STATE OF NEW JERSEY
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
FINAL DECISION
SUFFICIENCY CHALLENGE
OAL DKT. NO. EDS 00462-26
AGENCY DKT. NO. 2026-40224
D.G. ON BEHALF OF M.G.,
Petitioner,
v.
RIDGEFIELD BORO BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Respondent.
D.G., petitioner, pro se
Frances L. Febres, Esq., for respondent (Cleary, Giacobbe, Alfieri, Jacobs, LLC, attorneys)
Record Closed: January 16, 2026
Decided: January 16, 2026
BEFORE BARRY E. MOSCOWITZ, Director and Chief ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This decision addresses a sufficiency challenge under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)(2)(A), 34 C.F.R. § 300.508(d) (2019), and N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.7(f).
FINDINGS OF FACT
Based on the documents submitted concerning this sufficiency challenge, I FIND the following as FACT:
On January 5, 2026, petitioner, D.G. on behalf of M.G., filed a request for due process hearing with the Department of Education, Office of Special Education (OSE), against respondent, Ridgefield Boro Board of Education. In her request for due process, D.G. asserts that she does not agree with the Individualized Education Program (IEP) that Ridgefield drafted for her son. D.G. specifies that she does not agree with the classification.
In response, on January 9, 2026, Ridgefield filed a sufficiency challenge with the OSE under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)(2)(A), 34 C.F.R. § 300.508(d) (2019), and N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.7(f). In its sufficiency challenge, Ridgefield asserts that D.G. filed a request for due process hearing because she did not have an opportunity to speak with evaluators at the eligibility and IEP meeting. As such, Ridgefield asserts that D.G. filed a request for due process hearing for an impermissible purpose.
On that same date, January 9, 2026, the OSE transmitted the sufficiency challenges to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) under the Administrative Procedure Act, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15, and the act establishing the OAL, N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -23.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(7)(A), a due process complaint must include notice of the following:
(I) the name of the child, the address of the residence of the child (or available contact information in the case of a homeless child), and the name of the school the child is attending;
(II) in the case of a homeless child or youth (within the meaning of section 725(2) of the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 11434a(2)), available contact information for the child and the name of the school the child is attending;
(III) a description of the nature of the problem of the child relating to such proposed initiation or change, including facts relating to such problem; and
(IV) a proposed resolution of the problem to the extent known and available to the party at the time.
[20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(7)(A)(ii).]
In this case, Ridgefield asserts that D.G. filed a due process complaint for an impermissible purpose. This argument, however, does not address the sufficiency of the complaint. It addresses the merit of the case. Meanwhile, the due process complaint provides notice of all the requirements delineated in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(7)(A)(ii). Moreover, D.G. does file a due process complaint for a permissible purpose. She disagrees with the IEP. Therefore, I CONCLUDE that the notice contained in the due process complaint is sufficient under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(7)(A).
ORDER
Given my findings of fact and conclusions of law, I ORDER that the sufficiency challenge is DENIED, and that the timelines for conducting a due process hearing must CONTINUE.
This decision is final under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(1)(A) and is appealable under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(2) by filing a petition and bringing a civil action in the Law Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey or in the United States District Court for the State of New Jersey.
January 16, 2026
DATE
BARRY E. MOSCOWITZ
Director and Chief ALJ
Date Received at Agency: January 16, 2026
Date Sent to Parties: January 16, 2026
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