COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPEALS
BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS
Student v. Boston Public Schools BSEA # 2610482
Ruling on Boston Public Schools’ Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment
Relevant Procedural History
Student[1] filed a Request for Hearing on March 18, 2026. On March 27, Boston filed a Challenge to the Sufficiency of Student’s Hearing Request. The undersigned issued a Sufficiency Order on March 27 finding the Hearing Request insufficient and allowing Student until April 10, 2026 to re-file a more specific and detailed Hearing Request. An Amended Hearing request was thereafter filed on April 13, 2026.
Relevant Facts[2]
Student is a twenty-one-year-old (DOB: 7/25/2005) former student of Boston Public Schools. (Boston Exhibit B) She was enrolled and attended Another Course to College (within the Boston Public Schools) from September 2020 through June 2022. (Boston Exhibit-C) She has a diagnosis of dyslexia and was found eligible for special education services under the disability category Specific Learning Disability. (Boston Exhibit-B) While enrolled at Another Course to College, Student’s IEP called for services and accommodations in a full inclusion setting. (Boston Exhibit D, Boston Exhibit B)
Student’s Amended Hearing Request alleged that Student was denied a free appropriate public education for an unspecified time period and seeks a) reimbursement of “approximately $100,000 in private school[3] tuition and related expenses”, as well as b) compensatory education services for the denial of appropriate services for an unspecified time period. Said Request alleges violations stemming from the 2020-2021 school year and the 2021-2022 school year, with the latest alleged violation occurring on July 20, 2022. (See Amended Hearing Request) Student’s Amended Hearing Request alleges that on September 28, 2021 her Parent emailed Boston and stated teachers were failing to follow Student’s IEP, accommodations were not being provided, and Student’s disability was not being appropriately supported. (See Amended Hearing Request, pgs. 3, 6, and 8)
Student’s Team convened on June 22, 2022[4]. The Team reviewed evaluations and proposed placement in the full-inclusion setting. (Boston Exhibit-B)
Neither Student’s Hearing Request or Amended Hearing Request reflect that Parents/Student informed the Team of their disagreement with the proposed IEP/placement or of an intention to place Student out-of-district and request reimbursement from Boston. (See Hearing Request, Amended Hearing Request, (Boston Exhibit-H.) The N1, dated June 22, 2022, indicates Boston provided Parents/Student with the Parent’s Notice of Procedural Safeguards. (Boston Exhibit-H)
On August 30, 2022 Boston received an authorization form to send Student’s student records to Windham Woods School. This was the only communication the District received regarding Student’s transfer to Windham Woods School. (Boston Exhibit I).
Neither Student’s Hearing Request, Amended Hearing Request, or Response to Boston’s Motion to Dismiss/for Summary Judgment indicates that any further communication was sent to Boston regarding Student’s transfer to Windham Woods School.
Boston’s Position
The BSEA must dismiss claims barred by the statute of limitations under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and M.G.L. Chapter 71B.
Student filed her Amended Hearing Request, which provided some additional detail around the issues raised in her March 18, 2026 Hearing Request, on April 13, 2026. Applying the two-year statute of limitations, all claims in Parent’s Amended Hearing Request from before March 18, 2024 must be dismissed. Neither of the two exceptions to IDEA’s statute of limitations applies to Parent’s claims.
With respect to claims from after March 18, 2024, Boston argues that the Hearing Officer should grant summary judgment. It states that Parents/Student failed to provide adequate notice of their intent to make a unilateral placement. Therefore, pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)C)(iii), a hearing officer may deny or limit reimbursement. It argues that Parents’ failure to provide timely notice, coupled with the delayed request for reimbursement, demonstrates that the unilateral placement was a personal decision rather than the result of any deficiency by the district. As such, Student’s/Parents’ claims prior to March 18, 2024 must be dismissed.
Student’s Position
Student argues that summary judgment is not appropriate in this case because there are factual disputes as to the appropriateness of Boston’s IEPs that cannot be resolved without a Hearing. Further, she states that the adequacy of the IEP does not end the inquiry as Boston was also required to implement the IEP. She cites to an email, dated January 25, 2021, stating that Another Course to College did not have a rules-based program and Student should receive those services. (Student’s Exhibit D) Additionally, Student cites to an email from a teacher dated September 20, 2021, stating that he needs to ensure all students are writing the same amount and “It’s not fair that students have access to technology during an exam while others don’t.” (Student’s Exhibit B) Student argues that the case should not be dismissed at this stage as she should be allowed to present testimony and exhibits regarding her “required IEP accommodations; communications showing notice; staff statements and conduct regarding assistive technology and accommodations; evaluation delays and late delivery of information; academic decline and emotional regression; the decision to place [Student] at Windham Woods; tuition costs and related expenses; and [Student]’s progress and success after private placement.”
Student further states that the statute of limitations argument should be rejected or reserved for Hearing, arguing that “where the school controls the records, evaluations, explanations, and implementation information, parents may not know the full legal significance of what occurred until later.” Student states that her Parents repeatedly sought compliance, but Boston failed to implement the IEP, mischaracterized accommodations as discretionary, delayed evaluation information, and failed to remedy implementation failures. She argues that the statute of limitations cannot begin to run where Boston’s own conduct delayed discovery of the underlying violations. In response to Boston’s argument that reimbursement must be denied because Student/Parents did not provide formal written notice of their intent to unilaterally place Student, Student argues that Boston had actual and constructive notice of “the problem.” Parents repeatedly notified Boston that Student’s IEP was not being implemented. Further, she argues, additional notice would have been futile because even after repeatedly informing Boston that Student was not receiving required supports, Boston failed to meaningfully correct the problem.
Student also argues that Windham Woods need not be a state approved program if it was appropriate. She relies on Student Exhibit D as demonstrating that Boston lacked the staff and programming to provide her with required services, and thus Parents’ decision to place her in a private placement that provided those services was reasonable and appropriate.
Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to Hearing Rule XVI(A) and (B) of the Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeals (Hearing Rules) and 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3)[5], a BSEA hearing officer may allow a motion to dismiss if the party requesting the hearing fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The aforementioned rules are analogous to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As such, hearing officers have generally used the same standards as the courts in deciding motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. To survive a motion to dismiss, there must exist “factual ‘allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)’ an entitlement to relief.”[6]
In deciding motions to dismiss, the hearing officer must take as true “the allegations of the complaint, as well as such inferences as may be drawn therefrom in the plaintiff’s favor.”[7] In the instant matter, the allegations in Student’s Hearing Request are taken as true and all inferences are drawn in Student’s favor. These “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”[8]
Statute of Limitations
Any party seeking to file a due process hearing request before the BSEA must comply with the IDEA’s two-year statute of limitations adopted in Massachusetts. That is, a petitioner must initiate the request for a due process proceeding within two years of the date said party knew or should have known of the actions forming the basis of the hearing request[9], unless one of the two exceptions to the IDEA’s two-year limitation period is met. The two exceptions involve situations in which a parent is prevented from filing a hearing request because of: “(i) specific misrepresentations by the [district] that it had resolved the problem forming the basis of the complaint; or (ii) the [district]’s withholding of information from the parent that was required … to be provided …”. 20 USC 1415(f)(3)(D); 34 CFR 300.511(f).
Summary Judgment
Pursuant to 801 CMR 1.01(7)(h), summary decision may be granted when there is “no genuine issue of fact relating to all or part of a claim or defense and [the moving party] is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.”[10] BSEA hearing officers are also guided by Rule 56 of the Federal and Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that summary judgment may be granted only if the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.
The party seeking summary judgment must first demonstrate, with the support of its documents (pleadings, affidavits, and other submissions), that there is no genuine issue of fact relating to the claim or defense. The moving party bears the burden of proof, and all evidence and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.[11] In response to a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”[12] An issue is genuine if it “may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”[13] To survive this motion and proceed to hearing, the adverse party must show that there is “sufficient evidence” in her favor that the fact finder could decide for her.[14] In other words, the evidence presented by the non-moving party “must have substance in the sense that it [demonstrates] differing versions of the truth which a factfinder must resolve at an ensuing trial.”[15] The non-moving party’s evidence will not suffice if it is comprised merely of “conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.”[16]
Analysis
In applying the standards above to the instant matter, I bear in mind that complaints filed by pro se parties are to be construed liberally.[17] As explained by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, “[t]he policy behind affording pro se plaintiffs liberal interpretation is that if they present sufficient facts [to state a claim], the court may intuit the correct cause of action, even if it was imperfectly pled.”[18] This principle aligns with “[o]ur judicial system [which] zealously guards the attempts of pro se litigants on their own behalf” while not ignoring the need for compliance with procedural and substantive law.[19]
Here, Boston seeks to dismiss all Student’s claims that are barred by the statute of limitations. The IDEA and M.G.L. Chapter 71B provide that parties filing appeals under the IDEA must do so “within 2 years of the date the parent or agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C). Further, Boston correctly notes that upon reaching the age of majority a student only retains those rights to which their parents were entitled. See Student v. Dennis Yarmouth Regional School District, BSEA No. 1607923 (Figueroa, 2016) Thus, Student, who is now 21 years old, may only bring claims that Parents could have made on her behalf if she were still a minor. In her Hearing Request Student alleged Boston failed to implement her IEPs, provide necessary accommodations, complete timely evaluations, and provide her with FAPE during unspecified times between her ninth grade year (2020-2021) and her graduation in June 2024. Student’s Response to Boston’s Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment argues, without providing specifics, that Boston withheld required information and misrepresented the legal nature of Student’s accommodations. Student’s own exhibits, however, demonstrate that Parents/Student were aware that Student’s school did not offer a rules-based program, which Student should have received as early as January 2021. (See Student Exhibit D.) They were aware since Mr. Dibinga’s September 20, 2021 email that he was not allowing Student to use her iPad at all times in his class. (Student Exhibit B) They knew that they had not received evaluation reports since before July 20, 2022, when they requested the same from Boston. Despite this knowledge, they did not file a Request for Hearing until March 2026.
Moreover, neither of the two exceptions to the two-year statute of limitations outlined above is here applicable. Student has not alleged that Boston made any misrepresentations to her/Parents regarding resolution of the iPad issue, the rules based reading issue or the FAPE issue. Likewise, with respect to the second exception, Student has not alleged that Boston withheld information from her and/or Parents that was required to be provided. Conversely, Boston has demonstrated that Parents were provided with the Parents Right Brochure on or around June 22, 2022. (School Exhibit H)
Having determined that Student/Parents did not initiate the request for a due process proceeding within two years of the date they knew or should have known of the actions forming the basis of the hearing request and neither of the two exceptions to the statute of limitations applies to the instant matter, I find that Student’s claims arising prior to March 18, 2024 are barred by the statute of limitations and are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
Boston next argues that it is entitled to summary judgment with respect to all claims not barred by the statute of limitations, i.e., those arising after March 18, 2024. It points to 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) which provides in relevant part as follows:
(iii) Limitation on reimbursement
The cost of reimbursement described in clause (ii) may be (emphasis added) reduced or denied--
(I) if--
(aa) at the most recent IEP meeting that the parents attended prior to removal of the child from the public school, the parents did not inform the IEP Team that they were rejecting the placement proposed by the public agency to provide a free appropriate public education to their child, including stating their concerns and their intent to enroll their child in a private school at public expense; or
(bb) 10 business days (including any holidays that occur on a business day) prior to the removal of the child from the public school, the parents did not give written notice to the public agency of the information described in item (aa) . . . .
While it is true that Student has not provided any evidence that she or Parents provided the requisite notice, it would be improper to dispose of this issue through a summary judgment motion in light of the discretionary language used in the statute. (See italics, above.) Given such discretionary language, it is necessary to hear evidence regarding the lack of notice in order to determine whether reimbursement should be reduced or denied.
Further, under subsection((ii) of the above statute the hearing officer has discretion to reimburse parents upon a finding that the district did not provide FAPE to the student. It states:
If the parents of a child with a disability, who previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency, enroll the child in a private elementary school or secondary school without the consent of or referral by the public agency, a court or a hearing officer may require (emphasis added) the agency to reimburse the parents for the cost of that enrollment if the court or hearing officer finds that the agency had not made a free appropriate public education available to the child in a timely manner prior to that enrollment.
Although Boston has argued that it provided Student with FAPE, it has not provided sufficient evidence to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to its provision of FAPE. Boston’s exhibits contain proposed IEPs, but no evidence that they were reasonably calculated to provide Student with FAPE in the least restrictive environment and no evidence of what Student’s needs were at the time the IEPs were proposed. Therefore, Boston’s Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Student’s claims for the time period between March 18, 2024 and June 2024 when she graduated is DENIED.
ORDERS
Student’s claims prior to March 18, 2024 are barred by the statute of limitations and therefore Boston’s Motion to Dismiss all claims prior to March 18, 2024 with prejudice is ALLOWED.
Boston’s Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to claims for the time period between March 18, 2024 through June 2024 may proceed.
The case remains scheduled, as previously ordered on August 21, 2026, from 9:00 a.m. until 4:00 p.m., via Zoom. Exhibits and witness lists remain due on August 14, 2026 by 5:00 p.m.
So Ordered by the Hearing Officer,
/s/ Catherine Putney-Yaceshyn
Catherine Putney-Yaceshyn
Dated: August 12, 2026
Footnotes
[1] Student is over eighteen and is appearing pro se in this matter.
[2] The facts are established for purposes of this Ruling only.
[3] The Amended Hearing Request does not specify a private school.
[4] The Team was originally scheduled to held on April 11, 2022, but was rescheduled to June 2, 2022, and then again to June 22, 2022. (Exhibit S-G, P-C)
[5] Hearing Officers are bound by the BSEA Hearing Rules and the Standard Rules of Adjudicatory Practice and Procedure, 801 Code Mass Regs 1.01.
[6] Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).
[7] Blank v. Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, P.C., 420 Mass. 404, 407 (1995).
[8] Golchin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 460 Mass. 222, 223 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
[9] 20 USC 1415(f)(3)(C); 34 CFR 300.507(a)(2); 34 CFR 300.511(e).
[10] 801 CMR 1.01(7)(h).
[11] Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986); see also In Re: Westwood Pub. Schl., BSEA # 10-1162 (Figueroa, 2010); In Re: Mike v. Boston Pub. Sch., BSEA # 10-2417 (Oliver, 2010); Zelda v. Bridgewater-Raynham Pub. Sch. and Bristol Cty Agricultural Sch., BSEA # 06-0256 (Byrne, 2006).
[12] Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
[13] Maldanado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994).
[14] Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
[15] Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir. 1989).
[16] Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990).
[17] See Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997).
[18] Id.
[19] Id.