UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
M.I. 0/b/o M.L.,
Plaintiff,
y Civil Action No. 20-870 (MAS) (LHG)
NORTH HUNTERDON-VOORHEES MEMORANDUM ORDER REGIONAL HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Defendant.
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff M.I.’s (“Plaintiff”) request for attorney’s
fees. (ECF No. 19.) Defendant North Hunterdon-Voorhees Regional High School Board of
Education (“North Hunterdon’) opposed (ECF Nos. 21, 22), and M.I. replied (ECF No. 23). The
Court has carefully considered the parties’ submissions and decides the matter without oral
argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 78.1.
The parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history of this matter and therefore
the Court recites only those facts necessary to resolve the instant Motion. See MCI. ex rel. MI.
vy. N. Hunterdon-Voorhees Reg’! High Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 17-1887, 2018 WL 902265 (D.N.J.
Feb. 15, 2018). On April 30, 2021, the Court granted-in-part and denied-in-part M.I.’s Motion for
Summary Judgment concerning Plaintiffs claims under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (“IDEA”). (ECF No. 17; MI. 0/b/o MI. v. N. Hunterdon-Voorhees Reg’l High Sch.
Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 20-870, 2021 WL 1720853, at *7 (D.N.J. Apr. 30, 2021).) The Court
determined that since Plaintiff was the prevailing party under the IDEA, Plaintiff is entitled to
partial tuition reimbursement and attorney’s fees. (ECF No. 17.) The Court now addresses
Plaintiff's request.
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I. TUITION REIMBURSEMENT
The Court begins by addressing the issue of tuition reimbursement. Under 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a)(10)(C), parents are entitled to reimbursement if (1) the school district violated the IDEA
by, for example, failing to provide a Free Appropriate Public Education (““FAPE”) to the child,
and (2) the education provided by the private school is reasonably calculated to enable the child to
receive educational benefits. D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 564 (3d Cir. 2010); see
also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). Even if these requirements are met, however, a court may
reduce or deny such reimbursement if (1) the parents failed to give 10 days advance written notice
to the school district prior to removal of the child from the public school; (2) the school district
informed the parents prior to the child’s removal of its intent to conduct an Individualized
Education Program (“IEP”’) evaluation of the child, but the parents did not make the child available
for such evaluation; or (3) the parents acted unreasonably. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)Gin).
Plaintiff submitted the total expenses for the Pennington School for the 2016-2017 school
year and renewed her request for full reimbursement of $60,441.56, despite the Court’s previous
ruling that she was only entitled to partial reimbursement. (Pl.’s Br. 5, ECF No. 19.) North
Hunterdon argues that Plaintiff should only be awarded $21,085.46 to reflect the Court’s award of
partial tuition based on Plaintiff’s lack of credibility, failure to give timely notice, and a deduction
for room and board. (Def.’s Opp’n Br. 4, ECF No. 21.)
The Court will award Plaintiff partial tuition, as previously stated. For starters, the Court
denies Plaintiff's request for fees to compensate for late-paid tuition and boarding. As North
Hunterdon highlights, the record does not reflect Plaintiff's contention that room and board was
required to attend the Pennington School. Nor should North Hunterdon bear responsibility for the
late charge that accrued for Plaintiffs failure to timely pay tuition for the 2016-2017 school year. pa Setararih aan8) — fa
The Court thus finds these fees inappropriate to attribute to North Hunterdon and reduces the
starting point for the fees to $42,170.92.
Next, as the Court previously found, Plaintiff failed to provide timely notice to North
Hunterdon. That is, Plaintiff removed M.I. from school in May 2016 but did not provide notice
until July 2016. See MCI ex rel. MI. v. N. Hunterdon-Voorhees Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ.,
No. 17-1887, 2018 WL 902265, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 15, 2018). The Court also credited the ALJ’s
assessment that Plaintiff presented as a less-than-credible witness. M./., 2021 WL 1720853, at *6.
North Hunterdon requests that this Court reduce the tuition award by half. (Def.’s Opp’n Br. 4.)
Although the Court believes an award of partial tuition 1s appropriate, an award of 50% is too
punitive considering Plaintiffs overall success in the litigation and the Court’s finding that
Plaintiff's shortcomings did not evidence bad faith. MJ, 2021 WL 1720853, at *6. The Court will
reduce Plaintiff’s award by 25%, to a total of $31,628.19.
Il. ATTORNEY’S FEES
Moving next to the issue of attorney’s fees, Plaintiff requests $218,826.06 in attorney’s
fees. (Pl.’s Reply Br. 5, ECF No. 23.) North Hunterdon requests that the Court reduce the fees for
several reasons. (Defs.’ Opp’n Br. 5, ECF No. 21.) First, North Hunterdon contends that the Court
should discount other fees including entries for non-litigation tasks and double entries. Second,
North Hunterdon requests that the Court reduce Plaintiff?s attorney’s fees by $15,476.48 for the
current motion because it would constitute double billing. Third, North Hunterdon argues that the
Court should subtract the expert fees in the amount of $10,883.!
' Plaintiff concedes that the Court should also reduce the attorney’s fees by $24,969.73 for the interest charged. (Pl.’s Reply Br. 5 (“Plaintiff hereby amends its initial request for $243,795.79 in attorneys’ fees and costs to exclude the $24,969.73 in interest”).)
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“The IDEA attorneys’ fees provision, like various other statutory fee-shifting provisions,
allows courts to award attorneys’ fees to a ‘prevailing party.” MR. v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 868 F.3d
218, 224 (3d Cir. 2017). The party seeking attorney’s fees must “receive at least some relief on the
merits of [their] claim before [they] can be said to prevail.” Tex. State Tchrs.’ Ass’n v. Garland
Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989). In the Third Circuit, a court must determine whether:
(1) the plaintiff obtained relief on a significant claim in the litigation; and (2) there is a causal
connection between the litigation and the relief obtained from the defendant. See Metro. Pittsburgh
Crusade for Voters v. City of Pittsburgh, 964 F.2d 244, 250 (3d Cir. 1992).
The starting point for this Court’s determination of reasonable attorney’s fees is calculation
of the lodestar amount, which is “the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the
reasonable hourly rate.” Penn. Env’t Def Found. v. Canon-McMillan Sch. Dist., 152 F.3d 228,
231 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Hensley y. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)); see also Blakey v.
Continental Airlines, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 598 (D.N.J. 1998). In applying the lodestar formula, it is
imperative for a district court to “carefully and critically evaluate the hours and the hourly rate put
forth by counsel.” Blakey, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 602. Once the lodestar is calculated, the district court
is permitted to adjust fees depending on the success of the party seeking fees. Penn. Env’t Def.
Found., 152 F.3d at 232 (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435).
A. Hourly Rate
To start, the reasonable hourly rate is determined by reference to the marketplace. See
Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285 (1989). North Hunterdon does not dispute Plaintiff’s
attorney’s hourly rate. (Def.’s Opp’n Br. 5.) On the Court’s own review of the bills submitted, it
also finds that the rate is reasonable. Plaintiff's attorneys billed $375 an hour for a principal
attorney, $325 for counsel, between $325 and $335 an hour for associates, and $130 an hour for
law clerks. The Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied her burden of showing that the hourly rates
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were reasonable. See, e.g., D.E.R. v. Board of Educ. of the Borough of Ramsey, No. 04-2274, 2005
WL 1177944, at *18 (D.N.J. May 18, 2005) (finding, more than seventeen years ago, that $300.00
hourly rate charged by plaintiffs’ counsel in IDEA action was reasonable).
B. Hours Expended
Moving to the hours billed, “[h]ours are not reasonably expended if they are excessive,
redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990)
(citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433). For starters, North Hunterdon requests that the Court reduce the
award of attorney’s fees by $5,000 due to the inclusion of duplicative entries, and clerical or
administrative tasks as part of Plaintiff's request. (Def.’s Opp’n Br. 5.) Plaintiff did not respond to
this argument by North Hunterdon (nor any of North Hunterdon’s other specific reasons for
reductions).
The Court finds it appropriate to reduce Plaintiff's award by $5,000 for duplicative entries
and administrative tasks. Upon the Court’s review of the records submitted by Plaintiff, the Court
found numerous double entries without explanation. For example, for the billing period through
July 31, 2015, “review and respond to multiple client emails regarding due process” was included
twice. (Pl.’s Br. Ex. A.) The same duplicity problem occurred in the billing period through
February 28, 2018, when Plaintiff submitted bills for “Review and analyze defendants opposition
to motion for summary judgment” twice. (/d.) Moreover, regarding administrative tasks, time that
would not be billed to a client cannot be imposed on an adversary. Alexander v. NCO Fin. Sys.,
No. 11-401, 2011 WL 2415156, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 16, 2011). Thus, courts will not typically
sanction fee awards for administrative tasks, which are not the type normally billed to a paying
client, and may not be recovered by a party through a fee petition. See Spegon v. Catholic Bishop
of Chi., 175 F.3d 544, 552 (7th Cir. 1999). To give just one example, Plaintiff requested fees for
tasks such as “‘[b]egan transcribing Day 4 hearing transcript.” (Pl.’s Br. Ex. A.) The Court finds it
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inappropriate to award attorney’s fees based on these types of tasks. North Hunterdon caps its
request at a reduction of $5,000. Given the numerous duplicative entries and entries for
administrative tasks, the Court finds this request more than reasonable.
Next, North Hunterdon requests that this Court reduce the award by $15,476.48 because of
duplicative miscellaneous fees. Plaintiff requested that amount for what she describes as “expenses
related to filing fees, printing, mailing, transcript orders, courier service, etc.” (Flaum Cert., ECF
No. 19-2.) The Court may award fees for expenditures such as photocopying, travel, long distance
telephone and postage. B.K. v. Toms River Bd. of Educ., 998 F. Supp. 462, 476 (D.N.J. 1998)
(citations omitted). However, a review of the bill provides the Court with no information about the
exact nature of these fees. (PI.’s Br. Ex. B.) For example, there are no entries delineating whether
the fees were for a filing or if the fees were incurred for a transcript. (/d.) Because the Court cannot
judge the appropriateness of these fees, it will also reduce the award by this amount.
Moving to the next item, North Hunterdon also requests the Court to subtract fees for
experts and IEP meetings. (Def.’s Supp. Br. 2, ECF No. 22.) The Supreme Court reiterated in
Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., that the IDEA’s fee-shifting provision “does not authorize courts
to award expert-services fees to prevailing parents in IDEA actions because the Act does not put
States on notice of the possibility of such awards.” 557 U.S. 230, 246 (2009). Furthermore, 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii) states “[a]ttorney[’s] fees may not be awarded relating to any meeting
of the IEP Team unless such meeting is convened as a result of an administrative proceeding or
judicial action[.]” The Court, accordingly, will reduce the award by $22,363.
Finally, North Hunterdon argues this Court should reduce the remaining fee award by 50%
to reflect that the Court only awarded Plaintiff partial tuition. To arrive at a reasonable fee award,
a district court should exercise its equitable discretion “either by attempting to identify specific
hours that should be eliminated or by simply reducing the award to account for the limited success
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of the plaintiff.” Tex. State Tchr.’s Ass’n, 489 U.S. at 789-90 (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437;
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 96 (1989)). “Accordingly, a court must reduce the fee award
if ‘it concludes the benefits of the litigation were not substantial enough to merit the full amount
of the lodestar.’” McDonnell v. United States, 870 F. Supp. 576, 587 (D.N.J. 1994) (citation
omitted). Because the Court finds that Plaintiff was only entitled to partial tuition on the IDEA
claim, it likewise reduces the fees award. Here, the Court finds a reduction of 25% warranted to
mirror the corresponding reduction in tuition.
I. ORDER
IT IS on this aan of Abe nu [2e 42022, ORDERED that: 1, Plaintiff is awarded partial tuition in the amount of $31,628.19.
2. Plaintiff is awarded attorney’s fees in the amount of $148,762.19.
3. North Hunterdon must remit the above award to Plaintiff within 60 days.
Mad bhf? MICHAEL A. SMIPP UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE