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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
DUMONT BOARD OF EDUCATION, | Civil Action No.: 09-5048 (JLL)
Plaintiff,
LT. o/b/o LT., : ORDER
Defendants.
Currently before the Court is a motion for reconsideration of this Court’s July 15, 2010 Order
granting Defendant’s motion for attorneys’ fees [Docket Entry No. 52], and it appearing that:
1. On May 26, 2010, Defendant filed a motion for attorneys’ fees pursuant to
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(3)(B). In opposition to Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff filed a cross-
motion to stay Defendant’s application pending Plaintiff's appeal of this
Court’s May 10, 2010 Opinion and Order to the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit.
2. On July 15, 2010, after considering Defendant’s application, as well as
Plaintiffs opposition thereto, this Court entered an Order granting
Defendant’s motion for attorneys’ fees and denying Plaintiffs cross-motion
to stay. In doing so, the Court noted, in pertinent part, that “Plaintiff does
not dispute that J.T. is the prevailing party for purposes of this motion, that
the amount of fees sought are reasonable or that J.T. has satisfied the two part
test set forth by the Third Circuit in Wheeler by Wheeler v. Towanda Area
School Dist., 950 F.2d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 1991).”
3. Plaintiff now seeks reconsideration of this Court’s July 15, 2010 decision on
the basis that this Court overlooked a sentence contained in a certification
attached to Plaintiffs legal brief which provided: “the Board reserves its right
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tye a to oppose Defendants’ untimely motion for attorneys’ fees and expenses on
the merits.”
Local Civil Rule 7.1(4) states that a motion for reconsideration “setting forth
concisely the matter or controlling decisions which the party believes the
Judge or Magistrate Judge has overlooked” may be filed within ten business
days after entry ofan order. L.Civ.R. 7.1(1), Reconsideration, however, is an
extraordinary remedy and should be granted “very sparingly.” See L.Civ.R.
7.1(i) cmt.6(d); see also Fellenz v. Lombard Investment Corp., Nos. 04-3993,
04-5768, 04-3992, 04-6105, 2005 WL 3104145, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 18, 2005),
The motion may not be used to re-litigate old matters or argue new matters
that could have been raised before the original decision was reached. See,
e.g., P. Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Cendant Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d
349, 352 (D.N.J. 2001).Thus, a court may grant a motion for reconsideration
only if the moving party demonstrates that the court, in reaching its prior
decision, overlooked a controlling decision of law or a dispositive factual
matter which, if considered by the court, might reasonably have resulted in
a different conclusion. See, e.g., Polizzi Meats, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co.
931 F. Supp. 328, 339 (D.N.J. 1996).
The Court has considered the arguments raised in support of and in
opposition to the instant motion and, based on the following reasons, finds
that reconsideration is not warranted.
As a preliminary matter, it appears that the Court did, in fact, overlook the
“reservation of right” language contained in the certification attached to
Plaintiff's legal brief.
Nevertheless, even if such language had been considered by the Court, the
Court’s analysis would not have resulted in a different conclusion. Plaintiff
had every opportunity to oppose Defendant’s motion for attorneys’ fees “on
the merits” but chose not to do so on the date on which its opposition brief
was due. Adopting the approach utilized by Plaintiffs counsel (in burying
a “reservation of right” to submit additional arguments in opposition to a AY OAS >A ey ME HAQL wag TE Lmmy ee ons ans Mmrorrmant, oy &? gtk a) See ores fa ek Loaphoct MQie ‘Ri; : a Thane es, TS rere Te) wh oS PT = eyT oe ny d = Learpgoaih ds Pedr LOPS et ae ee BML ESE wd PURE Aa AL Ae A? PO RALEM at Ret ae F BN
properly pled motion at some future point in time in a document attached to
its legal memorandum) would, as a practical matter, result in piecemeal
litigation and a tremendous waste of judicial resources. Thus, even if the
Court had considered Plaintiff's “reservation of right” statement, the Court
would not have denied Defendant’s motion on such a basis. The Court’s
reconsideration of its July 15, 2010 Order is, therefore, not warranted. See,
e.g.,Polizzi, 931 F. Supp. at 339 (“[O]nly if the matters which were
overlooked, if considered by the Court, might reasonably have resulted in a
different conclusion will the court entertain” a motion for reconsideration),
8. Even assuming, arguendo, that reconsideration were warranted, the Court
finds that the fees sought by Defense counsel are reasonable in the context of
special education matters. See Sparr Decl., Ex. A, Docket Entry 45-1
(containing sworn certification by practitioner specializing in special
education matters attesting to customary fees charged by other attorneys
and/or paralegals in the field). In addition, the Court notes that Defense
counsel appropriately broke down its lodestar by rates charged depending on
the particular position of the attorney or paralegal involved and submitted a
detailed time log for each. See Sparr Decl., Ex. B, Docket Entry 45-1. Thus,
Defendant’s motion for attorneys’ fees was appropriately granted.
Accordingly, IT IS on this 7" day of September, 2010,
ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of this Court’s July 15, 2010 Order
[Docket Entry No. 52] 1s denied.
IT {IS SO ORDERED.
fe. LINARES, UWITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE