COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPEALS
BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS
In Re: Student v. Randolph Public Schools
BSEA No. 2614796
RANDOLPH PUBLIC SCHOOLS’ MOTION TO DISMISS/
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/SUFFICIENCY CHALLENGE
On June 3, 2026, Parent filed a Hearing Request with the Bureau of Special Education Appeals (BSEA) against the Randolph Public Schools (Randolph or the District). Parent, who is pro se, alleged that she and Student[1] had recently moved to Randolph and had provided the District with proof of residency, but Randolph Public Schools staff, including the special education director, were unhelpful and discriminatory on the basis of Parent’s and Student’s race, and had refused to enroll Student.[2] For relief, Parent requested the immediate enrollment of Student in the Randolph Public Schools for fall 2026 and the implementation of Student’s accommodations and special education services, including transportation.
On June 18, 2026, the District filed the Randolph Public Schools’ Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment (Motion to Dismiss) seeking dismissal, or in the alternative, summary judgment, with regard to Parent’s claims for lack of jurisdiction and/or failure to state a claim for which the BSEA can grant relief. Specifically, Randolph alleged that Student is not a student with a disability. In addition, through her Hearing Request, Parent seeks only enrollment of Student in Randolph’s Integrated Pre-School Program as a typical peer and transportation to/from this program. According to Randolph, while Parent seems, through her Hearing Request, to assert that Student should have a 504 Plan, Parent provided no information regarding the nature of the disability or how such disability renders Student eligible for a Section 504 Plan. In that regard, Parent’s Hearing Request is insufficient on its face and should be dismissed (Sufficiency Challenge).
On June 18, 2026, Parent responded via email, requesting that her complaint not be dismissed and clarifying that she was seeking a special education evaluation for her daughter. Via a separate email on the same date, Parent clarified that Student has a “communication disorder and emerging [] [Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder] ADHD.”
On June 19, 2026, Parent further clarified via email that Student does not have a 504 plan, but Parent “want[s] her to have one. [Student] has communication disorder and [sees a] therapist [] for behavioral [issues twice weekly] . She [has] emerging [] ADHD.” Parent is “looking for speech x 3 days a day [sic] for 45 mins and transportation.” Parent also wants Student to be “in a classroom [that will] help her but not in a classroom with non verbal kids [because she would] not do well [in such a setting] and [would not make] progress.”
The parties participated in an initial conference call on June 25, 2026. Subsequently, via email, Parent indicated that she was seeking to appeal Stoughton Public Schools’ finding of non-eligibility.[3] She also submitted two exhibits in support of her objection to the District’s Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Sufficiency Challenge.
Also on June 25, 2025, in response to Parent’s email of the same date reiterating her request for Student to be evaluated, the District informed Parent via email that Randolph would be sending her an Evaluation Consent Form seeking consent to administer a speech/language assessment and to conduct a records review of all previous assessments and additional documentation submitted.
As neither party has requested a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Sufficiency Challenge, and neither testimony nor oral argument would advance the Hearing Officer's understanding of the issues involved, I issue this Ruling pursuant to Rule VI(D) of the Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeals (Hearing Rules).
RELEVANT FACTS[4] AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Student is four years old and resides with Parent in Randolph, Massachusetts. Student meets the diagnostic criteria for Speech Dysfluency (stutter), a history of Sleep Disorder unspecified, and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder(ADHD), and would benefit from placement in a highly structured preschool with the support of special education teachers.[5] She is receiving speech and language services from a private provider for disfluency.
Prior to June 2026, Student resided in Stoughton. Stoughton Public Schools evaluated Student in the fall of 2025 and determined that Student was not eligible for special education services.
Following this finding of ineligibility, Parent sought an independent educational evaluation for Student, which Stoughton Public Schools funded in the spring of 2026.
The Stoughton Public Schools Team convened on May 28, 2026 to review the independent educational evaluation, and again did not find Student eligible for special education services and supports.
No Section 504 Plan was developed by Stoughton Public Schools.
Student enrolled in the District in June 2026, following verification of residency.
In Randolph, students who have 504 Plans but are not eligible for an IEP, are eligible to attend Randolph’s Integrated Pre-School Program as model peers only.
To be considered for a spot as a model peer, a parent must complete and submit the required application.
Model peers are not entitled to transportation to and from the Integrated Pre-School Program.
LEGAL STANDARDS AND APPLICATION OF LEGAL STANDARDS:
In applying the legal standards set out infra to the instant matter, I bear in mind that complaints filed by pro se parties, as in the instant matter, are to be construed liberally.[6] As explained by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, “[t]he policy behind affording pro se plaintiffs liberal interpretation is that if they present sufficient facts [to state a claim], the Court may intuit the correct cause of action, even if it was imperfectly pled.”[7] This principle aligns with “[o]ur judicial system[, which] zealously guards the attempts of pro se litigants on their own behalf” while not ignoring the need for compliance with procedural and substantive law.[8]
Legal Standards:
Sufficiency Challenge
According to BSEA Hearing Rule I(B), and consistent with the IDEA, a hearing request must contain the following information:
The name of the child;
The address of the residence of the child;
The name of the school the child is attending;
In the case of a homeless child or youth within the meaning of the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. Sec. 11434a(2)), available contact information for the child, and the name of the school the child is attending;
A description of the nature of the problem of the child relating to the proposed or refused initiation or change, including facts relating to the problem; and
A proposed resolution of the problem to the extent known and available to the party at the time.
BSEA Hearing Rule I(E) states that if the non-moving party believes that the hearing request does not contain the elements set out in Rule IB, that party may file a written challenge to the sufficiency of the hearing request with the Hearing Officer and the other party (ies) within fifteen (15) calendar days of receipt of the hearing request. The Hearing Officer shall rule as to the sufficiency of the hearing request within five (5) calendar days. This Rule further provides that if the hearing request is found to be sufficient, the original timelines remain unchanged. If the Hearing Officer finds the hearing request to be insufficient, the moving party may file an amended hearing request with the Hearing Officer and the other party, provided the moving party does so within fourteen (14) calendar days from the date of the insufficiency ruling. Failure to file the amended hearing request within 14 calendar days (or such other time as ordered by the Hearing Officer) may result in the dismissal of the case without prejudice.
Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to Hearing Rule XVI(A) and (B) and 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3)[9], a hearing officer may allow a motion to dismiss if the party requesting the hearing fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. These rules are analogous to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As such, hearing officers have generally used the same standards as the courts in deciding motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. To survive a motion to dismiss, there must exist “factual ‘allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)’ an entitlement to relief.”[10] The hearing officer must take as true “the allegations of the complaint, as well as such inferences as may be drawn therefrom in the plaintiff’s favor.”[11] These “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”[12]
i. Jurisdiction of the BSEA
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) grants the BSEA jurisdiction over timely complaints filed by a parent/guardian or a school district "with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child."[13] In Massachusetts, a parent or a school district, "may request mediation and/or a hearing at any time on any matter[14] concerning the eligibility, evaluation, placement, IEP, provision of special education in accordance with state and federal law, or procedural protections of state and federal law for students with disabilities."[15]
“A parent of a student with a disability may also request a hearing on any issue involving the denial of the free appropriate public education guaranteed by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as set forth in 34 CFR §§104.31-104.39.”[16] Section 504 requires schools to provide a free appropriate public education to each qualified individual with a disability.[17] An "appropriate education" is the provision of regular or special education and related aids and services that are designed to meet the educational needs of an individual with a disability as adequately as the needs of individuals without disabilities are met.[18] Although Section 504 does not delineate specific types of related services, OCR has interpreted Section 504 to encompass transportation as one of the many related services available under the law.[19] Transportation is also among the list of nonacademic and extracurricular services expressly enumerated as covered by Section 504's antidiscrimination provision.[20]
The BSEA "can only grant relief that is authorized by [state and federal special education] statutes and regulations, which generally encompasses orders for changed or additional services, specific placements, additional evaluations, reimbursement for services obtained privately by parents or compensatory services."[21]
The BSEA jurisdiction extends to IDEA-based claims.[22] The First Circuit held that the BSEA is not deprived of jurisdiction by the fact that certain claims are not based directly upon violations of the IDEA, nor by the fact that the relief a complainant seeks cannot be awarded by the agency. The IDEA’s exhaustion requirement “applies even when the suit is brought pursuant to a different statute so long as the party is seeking relief that is available under subchapter II of IDEA.”[23] However, in Fry v. Napolean Community Schools, 137 S.Ct. 743, 752 (2017), the U.S. Supreme Court held that “exhaustion is not necessary when the gravamen of the plaintiff’s suit is something other than the denial of the IDEA’s core guarantee – what the Act calls a ‘free appropriate public education.’” Whether a claim is IDEA-based turns on whether the underlying claim is one involving a violation of the IDEA or a violation of FAPE under Section 504, or “where there are no factual allegations to indicate that a dispute exists concerning the individual student’s eligibility under the IDEA or Section 504 or the discharge of the School’s procedural and substantive responsibilities under the IDEA or [Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973].”[24]
Motion for Summary Judgment
Pursuant to 801 CMR 1.01(7)(h), summary decision may be granted when there is “no genuine issue of fact relating to all or part of a claim or defense and [the moving party] is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.”[25] In determining whether to grant summary judgment, BSEA hearing officers are guided by Rule 56 of the Federal and Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that summary judgment may be granted only if the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."[26] A genuine dispute as to a material fact exists if a fact that “carries with it the potential to affect the outcome of the suit” is disputed such that “a reasonable [fact-finder] could resolve the point in the favor of the non-moving party.”[27] “As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.”[28]
The moving party bears the burden of proof, and all evidence and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.[29] In response to a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”[30] To survive this motion and proceed to hearing, the adverse party must show that there is “sufficient evidence” in its favor that the fact finder could decide for it.[31] In other words, the evidence presented by the non-moving party “must have substance in the sense that it [demonstrates] differing versions of the truth which a factfinder must resolve at an ensuing trial.”[32] The non-moving party’s evidence will not suffice if it is comprised merely of “conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.”[33]
Application of Legal Standards:
Randolph’s Sufficiency Challenge is DENIED.
Although the District correctly asserts that Parent did not articulate the nature of Student’s disability in her initial complaint, Parent has since clarified via her June 18 and 19, 2026, emails that Student has a communication disorder and, possibly, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). She also explained that she wants Student tested due to speech and behavioral concerns.
Because Parent is appearing pro se, I construe her pleading liberally[34] and find that Parent has provided the District with sufficient notice of Student’s alleged disabilities and the services she seeks. Accordingly, Randolph’s Sufficiency Challenge is DENIED.
Randolph’s Motion to Dismiss is ALLOWED.
After reviewing the facts in this matter, in the context of the legal standards described supra, I find that the District’s Motion to Dismiss must be ALLOWED.
Here, Parent alleges that the District discriminated against Student in the enrollment process on the basis of race. Because the BSEA has no jurisdiction over claims of discrimination on the basis of race,[35] Parent’s enrollment discrimination claim must be dismissed with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
In addition, in the instant matter, Student has not been found eligible for special education. Nor has she been found eligible for a Section 504 Plan. As such, Student is a general education student. To the extent that Parent seeks to enroll Student as a general education peer model student at the Integrated Preschool, the BSEA has no jurisdiction over general education students or such disputes.[36] In the same vein, to the extent that Parent alleges that in the context of general education transportation, the District has not offered transportation to Student, the claim is unrelated to the provision of a FAPE under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and, as such, the BSEA has no jurisdiction over this transportation issue. Parent’s claims relating to Student’s enrollment in the Integrated Preschool as a model student and transportation to and from school must be dismissed with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
To the extent that Parent seeks to have Randolph evaluate Student for special education eligibility, the District has agreed to conduct a speech and language assessment and a records review of all previous assessments and additional documentation submitted, but, to the undersigned Hearing Officer’s knowledge, has yet to provide Parent with the Consent to Evaluate Form. Parent made her request in writing on June 18, 2026[37]; Randolph’s last day of school for the 2025-2026 school year was June 22, 2026. As such, the District still has time to provide the Evaluation Consent Form to Parent[38], and therefore any claims relative to special education testing are not yet ripe for litigation. Should Randolph refuse to conduct the requested special education testing, Parent may file a Hearing Request contesting Randolph’s decision at that time[39].
To the extent that Parent is seeking to appeal Stoughton Public Schools’ finding of ineligibility for an IEP, the claim must be dismissed as Stoughton is not a party to the matter before me.
Randolph’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
As I have found that the District’s Motion to Dismiss must be allowed, I decline to address the District’s Motion for Summary Judgment. As such, it is DENIED.
ORDER:
Randolph’s Sufficiency Challenge is DENIED.
Randolph’s Motion to Dismiss is ALLOWED. The Hearing Request is dismissed with prejudice as to jurisdiction (integrated preschool enrollment as a model student, transportation, and racial discrimination claims), but without prejudice as to any future FAPE or 504-based claim.
Randolph’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
By the Hearing Officer:
/s/ Alina Kantor Nir
Alina Kantor Nir
Dated: June 25, 2026
Footnotes
[1] Parent filed a simultaneous Hearing Request for Student’s brother. This Ruling relates to Student only.
[2] Since the filing of the Complaint, Student has been enrolled.
[3] Specifically, Parent wrote, “I am asking to be tested[.] I am appealing the decision again.” I construe this to mean that Parent seeks to appeal the finding of ineligibility (discussed infra) by the Stoughton Public Schools.
[4] The following facts are taken as true for purposes of this Ruling only. I take those facts pled by Parent as true for purposes of the District’s Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment/Sufficiency Challenge, as well as any inferences that may be drawn therefrom. See Blank v. Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, P.C., 420 Mass. 404, 407 (1995).
[5] It is unclear whether the medical note from Student’s Developmental Behavioral Pediatrician, dated May 27, 2026, indicating Student’s diagnosis was ever provided to the Stoughton Public Schools. It was first provided to Randolph on June 25, 2026 when Parent submitted it as an exhibit in response to the District’s instant Motion.
[6] See Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997).
[7] Id.
[8] Id.
[9] Hearing Officers are bound by the Hearing Rules and the Standard Rules of Adjudicatory Practice and Procedure, 801 Code Mass Regs 1.01.
[10] Iannocchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).
[11] Blank v. Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, P.C., 420 Mass. 404, 407 (1995).
[12] Golchin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 460 Mass. 222, 223 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
[13] See 34 C.F.R. §300.507(a)(1).
[14] Limited exceptions exist that are not here applicable.
[15] 603 CMR 28.08(3)(a).
[16] 603 CMR 28.08(3)(a).
[17] See 34 CFR 104.33(a).
[18] See 34 CFR 104.33 b)(1).
[19] See Shasta County (CA) Office of Educ., 16 IDELR 1206 (OCR 1990).
[20] See 34 CFR 104.37(a)(2).
[21] In Re: Georgetown Pub. Sch., BSEA # 1405352 (Berman, 2014).
[22] See Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 59, 64 (1st Cir. 2002).
[23] Rose v. Yeaw, 214 F.3d 206, 210 (1st Cir. 2000).
[24] In Re Xylia, BSEA # 12-0781 (Byrne, 2012); see Diaz-Fonseca v. Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13, 29 (2006).
[25] 801 CMR 1.01(7)(h).
[26] Id.
[27] French v. Merrill, 15 F.4th 116, 123 (1st Cir. 2021); see Maldanado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994).
[28] Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
[29] See id. at 252; see also In Re: Westwood Pub. Sch., BSEA No. 10-1162 (Figueroa, 2010); In Re: Mike v. Boston Pub. Sch., BSEA No. 10-2417 (Oliver, 2010); Zelda v. Bridgewater-Raynham Pub. Sch. and Bristol County Agricultural Sch., BSEA No. 06-0256 (Byrne, 2006).
[30] Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
[31] Id. at 249.
[32] Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir. 1989).
[33] Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990).
[34] See Ahmed, 118 F.3d at 890.
[35] See Student v. Walpole Public Schools, BSEA # 17-01652 (Putney-Yaceshyn, 2016) ("it is well established that the BSEA has only that jurisdiction conferred upon it by law, which jurisdiction does not include ruling upon allegations of racial discrimination”).
[36] See Student v. Hampden Public Schools, BSEA # 14-03110 (Figueroa, 2013) ("I find that Student was a regular education student during the time in question and the BSEA has no jurisdiction over regular education disputes.").
[37] The Hearing Officer is not aware of whether Parent had made the request before that date. The initial Hearing Request does not allege that the Dstrict has refused to evaluate Student.
[38] See 603 CMR 28.04(1)(a) (“When a student is referred for an evaluation to determine eligibility for special education, the school district shall send written notice to the student's parent(s) within five school days of receipt of the referral”) (emphasis added). The District has indicated that it would be sending Parent a Consent to Evaluate Form.
[39] Except for matters involving discipline, which are not involved in the instant matter, Parent’s action in requesting an eligibility evaluation of Student also does not result in Student being covered at this time by the IDEA’s procedural protections. See 20 USC 1415(k)(5).