UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
K.M. ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 23-391-SRF ) (Consolidated) ADULT AND PRISON EDUCATION ) RESOURCES WORKSHOP ) ) Defendant. ) ) DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF ) EDUCATION, ADULT AND PRISON ) EDUCATION RESOURCES WORKSHOP ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) Vv. ) ) K.M. ) ) Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM ORDER!
At Wilmington this 24th day of June, 2025, the court having considered the pending
motion to dismiss Count I of K.M.’s counterclaims, (D.I. 28),? IT IS ORDERED that the motion
to dismiss is DENIED for the following reasons.
1. Background. The following facts are taken from K.M.’s counterclaims. (D.I. 25 at
24-55) In January of 2021, K.M. was a pretrial detainee at the Howard R. Young Correctional
Institution (“Young”). Ud. at ] 3) At that time, he was eligible for special education and related
' On June 21, 2024, the parties consented to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings in this case including trial, the entry of final judgment, and all post-trial proceedings. (D.I. 18) 2 The briefing associated with the pending motion to dismiss is found at D.I. 31.
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services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et
seg. and had a right to receive a free and appropriate public education (““FAPE”) while he was
incarcerated. (/d.) K.M. enrolled in APER’s education program on or around January 14, 2021.
(Id. at§ 11)
2. On August 17, 2022, K.M. filed a Special Education Due Process Complaint against
the Adult and Prison Education Resources Workgroup (““APER”) of the Delaware Department of
Education (“DDOE”), alleging violations of his right toa FAPE. (Ud. at J] 4, 12) After an
evidentiary hearing, the hearing panel issued a decision and order on March 7, 2023 finding that
APER violated K.M.’s right to a FAPE by: (i) failing to create an individualized education plan
(“IEP”) designed to provide him with a FAPE; (11) failing to provide appropriate educational
programming; (iii) failing to provide special education and related services in K.M.’s least
restrictive environment (“LRE”); (iv) failing to follow timeframes relating to the adoption of
IEPs and reevaluations; and (v) failing to provide copies of K.M.’s records to counsel. (/d.)
3. K.M. initiated the instant litigation in this court on April 6, 2023 by filing a petition
for attorney’s fees as the prevailing party at the administrative hearing. (/d. at J 14) On June 2,
2023, APER filed a complaint against K.M. seeking a reversal of the administrative hearing
panel’s decision. (/d. at J 15) The two matters were then consolidated. (Ud. at J 17)
4. On July 18, 2023, the parties filed a joint stipulation to extend the deadline “for
K.M. to file an answer, counterclaims or other pleadings” from August 7, 2023 to December 5,
2023. (D.I. 20 at 2) In accordance with the stipulated extension, K.M. filed its answer and
counterclaims to APER’s complaint on December 4, 2023, asserting counterclaims for violations
of the IDEA, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act based on APER’s failure to provide him with a FAPE or an opportunity to equally and effectively participate in and benefit from APER’s educational services and
programs. (D.I. 25 at J 7)
5. K.M. also “appeals from the decision of the Panel for erroneous findings of fact and
application of law.” (/d.) K.M. argues that the panel erred in two ways. First, the panel erred in
finding that APER provided a FAPE to K.M. between March of 2022 and June 4, 2022 and
failing to award K.M. additional compensatory education for that period. (/d. at ] 19) Second,
the panel erred in failing to award K.M. compensatory education for the period between October
28, 2022 and January 20, 2023, even though it found that APER failed to provide him with a
FAPE during that time. (/d.)
6. Legal standard. Rule 12(b)(6) permits a party to seek dismissal of a complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To state a
claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although detailed factual allegations are not required, the complaint must set
forth sufficient factual matter, accepted as true in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, to
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). A claim is facially plausible
when the factual allegations allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged. /gbal, 556 U.S. at 663; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56.
7. When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true
all factual allegations in the complaint and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.
Umland v. Planco Fin., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008). The court may consider only the
allegations in the complaint, documents incorporated by reference into the complaint, and matters of which the court may take judicial notice. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd.,
551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); see also Barrier 1 Sys., Inc. v. RSA Protective Techs., LLC, C.A. No.
20-340-MN, 2021 WL 4622545, at *1 (D. Del. Oct. 7, 2021) (applying the Rule 12(b)(6)
standard to a motion to dismiss counterclaims).
8. Analysis. APER argues that Count I of K.M.’s counterclaims should be dismissed
because it is a permissive counterclaim that was not timely filed within the IDEA’s 90-day
statute of limitations to bring a complaint challenging a hearing panel decision. (D.I. 28 at 3-5)
(citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B)). K.M. responds that Count J of his counterclaims is
compulsory, not permissive, and it is therefore exempt from the 90-day statute of limitations.
(D.I. 31 at 3-4)
9. Under Rule 13(a)(1), a “compulsory” counterclaim is one which “arises out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim,” whereas a
permissive counterclaim is defined as “any claim that is not compulsory.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
13(a)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(b). A counterclaim is compulsory if it “bears a logical
relationship” to the primary claim. Azurity Pharms., Inc. v. Biopharma Inc., 650 F. Supp. 3d
269, 276 (D. Del. 2023) (quoting Xerox Corp. v. SCM Corp., 576 F.2d 1057, 1059 (3d Cir.
1978)). A logical relationship, in turn, depends on whether the two claims “involve many of the
same factual issues, or the same factual and legal issues, or where they are offshoots of the same
basic controversy between the parties.” /d. “The concept of a ‘logical relationship’ has been
viewed liberally to promote judicial economy.” Transam. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Aviation
Office ofAm., Inc., 292 F.3d 384, 389 (3d Cir. 2002).
10. K.M.’s first counterclaim is a compulsory counterclaim because it arises out of the
same transaction or occurrence giving rise to the claims in APER’s complaint. APER’s complaint challenges the factual findings and compensatory educational relief granted in the
hearing panel’s March 7, 2023 decision. (C.A. No. 23-604-SRF, D.I. 1) Similarly, Count I of
K.M.’s counterclaims seeks the reversal of portions of the hearing panel’s decision and an award
of additional compensatory education. (D.I. 25 at {] 100-06)
11. APER does not meaningfully challenge K.M.’s position that Count I of the
counterclaims arises out of the same transaction and occurrence as APER’s complaint. Instead,
APER contends that Count I should have been raised in a complaint within 90 days of the
hearing panel’s decision. (D.J. 28 at 5) But the Third Circuit’s decision in Jonathan H. v.
Souderton Area School District does not support APER’s position. 562 F.3d 527, 530 (3d Cir.
2009). As in the instant case, Jonathan H. was granted only part of the relief he requested in the
administrative decision, so he filed a complaint in the district court within the 90-day time frame
set forth in the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B), seeking review of the denial of his tuition
reimbursement claim. Jd. at 528. In its answer and counterclaims, the school district challenged
the administrative decision’s award of compensatory education to Jonathan H. Jd. Jonathan H.
challenged the school district’s counterclaim as untimely because it was not brought within 90
days of the final administrative decision, and the district court denied the school district’s
counterclaim on that basis. Jd.
12. The Third Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, noting that an IDEA action
filed in the district court is an original “civil action,” as opposed to an appeal, and it is therefore
governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. /d. at 529. Under this rubric, the Third
Circuit rejected the argument that the school district’s compulsory counterclaim was an “action”
under the IDEA that would subject it to the 90-day statute of limitations, holding instead that
“the plain language of the IDEA allows for a compulsory counterclaim to be filed beyond the 90- me Oe i A ieee Pn ae ae PN ud
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day window for bringing a civil action.” /d. at 529-30. Similarly, K.M.’s counterclaim against
APER is not untimely because the counterclaim is compulsory under Rule 13(a), and it was
timely pleaded pursuant to the parties’ stipulation to extend the deadline to file an answer and
counterclaims to December 4, 2023. (D.I. 20) The IDEA’s 90-day limitation on a plaintiff's
right to bring a civil action does not bar K.M.’s compulsory counterclaim.
13. APER attempts to distinguish the Third Circuit’s decision in Jonathan H. by noting
that “the plaintiff challenged a mixed result from an administrative agency,” whereas K.M. was
the “prevailing party” at the administrative level in this case. (D.I. 28 at 5-6) But a review of the
administrative decision confirms that the panel did not grant all the relief requested in K.M.’s
due process complaint. (C.A. No. 23-604-SRF, D.I. 1, Ex. A at 44) For example, the panel
carved out a period from March of 2022 through June 4, 2022, finding that K.M. was in an
appropriate educational setting consistent with a FAPE during this time. U/d., Ex. A at 34) The
panel also determined that an award of compensatory education should not cover the period after
October 28, 2022, even though K.M. was denied a FAPE through January 20, 2023. Ud, Ex. A
at 43) Although the administrative decision largely favored K.M., he did not receive all the
requested relief. Under these circumstances, K.M. may pursue relief in federal court. See Slack
v. State of Del. Dep’t of Pub. Instruction, 826 F. Supp. 115, 120 (D. Del. 1993).
14, APER’s reliance on the out-of-district decision in Lloyd v. Ingenuity Prep Public
Charter School, 368 F. Supp. 3d 25 (D.D.C. 2019), is unpersuasive. The district court’s decision
in Lloyd is not binding on this court, and it expressly rejected the Third Circuit’s binding analysis
in Jonathan H. Id. at 29.
15. Conclusion. For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that APER’s motion to
dismiss Count I of K.M.’s counterclaims is DENIED. (D.I. 28)
Sherry R. Fallon, : \
United States Magistrate Judge ~ goo eee