and Procedural History
Given the limited issues on appeal, a full recitation of the student's educational history is not necessary. Briefly, on June 8, 2022, a CSE convened, determined the student was eligible for special education as a student with an other health impairment (OHI), and developed an IESP with a projected implementation date of September 1, 2022 (see generally Parent Ex. B).[1], [2] The June 2022 CSE recommended the following supports and services: three periods per week of group special education teacher support services (SETSS); two 30-minute sessions per week of individual physical therapy (PT); one 30-minute session per week of individual occupational therapy (OT); two 30-minute sessions per week of group OT; and one 30-minute session per week of individual counseling (Parent Ex. B at p. 9).[3] The June 2022 IESP noted that the student was parentally placed in a nonpublic school (id. at p. 12).
There is no evidence in the hearing record as to the student's education between the June 2022 IESP and the 2023-24 school year.
On September 1, 2023, the parent entered into a contract with Limud to provide the student with three hours per week of individual SETSS at a rate of $195 per hour for the 2023-24 school year (see Parent Ex. D).[4]
On February 26, 2024, parent's counsel sent the district a "10-Day Notice" letter via email advising that the parent had been unable to locate providers to implement the "mandated services" in the June 2022 IESP at the district's standard rate and therefore, she had "no choice but to implement the IESP on [her] own and seek reimbursement or direct payment" from the district for the costs of the private services for the 2023-24 school year (see Parent Ex. C).
A. Due Process Complaint Notice
In a due process complaint notice dated July 12, 2024, the parent alleged that the district denied the student a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for the 2023-24 school year (see generally Parent Ex. A). The parent asserted that the student's pendency laid in the June 2022 IESP which consisted of three periods per week of direct group SETSS, two 30-minute sessions per week of individual PT, one 30-minute session per week of individual OT, two 30-minute sessions per week of group OT, and one 30-minute session per week of group counseling (Parent Ex. A at p. 2). The parent alleged that there was a delay in convening the CSE for the 2023-24 school year and the June 2022 IESP was "outdated and expired" (id.). Further, the parent stated she was unable to locate a provider for the services recommended in the June 2022 IESP and the failure to implement the recommended services was a denial of FAPE (id.).
As relief, the parent requested an order that the district "fund the program outlined in the IESP dated [June 8, 2022] for the 2023-24 school year at the provider's contracted rate" and that the district fund a bank of compensatory services for any parts of the 2023-24 school year that were "not serviced" at the "prospective provider's contracted rate" (Parent Ex. A at p. 3).
In a due process response, the district denied the parent's material allegations, raised several defenses including, among others, that the parent failed to timely request equitable services for the 2023-24 school year in accordance with Education Law § 3602-c (Dist. Response to Due Process Compl. Not.).[5]
B. Impartial Hearing Officer Decision
After a prehearing conference on August 23, 2024, an impartial hearing convened before the Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH) on September 24, 2024 (Tr. pp. 1-39).[6] In a decision dated December 30, 2024, the IHO found that the district timely raised the June 1 affirmative defense and that the parent failed to timely request equitable services (IHO Decision at p. 7). The IHO determined that the parent did not submit any evidence or argue that a June 1 request for equitable services was provided to the district for the 2023-24 school year (id. at pp. 5, 7).[7] Accordingly, the IHO denied the parent's requested relief (id. at p. 7).
IV. Appeal for State-Level Review
The parent appeals, alleging that the IHO erred in dismissing the due process complaint notice based on the district's assertion that the parent did not provide a timely written request for equitable services.
The parent asserts that the district did not timely raise the June 1 affirmative defense because the "only time" the district referenced the June 1 affirmative defense was in its closing statement which did not provide the parent with sufficient notice of the defense (Req. for Rev. at p. 2). Next, the parent argues that the district failed to "satisfy [its] burden of presenting evidence to support [its] affirmative defense" (id. at p. 3). Moreover, the parent argues that she submitted evidence of the June 1 request which showed that the letter was emailed on May 30, 2023.
In connection with the unilaterally obtained services, the parent argues that she satisfied her burden that the SETSS "were specifically designed to address [the student's] needs" (Req. for Rev. at p. 5). The parent also asserted that equitable considerations weighed in her favor as the parent did not obstruct the CSE, that the parent sent a June 1 letter, and provided a 10-day notice for the unilaterally obtained services. As relief, the parent seeks reversal of the IHO's decision and an order requiring the district to fund privately-obtained SETSS at a rate of $195 per hour.
In an answer and cross-appeal, the district asserts that it timely raised the June 1 defense and the evidence in the hearing record failed to demonstrate that the parent timely sent the June 1 request. The district argues that the letter submitted by the parent was "a print-out of a purported June 1st letter allegedly e-mailed by the [p]arent to the CSE on May 30, 2023" but failed to offer any testimony that she actually signed the letter and emailed the document to the CSE. Lastly, in its cross-appeal, the district contends in the alternative that the parent's requested relief should be denied.[8]
V. Applicable Standards
A board of education must offer a FAPE to each student with a disability residing in the school district who requires special education services or programs (20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][1][A]; Educ. Law § 4402[2][a], [b][2]). However, the IDEA confers no individual entitlement to special education or related services upon students who are enrolled by their parents in nonpublic schools (see 34 CFR 300.137[a]). Although districts are required by the IDEA to participate in a consultation process for making special education services available to students who are enrolled privately by their parents in nonpublic schools, such students are not individually entitled under the IDEA to receive some or all of the special education and related services they would receive if enrolled in a public school (see 34 CFR 300.134, 300.137[a], [c], 300.138[b]).
However, under State law, parents of a student with a disability who have privately enrolled their child in a nonpublic school may seek to obtain educational "services" for their child by filing a request for such services in the public school district of location where the nonpublic school is located on or before the first day of June preceding the school year for which the request for services is made (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2]).[9] "Boards of education of all school districts of the state shall furnish services to students who are residents of this state and who attend nonpublic schools located in such school districts, upon the written request of the parent" (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2][a]). In such circumstances, the district of location's CSE must review the request for services and "develop an [IESP] for the student based on the student's individual needs in the same manner and with the same contents as an [IEP]" (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2][b][1]). The CSE must "assure that special education programs and services are made available to students with disabilities attending nonpublic schools located within the school district on an equitable basis, as compared to special education programs and services provided to other students with disabilities attending public or nonpublic schools located within the school district (id.).[10] Thus, under State law an eligible New York State resident student may be voluntarily enrolled by a parent in a nonpublic school, but at the same time the student is also enrolled in the public school district, that is dually enrolled, for the purpose of receiving special education programming under Education Law § 3602-c, dual enrollment services for which a public school district may be held accountable through an impartial hearing.
The burden of proof is on the school district during an impartial hearing, except that a parent seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placement has the burden of proof regarding the appropriateness of such placement (Educ. Law § 4404[1][c]; see R.E. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 184-85 [2d Cir. 2012]).
VI. Discussion
Here, the threshold issue of whether the parent requested equitable services prior to June 1, 2023 in compliance with the dual enrollment statue is disputed between the parties. As further described below, I find that the IHO failed to acknowledge the available evidence in the hearing record to determine whether the student was entitled to equitable services for the 2023-24 school year under Education Law § 3602-c.
The State's dual enrollment statute requires parents of a New York State resident student with a disability who is parentally placed in a nonpublic school and for whom the parents seek to obtain educational services to file a request for such services in the district where the nonpublic school is located on or before the first day of June preceding the school year for which the request for services is made (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2]). With respect to a parent's awareness of the requirement, the Commissioner of Education has previously determined that a parent's lack of awareness of the June 1 statutory deadline does not invalidate the parent's obligation to submit a request for dual enrollment by the June 1 deadline (Appeal of Austin, 44 Ed. Dep't Rep. 352, Decision No. 15,195, available athttps://www.counsel.nysed.gov/ Decisions/volume44/d15195; Appeal of Beauman, 43 Ed Dep't Rep 212, Decision No. 14,974 available athttps://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume43/d14974;see also, Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 25-058; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-212; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 23-121). Specifically, the Commissioner stated that Education Law § "3602-c(2) does not require [the district] to post a notice of the deadline" and that a parent being "unaware of the deadline does not provide a legal basis" for the waiver of the statutory deadline for dual enrollment applications (Appeal of Austin, 44 Ed. Dep't Rep. 352).
The issue of the June 1 deadline fits with other affirmative defenses, such as the defense of the statute of limitations, which are required to be raised at the initial hearing (see M.G. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 15 F. Supp. 3d 296, 304, 306 [S.D.N.Y. 2014] [holding that the limitations defense is "subject to the doctrine of waiver if not raised at the initial administrative hearing" and that where a district does "not raise the statute of limitations at the initial due process hearing, the argument has been waived"]; see also R.B. v. Dep't of Educ. of the City of New York, 2011 WL 4375694, at *4-*6 [S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2011] [noting that the IDEA "requir[es] parties to raise all issues at the lowest administrative level" and holding that a district had not waived the limitations defense by failing to raise it in a response to the due process complaint notice where the district articulated its position prior to the impartial hearing]; Vultaggio v. Bd. of Educ., Smithtown Cent. Sch. Dist., 216 F. Supp. 2d 96, 103 [E.D.N.Y. 2002] [noting that "any argument that could be raised in an administrative setting, should be raised in that setting"]). "By requiring parties to raise all issues at the lowest administrative level, IDEA 'affords full exploration of technical educational issues, furthers development of a complete factual record and promotes judicial efficiency by giving these agencies the first opportunity to correct shortcomings in their educational programs for disabled children.'" (R.B. v. Dep't of Educ. of the City of New York, 2011 WL 4375694, at *6 [S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2011], quoting Hope v. Cortines, 872 F. Supp. 14, 19 [E.D.N.Y. 1995] and Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1303 [9th Cir. 1992]; see C.D. v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 2011 WL 4914722, at *12 [S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2011]).
Here, during the September 24, 2024 impartial hearing date, the parent submitted into evidence Parent Exhibit H which consisted of a letter dated May 29, 2023 and an email dated May 30, 2023 (Tr. p. 17; see Parent Ex. H). The district did not object to Parent exhibit H, and it was admitted into the hearing record by the IHO (Tr. p. 17). The May 29th letter was a form letter from the district that stated if the parent had placed his/her student in a nonpublic school at his/her expense but wanted the student to continue receiving special education services at the nonpublic school, the parent was required to mail or email the form to the CSE no later than June 1, 2023 (Parent Ex. H at p. 1). The form letter also contained blank spaces for the parent to complete certain information including the student's name, parent email address, name of the nonpublic school, and grade of the student (id. at pp. 1-2). The evidence shows that the parent electronically signed the letter on May 29, 2023 and then emailed it to the district on May 30, 2023 (see Parent Ex. H).
Despite this evidence in the hearing record, the IHO stated in her decision that the "[p]arent did not assert that a June 1 notice was ever sent to the [district] prior to June 1, 2023" (IHO Decision at p. 4). Although admitting Parent Exhibit H into evidence, the IHO stated in the decision that "[t]he Hearing Officer admitted Parent's Exhibits A through G into the record as full exhibits" and excluded Parent Ex. H from the exhibit list at the end of the decision.[11] The IHO discussed the district's special education student information system (SESIS) events log for the student during the "relevant timeframe" and stated that although the SESIS log confirmed the district's receipt of the February 2024 ten-day notice letter and entries surrounding the June 2022 CSE meeting and IESP, absent from the SESIS log was "evidence that a June 1 notice was sent to the [district] for the 2023-[]24 school year" (id. at pp. 4-5, 7).
Contrary to the IHO's finding that the parent presented no evidence of a June 1 request, the parent did present documentary evidence of a written request and transmittal to the district by email in May 2023. I find that there is adequate evidence that the parent notified the district of her intent to parentally place the student in a nonpublic school and requested special education services from the district (see Parent Ex. H). The May 29, 2023 letter and May 30, 2023 email, without the testimony of the parent, was sufficient to prove that the letter was provided to the district. The essence of the district's argument is found in the statements of the district's attorney made during closing that
"[t]he parent didn't testify, so we have no direct knowledge or direct testimony whether the signature is hers or his, I'm not sure which parent it is, and any type of confirming that they requested these services and provided this letter. So at a minimum, the [d]istrict would argue that there are questions about the June 1st letter, and it creates doubt as to whether it was timely sent"
(Tr. p. 31). On appeal, the district attempts to further speculate as to why the parent had two different email addresses, alluding to possible ways in which the parent's email may not have actually been sent and again blames the parent for failing to offer testimonial evidence to bolster the documentary evidence showing transmission of the request to the CSE. Neither the IDEA, State Law, nor case law provides that a party fails to meet its burden of proof simply because the evidence produced does not consist of witness testimony and instead, each party has the right to "[p]resent evidence and confront, cross-examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses" (34 CFR 300.512 [a][2]). Because there is a right to present documentary evidence, the documentary evidence must be discussed as it relates to the disputed issues because a party could prevail on some or all of the disputed issues related to its burden by producing evidence consisting of documentary evidence. The two email addresses in the parent's request for equitable services both contain the parent's entire first name, the email for the CSE region in the district to whom it was sent, and a signature that is consistent with the typewritten name of the parent located just below the signature (Parent Ex. H). If the district's counsel believed the documentary evidence was questionable, the attorney should have called the parent as witness to testify (8 NYCRR 200.5[j][3][xii]). In view of the foregoing evidence, the IHO's finding that the parent failed to present any evidence that she timely requested equitable services was factually inconsistent with the evidence in the hearing record and must be reversed. Instead, available evidence shows that the parent timely submitted a written request for equitable services to the district for the 2023-24 school year and the district's speculation that the parent's email is without merit. Accordingly, the remainder of the parties' claims must be addressed.
When an IHO has not addressed claims set forth in a due process complaint notice, an SRO may consider whether the case should be remanded to the IHO for a determination of the claims that the IHO did not address (8 NYCRR 279.10[c]; see Educ. Law § 4404[2]; F.B. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 923 F. Supp. 2d 570, 589 [S.D.N.Y. 2013] [indicating that the SRO may remand matters to the IHO to address claims set forth in the due process complaint notice that were unaddressed by the IHO], citing J.F. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2012 WL 5984915, at *9 n.4 [S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2012]; see also D.N. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2013 WL 245780, at *3 [S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2013]). Because I find that the student was not precluded from receiving equitable services for the 2023-24 school year under Education Law § 3602-c due to a failure to timely request services, this matter warrants remand to the IHO to conduct a Burlington-Carter analysis as to whether the parent met her burden to prove that the unilaterally obtained services from Limud were appropriate and whether equitable considerations would support the parent's request for relief.
Accordingly, the IHO's order denying the parent's requested relief must be vacated, and the matter remanded for further proceedings.[12]
VII. Conclusion
Having determined that the IHO erred in determining that the student was precluded from receiving equitable services due to the parent's failure to make a timely request, upon remand the IHO should address whether the parent's unilaterally obtained services were appropriate and whether equitable considerations support the parent's claim using the Burlington/Carter framework.
THE APPEAL IS SUSTAINED TO THE EXTENT INDICATED.
THE CROSS-APPEAL IS DISMISSED.
IT IS ORDERED that the portion of the IHO's decision, dated December 30, 2024, that determined the parent failed to timely request equitable services in accordance with Educ. Law § 3602-c[2] is reversed; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is remanded to the IHO for further proceedings in accordance with this decision; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the event that the IHO cannot hear this matter upon remand, another IHO shall be appointed.
Footnotes
[1] The student's eligibility for special education as a student with an other health impairment is not in dispute (see 34 CFR 300.8[c][9]; 8 NYCRR 200.1[zz][10]).
[2] The hearing record contains one duplicative exhibit: Parent exhibit B (13 pages) and District exhibit 1 (12 pages) both of which are the June 8, 2022 IESP. Although the page numbers are different, the same information is contained in both documents. However, for purposes of this decision, only parent exhibits are cited in instances where both a parent and district exhibit are identical in content. The IHO is reminded that it is her responsibility to exclude evidence that she determines to be irrelevant, immaterial, unreliable, or unduly repetitious (8 NYCRR 200.5[j][3][xii][c]).
[3] SETSS is not defined in the State continuum of special education services (see 8 NYCRR 200.6). As has been laid out in prior administrative proceedings, the term is not used anywhere other than within this school district and a static and reliable definition of "SETSS" does not exist within the district.
[4] Limud has not been approved by the Commissioner of Education as a school or agency with which school districts may contract to instruct students with disabilities (see 8 NYCRR 200.1[d]; 200.7).
[5] The parties and the IHO generally refer to a parental request for equitable services under Education Law § 3602-c as a June 1 letter, June 1 defense, or June 1 request or a similar labels because of the last day upon which such a request must be received by statute and to distinguish it from other legal disputes that the parties may have.
[6] During the impartial hearing, the district raised its motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds which the IHO later denied in the decision (see Tr. pp. 37-38; IHO Decision at p. 5).
[8] Despite labeling the document as a "Verified Answer and Cross Appeal", the district does not seek to reverse any portion of the IHO's decision. In fact, the district seeks to affirm the IHO's finding that the parents claims should be dismissed.
[9] State law provides that "services" includes "education for students with disabilities," which means "special educational programs designed to serve persons who meet the definition of children with disabilities set forth in [Education Law § 4401(1)]" (Educ. Law § 3602-c[1][a], [d]).
[10] State guidance explains that providing services on an "equitable basis" means that "special education services are provided to parentally placed nonpublic school students with disabilities in the same manner as compared to other students with disabilities attending public or nonpublic schools located within the school district" ("Chapter 378 of the Laws of 2007–Guidance on Parentally Placed Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary School Students with Disabilities Pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 2004 and New York State (NYS) Education Law Section 3602-c," Attachment 1 (Questions and Answers), VESID Mem. [Sept. 2007], available athttps://www.nysed.gov/special-education/guidance-parentally-placed-nonpublic-elementary-and-secondary-school-students). The guidance document further provides that "parentally placed nonpublic students must be provided services based on need and the same range of services provided by the district of location to its public-school students must be made available to nonpublic students, taking into account the student's placement in the nonpublic school program" (id.). The guidance has recently been reorganized on the State's web site and the paginated pdf versions of the documents previously available do not currently appear there, having been updated with web based versions.
[11] A staff member at OATH suggested in a January 13, 2025 email clarification that Parent Exhibit H was merely left off the list; however, while I appreciate the staff member's opinion as to what might have occurred, it is apparent from the entirety of the IHO's decision that the IHO did not consider Parent Ex. H at all when writing the decision since it is not even mentioned by the IHO and the IHO explicitly stated in the decision that Parent Exhibits A-G were considered (IHO Decision at p. 4).
[12] On remand, an IHO retains the authority to conduct a prehearing conference and take additional testimony if such actions are deemed necessary to create a complete record and render a proper decision (8 NYCRR 200.5[j][3][vii], [xi], [xii]; [4]; see Letter to Anonymous, 23 IDELR 1073 [OSEP 1995]; Impartial Due Process Hearing, 71 Fed. Reg. 46704 [Aug. 14, 2006]).