UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
M.K., by and through his Mother : and Next Friend, MRS. K.,
Plaintiffs, : No. 3:96cv00482(WIG) vs. (Lead Case)
THEODORE SERGI, et al.,
Defendants. -----------------------------------X
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND : FAMILIES,
Plaintiff, : No. 3:03cv1658(WIG) vs. (Consolidated Case)
M.K., and MRS. K.,
Defendants. -----------------------------------X
RULING ON DEFENDANTS M.K. & MRS. K.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 3:03CV1658 [# 275]
Defendants, M.K. and his mother, Mrs. K., have moved for
summary judgment in the consolidated case, Commissioner,
Department of Children and Families v. M.K. and Mrs. K., No.
3:03CV1658(WIG).1 In that action, plaintiff Department of
1 This motion pertains only to Commissioner, Department of Children and Families v. M.K. and Mrs. K., No. 3:03CV1658(WIG). Four other motions were filed in the consolidated case, M.K. v. Sergi, et al., 3:96cv00482(WIG). In many respects, the motions are interrelated, and the parties’ general familiarity with the underlying facts is presumed. The Court will recite in this decision only those facts necessary to this particular ruling.
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Children and Familites (“DCF”) challenges the Hearing Officer’s
authority to join it as a party to the due process hearing in
Case No. 03-087 and to enter orders against it, and further
maintains that no attorney’s fees may be imposed against it.
Defendants now move for summary judgment on the following
grounds:
(1) This Court lacks jurisdiction over this case because DCF
failed to exhaust administrative remedies;
(2) The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel
preclude DCF’s relitigating the hearing officer’s findings
of fact and conclusions of law;
(3) DCF’s cause of action is without merit as a matter of
law; and
(4) An award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs against
DCF is appropriate.
For the reasons set forth below, defendant’s motion for summary
judgment will be denied.
Procedural Background
Following a due process hearing held pursuant to the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400,
et seq., M.K., by and through his mother and next friend, Mrs.
K., filed the original lawsuit, No. 3:96cv482(WIG), on March 19,
1996. On March 25, 2003, M.K. and Mrs. K. requested a second due
process hearing. On April 7, 2003, a pre-hearing conference was
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held with counsel for M.K. and the Putnam Board of Education.
DCF did not participate in that hearing and claims not to have
been aware that it was being held. The due process hearing began
on April 21, 2003. The issues before the Hearing Officer were:
1. Is the Student eligible for services under the IDEA?
2. Did the May 11, 2001, Individualized Education Program
(“IEP”) provide the Student with a Free and Appropriate
Public Education (“FAPE”)?
3. Did the Putnam Board of Education provide the Student
with appropriate transition services?
4. Is the Putnam Board of Education responsible for payment
of the Student’s foster placement, therapy and other support
services provided by DCF?
(Final Decision and Order No. 03-087 at 1.)
On the first day of the due process hearing, counsel for
M.K. stated that he believed that DCF was going to have to be
made a party because “DCF is currently paying for foster case,
paying for therapy, paying for case management. And, its our
And . . . the termination of these services will have a
devastating effect of Special Education programming for M.”
(4/21/02 Hr’g Tr. at 5-6.) M.K.’s counsel indicated that he
intended to file a motion to join DCF as a party to the hearing.
On April 30, 2003, M.K.’s counsel filed a motion to join DCF
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as a party to the due process hearing. On May 8, 2003, the
Hearing Officer heard oral argument on the motion. DCF states
that it did not receive notice of the hearing and did not
participate. The Hearing Officer granted M.K.’s motion stating,
“my jurisdiction over DCF is extremely limited. But I’m going to
join DCF at the current time because of the nature of the
hearing, because we’re dealing with transition services it
appears the Board is responsible for and DCF seems to be possibly
providing some of them.” (5/8/03 Hr’g Tr. at 9.)
On May 12, 2003, DCF filed an objection to M.K.’s motion and
requested oral argument, which request was granted. On June 6,
2003, DCF, joined by the Putnam Board of Education, argued
against its joinder. The Hearing Officer, however, declined to
change her May 8th ruling. On June 13, 2003, DCF filed a motion
for articulation and advised the Hearing Officer by letter that
it would not be participating in the hearing. The hearing
proceeded over seven days, concluding on July 2, 2003.
On August 15, 2003, the Hearing Officer issued her decision.
With respect to DCF, she concluded that, because she had
jurisdiction under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-76h(d)(1) to determine
whether a FAPE had been provided, she had limited jurisdiction
over DCF “where their actions may impact on the Student’s
transition plan.” (Final Decision & Order No. 03-087, Findings
of Fact ¶ 16.) She then ordered DCF to coordinate its school-to-
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work transition plan with that of the school district “to ensure
consistency, non-duplication of services, and, ideally, a more
appropriate and comprehensive plan.” (Id. at ¶ 17.) She also
ordered DCF to provide on-going representation to the PPT and to
coordinate their transition plan. (Id., Final Decision & Order ¶
6.).
On September 30, 2003, DCF filed the instant lawsuit limited
to the issue of the jurisdiction of the Hearing Officer over DCF.
This case was later consolidated with the two suits filed by M.K.
and Mrs. K.
Discussion
Defendants, relying on 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A),2 argue
that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this
action because DCF failed to exhaust administrative remedies
under the IDEA before filing suit. They assert that before DCF
2 Section 1415(i)(2)(A) provides:
Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made under subsection (f) or (k) of this section who does not have the right to an appeal under subsection (g) of this section, and any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made under this subsection, shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented pursuant to this section, which action may be brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States, without regard to the amount in controversy.
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could challenge in this action the hearing officer’s assertion of
even limited jurisdiction over it, DCF was required to appear at
the due process hearing to present evidence concerning the nature
and extent of the support services that it was providing, whether
those services should be considered educational or related
services under the IDEA, and whether those services were in any
way undermining M.K.’s ability to receive a FAPE.
Essentially defendants’ position is that if DCF provides
services to a student who is also entitled to receive or is
receiving special education services, DCF can be joined as a
party to an IDEA due process hearing and at that hearing it must
explain the nature and extent of the support services that it is
providing, whether or not they are educational services, and
whether or not they affect the student’s ability to receive a
FAPE. Additionally, if DCF refuses to subject itself to the
jurisdiction of the hearing officer, it is barred from filing
suit to contest the hearing officer’s assertion of jurisdiction
over it because it did not exhaust administrative remedies.
Thus, based on defendants’ interpretation of the IDEA, DCF is
faced with the proverbial “Catch-22” – subject itself to the
jurisdiction of the hearing officer or be forever barred from
challenging her assertion of jurisdiction.
As the Second Circuit recognized in Polera v. Board of
Education of the Newburgh Enlarged City School District, 288 F.3d
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478, 487 (2d Cir. 2002), “[t]he IDEA’s exhaustion requirement was
intended to channel disputes related to the education of disabled
children into an administrative process that could apply
administrators’ expertise in the area and promptly resolve
grievances.” “‘Exhaustion of the administrative process allows
for the exercise of discretion and educational expertise by state
and local agencies, affords full exploration of technical
educational issues, furthers development of a complete factual
record, and promotes judicial efficiency by giving those agencies
the first opportunity to correct shortcomings in their
educational programs for disabled children.’” Id. (quoting Hoeft
v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1303 (9th Cir.
1992)). However, the Second Circuit has held that “[e]xhaustion
will be excused where it would be futile, the agency has adopted
a policy or practice of general applicability that is contrary to
law, or it is improbable that adequate relief is available in the
administrative forum, or where . . . the parents have not been
notified that such remedies were available to them.” Weixel v.
Board of Educ. of City of New York, 287 F.3d 138, 149 (2d Cir.
2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In this case, exhaustion of administrative remedies must be
excused. DCF did, in fact, appear before the Hearing Officer for
the purpose of contesting jurisdiction, thus giving the Hearing
Officer an opportunity to rule on this issue in the first
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instance. Additionally, counsel for DCF expressly stated that it
was not waiving any objection that it had to its joinder in the
hearing by virtue of its presence at the hearing. (6/6/03 Hr’g
Tr. at 43-45.) DCF also filed an objection to plaintiffs’ motion
to join DCF in the due process hearing (Ex. B to DCF’s Reply
Brief), which was overruled. A requirement of further exhaustion
would entail DCF’s subjecting itself to the administrative
process that it is challenging here. Moreover, the
jurisdictional issue is a legal issue, not a factual, educational
issue on which the Hearing Officer has special expertise. Thus,
the Court finds that exhaustion of administrative remedies was
not required under the circumstances presented.
Defendants next argue that plaintiff is precluded by the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel from
relitigating the issues concerning whether the services it
offered were special education services and the manner in which
those services were delivered. In support of this argument,
defendants cite Patricia N. v. Lemahieu, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1243 (D.
Hawaii 2001), and Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 1994).
Neither of those cases, however, involved a situation, as in this
case, where the plaintiff was contesting the jurisdiction of the
court or administrative agency in the initial proceeding.
As a general rule, the doctrine of res judicata, or “claim
preclusion,” provides that when a court of competent jurisdiction
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has entered final judgment on the merits of a cause of action,
the parties to that action and their privies are bound not only
as to every matter presented to the court but also as to every
matter that might have been offered for that purpose. See
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Empresa Naviera Santa S.A.,
56 F.3d 359, 366 (2d Cir. 1995). The doctrine of res judicata
does not apply where “‘the initial forum did not have the power
to award the full measure of relief sought in the later
litigation.’” Burgos, 14 F.3d at 790 (quoting Davidson v.
Capuano, 792 F.2d 275, 278 (2d Cir. 1986)). Even where a second
action arises from some of the same factual circumstances that
gave rise to a prior action, res judicata does not apply if
formal jurisdictional or statutory barriers precluded the
plaintiff from asserting its claims in the first action. Id.
Here, because the Court has found that the Hearing Officer did
not have jurisdiction over DCF and DCF was not a proper party to
the due process hearing, the doctrine of res judicata does not
apply.
Likewise, DCF’s suit is not barred by the doctrine of
collateral estoppel or “issue preclusion,” where the judgment in
a prior suit precludes relitigating in a second action “issues
actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of the first
action.” Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n. 5
(1979). For collateral estoppel to apply, four elements must be
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present: “(1) the issues of both proceedings must be identical,
(2) the relevant issues were actually litigated and decided in
the prior proceeding, (3) there must have been full and fair
opportunity for the litigation of the issues in the prior
proceeding, and (4) the issues were necessary to support a valid
and final judgment on the merits.” Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp., 56 F.3d at 368 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). Again, because DCF was not a proper party to the due
process hearing, it did not have a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issues raised in this action. Therefore, it is not
barred by collateral estoppel from asserting these issues before
this Court.
As this Court ruled in its decision on Defendant Sergi’s
Motion for Summary Judgment [# 231] filed in the consolidated
action, Case No. 3:96cv00482(WIG), except in those instances in
which DCF acts as the LEA, the proper respondent in a due process
hearing is the local school board, the LEA, and not DCF, even
though DCF may be providing services that impact on the provision
of a FAPE. At all times relevant to the issues presented at the
second due process hearing, Putnam was serving as M.K.’s LEA.
Accordingly, DCF should not have been joined as a respondent in
the second due process hearing and cannot be held liable for any
of the costs and fees associated with that hearing. Therefore,
the Court denies defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to
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the merits of DCF’s complaint and also as to M.K. and Mrs. K.’s
claim against DCF for reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in
connection with the second due process hearing.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Defendants M.K. and
Mrs. K.’s Motion for Summary Judgment [# 275] in Department of
Children and Families v. M.K. and Mrs. K., No. 3:03cv1658(WIG),
is DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this 12th day of May, 2008, at Bridgeport,
Connecticut.
/s/ William I. Garfinkel WILLIAM I. GARFINKEL United States Magistrate Judge
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