UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
MR. and MRS. O, on their own behalf and as next friends of J.O. Plaintiffs, No. 3:20-cv-00690 (VAB) v.
GLASTONBURY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant.
RULING AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
On May 18, 2020, Mr. and Mrs. O. (“Plaintiffs” or “Parents”) filed a lawsuit against the
Board of Education of Glastonbury, Connecticut (“Defendant” or “the Board”), alleging that
Glastonbury violated the right of their son (“Student”) to a free appropriate public education
(“FAPE”) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.
(“IDEA”) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (“Section 504”). See
Compl., ECF No. 1 (May 18, 2020) (“Compl.”).
On December 29, 2021, this Court issued a Ruling and Order denying the parties’ cross-
motions for judgment on the administrative record. See Ruling and Order on Cross-Mots. for J.
on the Administrative R., ECF No. 33 (Dec. 29, 2021) (“Ruling and Order”); see also Mr. O v.
Glastonbury Bd. of Educ., No. 3:20-CV-00690 (VAB), 2021 WL 6134691, at *1 (D. Conn. Dec.
29, 2021). The Court then remanded the case to the state administrative hearing officer for
additional findings consistent with its decision. Id.
Parents have filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s decision. See Pls.’ Mot. for
Recons. of Order on Mots. for J. on the Administrative R., ECF No. 36 (Jan. 12, 2022) (“Mot.
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for Recons.”); Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Recons., ECF No. 36-1 (Jan. 12, 2022) (“Pl.
Mem.”). The Board opposes this motion. See Glastonbury Board of Education’s Opp’n to
Parents’ Mot. for J., ECF No. 37 (Jan. 24, 2022) (“Opp’n”).
For the following reasons, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to move to “alter or
amend a judgment” no later than twenty-eight days after the entry of the judgment. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 59(e). “The standard for granting [a motion for reconsideration] is strict, and reconsideration
will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that
the court overlooked—matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the
conclusion reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir.
1995); Lora v. O’Heaney, 602 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
“A motion for reconsideration is committed to the sound discretion of the court.” Nygren
v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 3:07-CV-462 (DJS), 2010 WL 3023892, at *2 (D. Conn. Aug.
2, 2010) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Lesch v. United States, 372 F.
App’x 182, 182 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The standard of review of a district court order granting or
denying a motion for [reconsideration under both Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b)] is whether the
order constituted an abuse of discretion.” (citing Devlin v. Transp. Commc’ns Int’l Union, 175
F.3d 121, 132 (2d Cir. 1999))).
II. DISCUSSION
Parents have moved for reconsideration of the Court’s decision on the parties’ cross-
motions for judgment on the administrative record, arguing that, based upon the conclusions in
that decision, this Court should reverse the decision of the administrative hearing officer and
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award student placement at Meliora Academy, reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, and any
other legal and equitable relief deemed just and proper. See Mot. for Recons. at 1; Pl. Mem. at 1–
9.
The Court will address each of Parents’ arguments, both on the procedural and
substantive issues, below.
A. Procedural Issues
In Parents’ view, this Court’s last decision supports that Parents were denied meaningful
parental participation as defined under the IDEA, and, as a result, Parents argue that they are
entitled to judgment on the administrative record. See Pl. Mem. at 3–5. Specifically, Parents
contend that this Court should grant them judgment on the administrative record where, in its last
decision, the Court noted the existence of evidence to support a claim of denial of parental
participation, including indications in the administrative record that the Board did not read letters
provided by Parents from Student’s physicians. See id. at 4 (citing Ruling and Order at 17–21).
This evidence in the administrative record, Parents argue, shows that the Board deprived Parents
of their right to meaningful participation, resulting in a denial of FAPE. Id.
In response, the Board argues that Parents have failed to meet the “strict” standard for
reconsideration in the Second Circuit, which requires, at a minimum, that a moving party point to
controlling decisions or data that the Court overlooked. See Opp’n at 1–3. In addition, as to the
issue of meaningful parental participation, the Board argues that reconsideration is inappropriate,
where Plaintiffs do not identify authority to suggest that the Court’s decision was incorrect, “nor
can they, because it is a rare case where alleged procedural errors are the type to entitle parents
to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 3 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). In sum,
the Board contends that Parents have merely requested that the Court repeat its analysis, but
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reach a different conclusion, an approach prohibited by the relevant standard on a motion for
reconsideration. Id. at 3–4.
The Court agrees.
Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence or other relevant information not already
considered by the Court, nor do they introduce any new or controlling case law that contradicts
the Court’s conclusion. While Plaintiffs may disagree with the Court’s decision, this is
insufficient to justify reconsideration. See Mercedes Zee Corp. LLC v. Seneca Ins. Co., 3:14-CV-
00119 (JAM), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126029, at *3 (Sept. 16, 2016) (“The fact that counsel
feels upset or disappointed with a judge’s ruling is not grounds for a motion to reconsider. Nor
should counsel file a motion for reconsideration on the assumption that a judge did not bother to
read or understand counsel’s prior pleading.”).
When deciding to deny judgment as a matter of law on the procedural issues raised, the
Court was cognizant that, in some cases, procedural inadequacies so seriously infringe on a
parent’s participation in the creation or formulation of the IEP that they constitute a denial of
FAPE. See K.R. ex rel. Matthew R. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 107 F. Supp. 3d 295, 309 n.120
(S.D.N.Y. 2015); see also Mr. P v. W. Hartford Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 735, 748 (2d Cir. 2018)
(“A procedural violation of the IDEA entitles a plaintiff to relief only if it: ‘(I) impeded the
child’s right to a [FAPE]; (II) significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity to participate in the
decision[-]making process regarding the provision of a [FAPE] to the parents’ child; or (III)
caused a deprivation of educational benefits.’” (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii)), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 322 (2018). The Court also did not exclude the possibility that such a violation
occurred here.
The facts in the administrative record, however, do not allow this Court to find a
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procedural violation resulting in a denial of FAPE as a court reviewing the issue in the first
instance, as opposed to in deference to a past state administrative law judge decision. See, e.g.,
E.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 164 F. Supp. 3d 539, 551–53 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (deferring to
decision of initial hearing officer, to the exclusion of a state-level appellate hearing officer,
where the administrative record supported the initial hearing officer’s conclusion that the Board
had submitted “no evidence that the [IEP Team] considered a more restrictive setting for M.K.,
[and] in doing so denied the Parent of an opportunity to meaningfully participate”); see also J.E.
v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 229 F. Supp. 3d 223, 235–237 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (declining to defer to
opinion of state-level appellate hearing officer, where the administrative record supported the
initial hearing officer’s conclusion that “the [IEP Team] offered its 6:1:1 program as a matter of
administrative convenience and a pre-determined outcome”).
This is especially so where the Second Circuit has distinguished the seminal case on
predetermination from the Sixth Circuit, Deal v. Hamilton County Board of Education, 392 F.3d
840 (6th Cir. 2004). In T.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free School District, 554 F.3d 247 (2d Cir.
2009), the Second Circuit found no evidence of predetermination, and distinguished Deal, where
it found that the parents had failed to demonstrate that the school district lacked an “open mind”
as to the contents of the IEP and where the administrative record contained evidence that the
parents “meaningfully participated” in the IEP meeting at issue. Id. at 253. Meaningful
participation was found where, although the parents alleged predetermination as to Student’s
educational program, the Committee adopted several of the parents’ recommendations in the
IEP, including that staff observe the student over the summer and receive training on how to
educate the student. Id. at 253.
Here, the Court’s last decision did not preclude the possibility that, on remand, an
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administrative law judge could find evidence of predetermination sufficient to find a denial of
meaningful parent participation, and, accordingly, a FAPE denial. Further factual development,
however, is required to determine whether, as a result of the alleged predetermination, the Board
denied Parents meaningful participation in the creation of the IEP.
Significantly, additional factual development is required to determine whether the school
district considered Parents’ position before rejecting their concern about transition to a public
school environment. 1 Such information is critical to decide whether predetermination occurred in
the first instance, especially where, as stated in the Court’s prior decision, the cases in which
federal courts have granted relief as a matter of law, without deference to the initial decision of
an educational hearing officer, tend to contain more conclusive evidence of predetermination
than is available here—for example, record evidence of a district policy or practice against a
particular form of special education placement or service. See, e.g., S.Y. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.,
210 F. Supp. 3d 556, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding FAPE denial on the basis of predetermination
where the administrative record showed that a proposed educational program “was rejected
categorically on the ground that the DOE does not offer [the requested 8:1:3] ratio in the public
schools”); see also Deal, 392 F.3d at 855–59 (finding predetermination where the administrative
record showed that the school district “had an unofficial policy of refusing to provide one-on-one
[Applied Behavior Analysis (‘ABA’)] programs and . . . thus did not have open minds and were
1 The IEP Team meeting notes state that, in response to Parents’ concern about transition to a public school environment, the head nurse stated that Student’s pediatrician informed her that Student’s medical issues would not prevent this change in educational placement. See Individualized Education Program at 2, ECF No. 26-20 (Jan. 30, 2019) (“B-46”). At the same Team meeting, however, Parents provided a letter written and signed by the pediatrician, which advised against transition to a private school environment, in light of students’ unique medical and academic needs. See id.; see also Letter from Maureen Onyirimba, M.D., ECF No. 26-20 (Jan. 29, 2019) (“B- 45”) (stating that Student is “medically fragile” and “recommend[ing] that he remain at Meliora Academy as the appropriate placement where his medical and education needs are being met”). Further factual development about the IEP Team meeting, in addition to an opportunity to assess witness credibility, is required to determine whether this interaction supports either the Parents’ or school district’s position on whether meaningful parent participation and/or predetermination occurred.
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not willing to consider the provision of such a program”).
Further, while the Board has pointed to evidence in the record that it provided Parents
with the results of the multidisciplinary evaluation in advance of the January 2019 IEP Team
meeting, see, e.g., E-mail Correspondence at 17–19, ECF No. 26-18 (January 8, 24, and 25,
2019) (“B-25”); Notice of Planning and Placement Team Meeting, ECF No. 26-18 (Jan. 3, 2019)
(“B-34”), additional factual development is required to determine whether Parents’ concerns
were considered in the 2019 IEP Team meeting at which the relevant IEP was created, see J.E.,
229 F. Supp. 3d at 234–35 (“While the [IEP Team] need not adopt a parent’s recommendation
for any particular aspect of an IEP, . . . ‘it may not deprive the Parent of meaningful participation
by refusing to consider . . . the Parent's concerns.’” (quoting E.H., 164 F. Supp. 3d at 551)).
Accordingly, the Court remands this issue to the administrative law judge for additional
fact-finding. See T.L. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 938 F. Supp. 2d 417, 437 (E.D.N.Y.
2013), appeal dismissed and remanded (June 26, 2014) (“A district court may remand the
proceeding for further development and clarification of the record.” (citing, inter alia, D.N. v.
N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 905 F. Supp. 2d 582, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding remand appropriate
where administrative hearing officer was “uniquely well suited” to review an issue on the
merits))).
The Court notes the following as to the remaining alleged procedural violations, which
include: (1) the Board removed objectives from the 2019 IEP; (2) the IEP had an error in the
number of service hours being provided to the Student; (3) the IEP lacked measurable objectives;
and (4) the Board failed to consider documents from an outside doctor or independent evaluators.
See Pl.’s Mot. for J. on the Administrative R. at 26–30, ECF No. 29 (Sept. 30, 2021).
As to the first and third alleged procedural violations, Parents have not cited any Second
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Circuit authority or case law to support their allegation that the Board’s alterations to the IEP
constitute procedural violations, much less ones that can result in a denial of FAPE or otherwise
argued that the Court should not defer to the Hearing Officer’s findings on these issues
specifically. Regarding the second, the Court agrees with the school district that this alleged
procedural concern amounts to impermissible “[s]peculation” that the school district will not
follow the IEP as written. M.O. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 793 F.3d 236, 244 (2d Cir. 2015).
Finally, as to the fourth alleged violation, the IDEA does require that the school district
“consider[]” evaluations that the parent obtains independently regarding their child, which, at its
most basic level, includes reading the evaluations. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(c); see also
Mr. P, 885 F.3d at 753–54 (noting that “an [Independent Educational Evaluation] had been
adequately ‘considered’ when it was read by the public school’s director of special education”
(citation omitted)). As previously noted, however, a procedural violation in and of itself will not
necessarily result in a FAPE violation. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii); see also M.W. ex rel.
S.W. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 725 F.3d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 2013) (stating that “parents must
articulate how a procedural violation resulted in the IEP’s substantive inadequacy or affected the
decision-making process”). The issue of whether this procedural violation resulted in a denial of
parents’ opportunity to participate in the decision-making process, or otherwise resulted in a
denial of FAPE, falls within the scope of the questions the Court has remanded to the
administrative law judge, including those clarified in further detail above. As a result, in the
absence of further fact-finding, the Court cannot find that the alleged procedural violations
individually or cumulatively resulted in a denial of FAPE, as would be required to grant
judgment on the administrative record to Parents.
Accordingly, the motion for reconsideration on the alleged procedural violations will be
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denied.
B. Substantive Issues
Parents further argue that this Court is required to grant judgment as a matter of law in
favor of private school placement where the parties did not present any additional evidence
beyond the administrative record on appeal, and where the Court did not find, as in E.M. v. New
York City Department of Education, 758 F.3d 442 (2d Cir. 2014), that the Hearing Officer relied
on improper evidence, Pl. Mot. at 6–7. Remand is inappropriate, in Parents’ view, where the
Hearing Officer will be “addressing the same issues under the same record,” upon which the
administrative hearing officer already offered a conclusion based on her educational expertise.
Id. at 6.
In response, the Board argues that remand is appropriate where the Court determined that
the Hearing Officer failed to make findings regarding the impact of the transition on the Student,
the relevant differences in certain parts of the 2018 and 2019 IEPs, and the appropriateness of the
proposed placement within a public- school environment in light of Student’s medical needs.
Opp’n at 4–5. The Board further argues that Parents’ motion for reconsideration is inappropriate
where it fails to identify any law that precludes such an order from the Court. Id.
The Court agrees.
As acknowledged by both parties, this Court has remanded several issues regarding the
appropriateness of Student’s placement to the Hearing Officer, including: (1) the appropriateness
of the timing of Student’s transition to the proposed program, given the substantial difficulty
with transitions described in the administrative record; (2) relevant differences between the 2018
and 2019 IEPs, including the provision of 1:1 ABA support and consultation services; and (3) the
appropriateness of the proposed placement in light of Student’s medical needs. Ruling and Order
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at 28–31. Parents have pointed to no authority to suggest that such questions cannot be
remanded, with the guidance provided by this Court, or, conversely, that this Court has the
authority to render a decision about the substantive appropriateness of the Student’s proposed
programming, where the administrative law judge did not address the issues identified above in
the first instance.
Where such critical aspects of the appropriateness of Student’s programming are not
addressed in the record of Hearing Officer’s decision, remand is appropriate. See T.L., 938 F.
Supp. 2d at 436 (“Remand is appropriate to obtain the necessary educational expertise of the
[administrative hearing officer].” (citation omitted)); J.F. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 12-CV-
2184 (KBF), 2012 WL 5984915, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2012) (stating that the
appropriateness of a proposed IEP and placement “is a question this Court is ill-equipped to
decide” and “involves important questions of educational policy [that] require[] educational
expertise to resolve”); see also J.H. v. Henrico Cnty. Sch. Bd., 326 F.3d 560, 568–69 (4th Cir.
2003) (remanding to state-level hearing officer where “the record does not contain findings by
the Hearing Officer with respect to” whether FAPE was provided, in relation to several key areas
of need); Henry v. D.C., 750 F. Supp. 2d 94, 99 (D.D.C. 2010) (denying cross-motions for
judgment on the administrative record where, although “the Court has the authority to undertake
its own review of the record and issue judgment in the case, the district court [also] may
determine that the ‘appropriate’ relief is a remand to the hearing officer for further proceedings”
(internal citations, quotation marks, and alteration omitted)). The Court therefore need not vacate
its prior decision.
Accordingly, the motion for reconsideration will be denied.
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V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
SO ORDERED at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 1st day of July, 2022.
/s/ Victor A. Bolden Victor A. Bolden United States District Judge
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