COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPEALS
BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS
In Re: Worcester Public Schools v. Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education & Lowell Public Schools
RULING ON THE DEPARTMENT OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION’S MOTION TO DISMISS WORCESTER'S AMENDED HEARING REQUEST
This matter comes before the Hearing Officer on the Second Motion to Dismiss (Motion) filed by the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (DESE, or the Department) in response to an Amended LEA (Local Educational Agency) Assignment Hearing Request (Amended Hearing Request) filed by Worcester Public Schools (Worcester, or WPS) on April 22, 2026.[1] A Motion Hearing was held via a virtual platform on May 28, 2026, during which the parties offered oral arguments to supplement their written submissions.[2] For the reasons articulated below, DESE’s Motion is hereby ALLOWED in part and DENIED in part.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The detailed procedural history of this case is described in the undersigned Hearing Officer’s Ruling on Motions to Dismiss issued March 2, 2026 [hereinafter March Ruling] [3] and need not be repeated here, except as relevant to the instant determination. On January 13, 2026, Worcester filed a LEA Assignment Hearing Request (Initial Hearing Request) against DESE, Quabbin Regional School District (Quabbin, or QRSD), Springfield Public Schools (Springfield, or SPS), Framingham Public Schools (Framingham, or FPS), Acton Public Schools (Acton, or APS), and Lowell Public Schools (Lowell, or LPS).
In the Initial Hearing Request, WPS challenged the Assignment Notice issued by DESE on November 14, 2025 (2025 Assignment), pursuant to which the Department assigned both fiscal and programmatic responsibility for Student to Worcester, in which school district Student had been enrolled from February 2, 2025 until he was relocated by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) on or about July 21, 2025. At that time Student was enrolled in an approved special education school within Quabbin.[4] The 2025 Assignment specified that WPS would remain responsible until Student is adopted “or until a legal guardian for him is appointed.” DESE recognized in the 2025 Assignment that Student’s situation is complicated, as under the Department’s regulations, assignment of responsibility for students who are in foster care and without a parent or guardian residing in Massachusetts depends upon where the parents last resided in Massachusetts, but in this case, Student’s legal guardian is DCF and Parents have never resided in Massachusetts. In its Initial Hearing Request, Worcester sought a decision finding that DESE had erroneously applied its own regulations and finding that one of the other districts named therein, or some combination thereof, should bear responsibility for Student.
The Hearing was scheduled for February 2, 2026. On January 20, 2026, the Hearing was postponed for good cause.
Between January 26, 2026 and February 4, 2026, DESE, Lowell, Framingham, Springfield, and Quabbin filed Motions to Dismiss and/or Responses to Worcester’s Hearing Request in which they expressed support for each other’s Motions to Dismiss. On February 6, 2026, after requesting and receiving an extension, Worcester filed its Oppositions to the pending Motions to Dismiss. Among other things, in its Opposition to DESE’s Motion to Dismiss, Worcester argued that statutory authority and persuasive case law permits the assignment of fiscal responsibility to state educational agencies (SEAs) when state law does not apply squarely to an individual student’s circumstances, such that the BSEA could exercise its discretionary authority to fashion equitable relief, making DESE responsible for Student in the unique circumstances of this case.
On February 26, 2026, the parties jointly requested that the matter be continued to April 17, 2026, and that a decision be rendered without a Hearing, based solely on written material submitted by the parties on or before that date. This request was allowed for good cause on February 27, 2026. The March Ruling dismissed Framingham, Quabbin, and Springfield as parties to the instant matter.[5] DESE’s Motion to Dismiss was allowed as to programmatic responsibility but was denied as to fiscal responsibility.
In March and April 2026, the parties issued subpoenas duces tecum to DCF, seeking records regarding Student and his parents. DCF objected to the subpoenas, and the issue was ultimately resolved informally.
On April 22, 2026, with the assent of the parties, WPS submitted its Amended Hearing Request, to clarify Worcester’s claims against the remaining parties.[6] Worcester contends that DESE erred in assigning WPS fiscal responsibility for Student under three theories: (1) Lowell bears fiscal responsibility under 603 CMR 28.10(8)(c)(4); (2) DESE is fiscally responsible for Student’s education under 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(11)(A) and Orange County Department of Education v. California Department of Education (Orange County);[7] and/or (3) if DESE cannot be held fiscally responsible for Student, its LEA Assignment should nonetheless be overturned because the Department failed to apply the same logic it employed in a 2021 LEA Assignment (2021 Assignment).[8]
On May 8, 2026, Lowell filed a Motion to Dismiss and Response to Worcester’s Amended Hearing Request, with accompanying exhibits. On May 12, 2026, DESE filed its Second Motion to Dismiss. To the extent this document responds to the Amended Hearing Request, the Department asserts that its interpretation of its special education assignment regulations is entitled to deference; that the 2021 LEA Assignment is not relevant to the present matter as it was never appealed by the assigned districts and is factually and legally distinguishable; that the Department cannot be assigned fiscal responsible under 603 CMR 28.10(9)(f) for Student because it is not a school district; and that DESE cannot be found liable under a general supervision theory. As such, according to the Department, the 2025 Assignment should be upheld. DESE’s Response also seeks dismissal of several claims in Worcester’s Amended Hearing Request. For the first time, the Department raises the issue of the statute of limitations within its LEA assignment regulations. Specifically, the Department argues that 603 CMR 29.10(9)(a), which allows a school district to appeal a LEA assignment within 60 days of the most recent notification of assignment, bars Worcester’s Amended Hearing Request, because the most recent notification of assignment was November 14, 2025, and the statute of limitations deadline therefore expired on January 13, 2026, the date on which WPS filed its Initial Hearing Request. As such, any new claim Worcester raises – specifically, any allegation that DESE should be fiscally responsible for Student – is barred.
Following an assented-to extension, on May 22, 2026, Worcester filed its Opposition to Lowell Public Schools’ Motion to Dismiss, with accompanying exhibits, and its Opposition to DESE’s Response to Amended Hearing Request/Second Motion to Dismiss. On May 27, 2026, Lowell withdrew its Motion to Dismiss.
In its Opposition to DESE’s Response to Amended Hearing Request/Second Motion to Dismiss (Opposition), Worcester asserts that to the extent DESE’s Response to Worcester’s Amended Hearing Request seeks dismissal of Worcester’s claims, it is in fact an overdue opposition to Worcester’s Amended Hearing Request. As such, the Hearing Officer must treat Worcester’s Amended Hearing Request as a motion for leave to amend and DESE’s Second Motion to Dismiss as an opposition/response to Worcester’s motion for leave, consistent with Rule VI(C) of the Bureau of Special Education Appeals Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeals (BSEA Hearing Rules). Worcester argues that in the alternative to ruling on Worcester’s motion for leave to amend, the BSEA should deny DESE’s Second Motion to Dismiss as untimely.
Substantively, Worcester contends that WPS was only made aware of the 2021 LEA matter during discovery in the instant LEA case. As such, Worcester could not have raised the issue of what it considers DESE’s arbitrary application of its own regulations (namely, the Department’s exercise of inherent discretionary authority in the 2021 Assignment, versus its reliance on the temporary assignment provision in the 2025 Assignment) in its Initial Hearing Request. Given these inconsistencies, WPS requests that the BSEA overturn DESE’s 2025 LEA Assignment and return the matter to the Department, “with instructions for DESE to apply the LEA regulations as DESE did in 2021 when it ‘consider[ed] all relevant information to make a reasonable determination about programmatic and fiscal responsibility.’” Worcester argues, further, that its claim that DESE bears fiscal responsibility for Student is based not on a general supervisory theory, but on “particular persuasive authority from the Ninth Circuit finding that, in rare circumstances where a student’s custody/place of living is constantly in flux and state law/regulations fail to determine fiscal responsibility, [SEAs] can be ordered fiscally responsible under [the] IDEA.” In the decision cited by Worcester, Orange County, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that in the specific circumstances of the case, where California law failed to make any school responsible for the student’s eduction for a period of time, the SEA was fiscally responsible for the student’s placement at an out-of-state residential school.[9] Finally, according to Worcester, when the BSEA denied DESE’s first attempt to dismiss Worcester’s claims in its March Ruling, the Hearing Officer “essentially acknowledged that Worcester would have to amend” its Hearing Request (emphasis in original).
II. DISCUSSION
Evaluating DESE’s Second Motion to Dismiss requires examination and application of the relevant substantive law and procedural standards.
A. Legal Standards
i. Motions to Dismiss
Pursuant to the Standard Adjudicatory Rules of Practice and Procedure, 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3) and Rule XVI(B) of the BSEA Hearing Rules, a hearing officer may allow a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction to decide the matter, or if the party requesting the appeal fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. These rules are analogous to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and, as such, hearing officers have generally used the same standards as the courts in deciding motions to dismiss.[10] Like Rule 12(b)(1), 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3) permits a party to move at any time to dismiss a claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the ground that the tribunal lacks the authority to adjudicate the matter at all.[11] What is required to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) “are factual ‘allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)’ an entitlement to relief.”[12] In evaluating the complaint, the hearing officer must take as true “the allegations of the complaint, as well as such inferences as may be drawn therefrom in the plaintiff’s favor.”[13] These “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . [based] on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact) . . . .”[14]
ii. BSEA Jurisdiction and LEA Assignment Appeals
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) provides parents the right to pursue a formal due process complaint with respect to “any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.”[15] In Massachusetts, the BSEA is the administrative agency before which any impartial due process hearing regarding these issues takes place. The limited jurisdiction of the BSEA includes both hearing requests filed by parents and school districts concerning these matters, and “appeals of the Department’s assignments of school district responsibility for children with disabilities,[16] as each LEA assignment necessarily concerns ‘a matter relating to the . . . education program or educational placement of a child with a disability or the provision of a free appropriate public education to the child.’”[17]
LEA assignment appeals are governed primarily by 603 CMR 28.10(9), which authorizes an assigned school district to appeal a LEA Assignment to the BSEA.[18] Pursuant to BSEA Hearing Rule XVII, pertaining to appeals of LEA assignments, some of the BSEA Hearing Rules also apply.[19]
iii. Amendments and Statutes of Limitations
BSEA Hearing Rule I(G) governs amendments to Hearing Requests. The Rule permits such amendments under specific circumstances and provides that where an amendment merely clarifies issues raised in the initial hearing request, the date of the initial hearing request controls for statute of limitations purposes, but for issues not included in the original hearing request, the date of the amended hearing request is controlling. BSEA Hearing Rule XVII(B), however, specifies that LEA Assignment Hearing Requests are not subject to BSEA Hearing Rule I(G).
603 CMR 28.10(9) is silent as to amendments. Pursuant to 603 CMR 28.10(9)(a), a school district must appeal an assignment of school district responsibility within 60 days of the most recent notification of assignment. A request for appeal must be based on information that was provided to DESE in connection with the original assignment.[20] The BSEA may return the case to DESE if new information is presented at the hearing.[21]
B. Application of Standards Requires Partial Denial of DESE’s Second Motion to Dismiss in Response to Worcester’s Amended Hearing Request
I note as a preliminary matter that although Worcester is correct that DESE filed the instant Second Motion to Dismiss beyond the 10 days provided in BSEA Hearing Rule I(D) for a response to a Hearing Request, this Rule does not apply to LEA Assignment Hearing Requests.
Reading together 603 CMR 28.10(9)’s statute of limitations for appeals of LEA assignments, and BSEA Hearing Rule XVII(B)’s exclusion of BSEA Hearing Rule I(G) from the Hearing Rules that apply to these cases, I conclude that amendments to pending LEA Hearing Requests that raise new claims are not permitted.[22] However, to the extent an amendment merely clarifies claims encompassed in the initial Hearing Request, such clarification is permitted.[23] DESE does not disagree with this principle, but the Department argues that all of Worcester’s claims that DESE should be fiscally responsible for Student are new and should, therefore, be dismissed. On the other hand, Worcester asserts that the Hearing Officer has already stated in the March Ruling that its claims against DESE, including its claim that DESE may bear independent fiscal responsibility for Student, are sufficient to withstand dismissal. Therefore, Worcester contends that the BSEA should not contradict its March Ruling by dismissing the claims in the Amended Hearing Request on statute of limitations grounds.
The standard for a Motion to Dismiss, reviewed above, requires me to examine only the allegations contained in the Amended Hearing Request, take them as true, and draw any inferences that may reasonably be drawn therefrom in Worcester’s favor.[24] If these allegations plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, DESE’s Second Motion to Dismiss will be denied.[25]
Worcester asserted in its Initial Hearing Request that DESE erred in applying its regulations when the Department concluded that WPS was fiscally and programmatically responsible for Student during the relevant timeframe. Thus, any claim in the Amended Hearing Request that may reasonably be understood as clarifying this original claim will be permitted.
i. Claims in the Amended Hearing Request that Merely Clarify Claims from the Initial Hearing Request Survive DESE’s Second Motion to Dismiss
In the March Ruling, I denied DESE's first Motion to Dismiss as to fiscal responsibility, allowing Worcester's claim that DESE should bear fiscal responsibility for Student's special education to survive.[26] Although Worcester had not explicitly named DESE as fiscally responsible in its initial Hearing Request, and although I declined to consider arguments raised for the first time in Worcester's Opposition to DESE's Motion to Dismiss, I found that this claim was nonetheless sufficiently pled as a reasonable inference from Worcester's core allegation, that is, that DESE had itself acknowledged its regulations did not squarely apply to Student's circumstances, yet assigned both programmatic and fiscal responsibility to Worcester, where Parents had never resided.[27] Viewing the allegations in the Amended Hearing Request in the light most favorable to WPS and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor, I concluded that Worcester's factual allegations at the time plausibly suggested an entitlement to relief on the question of fiscal responsibility, whether in the form of an assignment to Lowell as the district of Parents' last known Massachusetts residence, or alternatively an assignment to DESE itself in the unique circumstances of this case where no regulation applied squarely.[28]
Although Worcester’s argument that the differing outcomes between the 2021 LEA Assignment and the 2025 LEA Assignment involving the same student appears for the first time in its Amended Hearing Request, this contention may also reasonably be read to support the core allegation contained in Worcester’s initial Hearing Request. The argument highlights DESE’s own prior decision-making with respect to the same student and, as such, further clarifies WPS’s contention regarding the Department’s application of its regulations. Thus, to the extent the amendment incorporates a claim that the 2021 LEA assignment demonstrates that DESE applied its regulations inconsistently and improperly, such amendment is permitted, and DESE’s Motion to Dismiss is denied.[29]
ii. Claims Appearing for the First Time After the Initial Hearing Request Do Not Survive DESE’s Motion to Dismiss
In my March Ruling, I noted that WPS may also succeed in its appeal if Worcester could demonstrate that DESE’s regulations do not apply squarely to resolve the issue of fiscal responsibility for Student, such that the BSEA might conclude that in the unique circumstances of this case, this responsibility lies with the Department. Since that time, however, DESE has raised a statute of limitations argument, which requires me to analyze whether a particular claim in Worcester’s Amended Hearing Request that was not raised in the Initial Hearing Request clarifies those original claims or raises a new one. Worcester’s Initial Hearing Request was grounded in WPS’s assertion that DESE misapplied its own regulations. Worcester’s claim in its Amended Hearing Request that DESE bears fiscal responsibility as a SEA under 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(11)(A), or pursuant to Orange County, may clarify its claim that fiscal responsibility may be assigned to a SEA when state law does not apply squarely to a particular student’s circumstances. This claim appeared for the first time, however, in Worcester’s Opposition to DESE’s Motion to Dismiss, filed on February 26, 2026, not in Worcester’s Initial Hearing Request. As such, this claim does not clarify those claims appearing in Worcester’s initial Hearing Request. Notwithstanding my comment in the March Ruling, Worcester’s claims that DESE may bear independent fiscal responsibility for Student for any reason other than the erroneous application of its own regulations are hereby DISMISSED, as such claims do not merely clarify the claims raised in the Initial Hearing Request.[30]
III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Upon consideration of Worcester's Amended Hearing Request, DESE's Second Motion to Dismiss, and Worcester's Opposition thereto, I find that DESE has not met its burden to demonstrate that Worcester's Amended Hearing Request does not plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief regarding the Department's assignment of fiscal responsibility to Worcester. DESE’s Motion is therefore DENIED as to any claims alleging that the Department erroneously applied its own regulations.[31] DESE's Motion to Dismiss is hereby ALLOWED as to Worcester's claim that DESE bears independent fiscal responsibility as a SEA for any reason other than the misapplication of its regulations.
The matter will proceed to Hearing on the claims raised in Worcester’s Initial Hearing Request and clarified in its Amended Hearing Request, to the extent they survived the March Ruling and the instant Ruling. Specifically, the issues are as follows:
1. Whether DESE erred in assigning fiscal responsibility for Student to Worcester by misapplying the Department’s regulations;
2. If so, whether Lowell and/or DESE should bear fiscal responsibility for Student under the regulations.
By the Hearing Officer:[32]
/s/ Amy Reichbach
Date: July 16, 2026
Footnotes
[1] Because the Department’s Response to Amended Hearing Request seeks partial dismissal of Worcester’s Amended Hearing Request, I refer to it as the Department’s Second Motion to Dismiss.
[2] The parties participated in a further conference over a virtual platform on June 2, 2026, for continued discussion of an issue raised during the Motion Hearing.
[3] See Worcester Public Schools v. Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, Quabbin Regional School District, Framingham Public Schools & Lowell Public Schools (Ruling on Motions to Dismiss), BSEA # 2607483 (Reichbach, 2026) [hereinafter March Ruling].
[4] The name of the school and the town in which it is located are withheld to preserve Student’s confidentiality.
[5] Worcester had previously withdrawn its claims against Acton, on February 12, 2026.
[6] At the time, the parties anticipated receiving information pursuant to discovery requests regarding Student’s parents’ previous addresses.
[7] 668 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2011).
[8] In a 2021 LEA Assignment involving Student, DESE had concluded that that "there is no school district where the parent resides [in reference to 603 CMR 28.10(8)(a)(1) and 28.10(8)(c)(7)]" and that "no situations contemplated by the regulations are applicable." The Department then interpreted the regulations to permit "the Department … [to] consider all relevant information to make a reasonable determination about programmatic and fiscal responsibility." DESE did so, then assigned fiscal responsibility for Student to Framingham, the school district in which Student's then-pre-adoptive foster family resided, and programmatic responsibility to Dracut, the school district where Student was then enrolled.
[9] See 668 F.3d 1052, 1053-54, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 2011) (student was placed in out-of-state facility in 2006; under the 2005 version of California Education Code, prior to amendment in 2007, student had no “parent.” As a result, “California law did not designate any educational agency as responsible for [student]’s education. The California Department of Education was responsible by default” for student’s placement in 2006 until amendment of statute in October 2007).
[10] See In Re: Carly (Ruling on Parents’ Motion for Expedited/Accelerated Hearing and Order Compelling Certain Discovery), BSEA # 2412891 (Reichbach, 2024) (“Although Hearing Officers are not bound by the rules of evidence or civil procedure applicable to Massachusetts or federal courts, these rules provide useful guidance”); see also In Re: Newton Public Schools (Ruling on Parents’ Motion to Dismiss (Converted to Motion for Summary Judgment)), BSEA # 2208172 (Kantor Nir, 2022) (“In the absence of guidance in either state or federal regulations regarding computing time for the purpose of BSEA filings, the Hearing Officer looks to Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to determine how to compute the 5-school day timeline for the purpose of filing BSEA complaints relative to requests for IEEs”).
[11] See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (“The objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction . . . may be raised by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, at any stage in the litigation” (internal citation omitted)); see also 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3) (“The Presiding Officer may at any time, on his or her own motion or that of a Party, dismiss a case for lack of jurisdiction to decide the matter”).
[12] Iannocchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
[13] Blank v. Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, P.C., 420 Mass. 404, 407 (1995).
[14] Golchin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 460 Mass. 222, 223 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011).
[15] 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6).
[16] See 603 CMR 28.10(9).
[17] In Re: Foxborough Public Schools, Norwood Public Schools, the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, & Student, BSEA # 2600283 (Reichbach, 2026 (quoting M.G.L. c. 71B, § 2A (establishing the BSEA))).
[18] See BSEA Hearing Rule XVII(B).
[19] See id. (specifying that LEA appeals are not subject to BSEA Hearing Rules I(A) through I(G), II(C), or XIII(A)).
[20] See 603 CMR 28.10(9)(b)(1); March Ruling.
[21] See 603 CMR 28.10(9)(e)); March Ruling.
[22] For this reason, I need not address Worcester’s assertion that DESE’s Second Motion to Dismiss somehow transforms Worcester’s Amended Hearing Request into a motion for leave to amend.
[23] Under BSEA Hearing Rule I(G), the date of an amended hearing request is controlling for statute of limitations purpose for any issues not included in the initial hearing request, but “to the extent the amendment merely clarifies issues raised in the initial hearing request, the date of the initial hearing request shall be controlling” for such purposes. Although BSEA Hearing Rule I(G) does not apply to LEA Assignment Hearing Requests, its logic suggests persuasively that an amendment that clarifies an existing claim is not, essentially, seeking to add a claim to an existing Hearing Request.
[24] See Blank, 420 Mass. at 407.
[25] See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
[26] See March Ruling
[27] See id.
[28] See id.
[29] I make no comment or conclusions regarding whether the 2021 LEA Assignment may properly be considered as evidence in the instant matter.
[30] To the extent Worcester makes new claims based on new information, such claims may be presented first to the Department. See 603 CMR 28.10(9)(b)(1) (“request for appeal shall be based only on the information provided to the Department”) and 28.10(9)(e) (BSEA may return the case to DESE “based on new information presented at the hearing”).
[31] Worcester may argue, based on this theory only, that the BSEA should assign fiscal responsibility to the Department, though I make no comment or conclusions regarding the efficacy of such argument.
[32] The Hearing Officer gratefully acknowledges the diligent assistance of legal intern Iman Aoun in the preparation of this Ruling.