UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
RAYNA P., by and through her Parents, ) JESSIE P. and RONALD P., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) V. ) Civ. No. 16-063-SLR ) CAMPUS COMMUNITY SCHOOL, ) ) Defendant. )
M.P., by and through his Parents, ) JESSIE P. and RONALD P., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) V. ) Civ. No. 16-151-SLR ) CAMPUS COMMUNITY SCHOOL, ) ) Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM
At Wilmington this “Yay of January, 2017, having reviewed the pending motions
and the papers filed in connection therewith, the court issues its decision for the
reasons that follow:
1. Introduction. Plaintiffs Rayna P. and M.P., by and through their parents,
Jessie P. and Ronald P. (collectively, “plaintiffs”), brought the above captioned actions
against defendant Campus Community School (“defendant”), a public charter school,
pursuant to: the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400
et seq.; section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 504”), 29 U.S.C. § 794:
the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.; and 14
Del. Admin. C. § 922 et seq. (D.I. 1) The actions are in the nature of an appeal from
various aspects of the decisions of the presiding Delaware Special Education Due
Process Hearing Panels (“the Panel’), following evidentiary Due Process hearings. The
Panels found in their post-hearing decisions that defendant violated various of its
statutory duties to plaintiffs. The pending motions request supplementation of the
administrative records.
2. Standard of review. The IDEA provides that, in any action brought pursuant
to § 1415(e)(2), the district court “shall hear additional evidence at the request of a
party” and, “basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such
relief as the court determines is appropriate.” “[T]he question of what additional ny
evidence to admit in an IDEA judicial review proceeding, as well as the question of
weight due to the administrative findings of fact, should be left to the discretion of the
trial court.” Susan N. v. Wilson School Dist., 70 F.3d 751, 760 (3d Cir. 1995). In this
regard, the trial court’s focus should be on allowing evidence that is “relevant, non-
cumulative and useful in determining whether Congress’ goal has been reached for the
child involved.” /d. Factors the trial court may consider are: “(1) whether a procedural
bar prevented the introduction of the evidence at the administrative hearing; (2) whether
the party seeking an admission of the evidence deliberately withheld it at the hearing for
strategic reasons; (3) whether the introduction of the additional evidence at the district
court level would be prejudicial to the opposing party; and (4) the impact of the
admission of the evidence on the administration ofjustice, that is, whether the party
seeks to introduce not just new evidence but a new theory unrelated to the legal theory
presented at the due process hearing.” K.D. v. Downington Area Sch. Dist., 2016 WL
4502349, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2016).
3. Defendant’s motions in Civ. No. 16-063 (D.I. 16) and Civ. No. 16-151 (D.1.
17). Defendant, in both of the above captioned cases, moved to dismiss plaintiffs’
complaints based on the relevant statute of limitations. The respective Panels denied
both requests.' Defendant now moves to “consider further evidence” on the topic,
which evidence it intends to pursue through discovery. !n other words, defendant is not
moving to supplement the record with evidence it has in hand; defendant is seeking an
opportunity to acquire relevant evidence through discovery that it was not allowed to
take at the administrative level.
4. As noted by plaintiffs, however, defendant has neither appealed from the
adverse decisions of the respective Panels on its statute of limitations defense, nor has
it filed timely counterclaims in connection with such rulings. The court concludes,
therefore, that any discovery related to the applicable statute of limitations is not
relevant to the issues before the court.
5. Plaintiffs’ motion in Civ. No. 16-151 (D.I. 18). The subject of plaintiffs’
motion to supplement in Civ. No. 16-151? is related to the monetary value that should
‘See Civ. No. 16-063, Admin. record, ex. 2 at 30-31; Civ. No. 16-151, Admin. record, ex. 2 at 2.1.
*The additional evidence being the “verifications” of Jennifer Fletcher Tracy, Lindsay LaRiviere, and Beth Evans. (Civ. No. 16-151, D.I. 18, appendix)
be placed on the compensatory education provided to plaintiff M.P.. Having reviewed
the transcript of the hearing before the Panel, it is evident to the court that the above
subject matter generally is addressed at such hearings. In this instance, however,
plaintiffs’ counsel was under the impression that “the issue of relief’ would be
addressed in a separate hearing and, therefore, neither party affirmatively presented
relevant evidence.* The record, therefore, is consistent with plaintiffs’ position, that is,
the compensation rate reached by the Panel was based on insufficient evidence that
did not necessarily reflect the real world. Under these circumstances, the court will
allow plaintiffs to supplement the record.
6. The court recognizes, of course, that defendant has not had the chance to vet
this evidence, or to present contrary evidence. Therefore, defendant may depose each
of the new “witnesses” (each deposition not to exceed three hours), and may present
up to three opposing declarations (no longer than one-page in length), with plaintiffs
having the same opportunity to depose defendant’s declarants.
7. Conclusion. For the reasons stated, defendants’ motions (Civ. No. 16-063,
D.1. 16; Civ. No. 16-151, D.I. 17) are denied, and plaintiffs’ motion (Civ. No. 16-151, D.1.
18) is granted. An appropriate order shail issue.
Be Cant aneee United Statey District Judge
3See Civ. No. 16-151, Admin. record, ex. 5 at 653-661, with the Chair of the Panel conducting a limited examination.