COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPEALS
BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS
In Re: Student v. Arlington Public Schools
BSEA # 2606305
RULING ON ARLINGTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS' SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS AND ARLINGTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On December 9, 2025, Parent, who is pro se, filed a Hearing Request with the Bureau of Special Education Appeals ("BSEA") alleging that the Arlington Public Schools (Arlington or the District) failed: to conduct a manifestation determination review (MDR) prior to Student's removal from school; to provide Student with his IEP and proper supports; to provide Student with educational services during removals; and to convene a Team meeting in response to disciplinary removals and changing educational needs. On December 16, 2025, Arlington filed Arlington Public Schools' Motion to Dismiss First Claim of Initial Hearing Request.[1] Specifically, the District moved to dismiss Parent's first allegation for failure to state a claim, asserting that Student was suspended for only two school days during the current school year, which does not constitute a change of placement under state or federal law and therefore does not trigger a manifestation determination.
On December 18, 2025, Parent filed an Amended Hearing Request with the BSEA, asserting that the "core issue" of her complaint is an alleged "safety crisis" involving an administrator's repeated use of a racial slur toward Student during an emotional crisis and the District's failure to implement effective protections, corrective actions, and a safe return plan. Also on December 18, 2025, Arlington moved to dismiss Parent's Amended Hearing Request, pursuant to BSEA Hearing Rules I(E) and I(G), because Parent had failed to state claims within the jurisdiction of the BSEA and had failed to plead sufficient facts to support any claims over which the BSEA has jurisdiction (Motion To Dismiss Amended Hearing Request In Its Entirety/Sufficiency Challenge). Specifically, Arlington asserted that the BSEA does not have jurisdiction over claims sounding in general student discipline, school safety, staff misconduct, or alleged civil rights violations, including allegations of discrimination or harassment based on race. Moreover, a hearing request must set forth sufficient facts to state a claim within the BSEA's jurisdiction, and conclusory statements, generalized allegations, or references to non-IDEA issues are insufficient to confer jurisdiction or warrant a hearing.
On January 6, 2026, a Ruling on Arlington Public Schools' Motion to Dismiss First Claim of Initial Hearing Request and Motion to Dismiss Amended Hearing Request was allowed with respect to general school safety or policy considerations and as to Parent's claim relating to whether the District "failed to conduct a manifestation determination review (MDR) prior to Student's removal from school", but denied insofar as the Amended Hearing Request implicates disciplinary response or exclusion involving Student's right to a FAPE.
On January 30, 2026, in response to Arlington's request, I issued an Order clarifying the remaining issues for hearing as follows:
Whether Student's IEP was implemented during the time before his disciplinary incident in [November] [2]2025?
Whether the disciplinary response to Student's disciplinary incident in [November] 2025 denied Student a free appropriate public education FAPE?
Whether the District failed to convene a Team meeting in response to Student's disciplinary removal and changing educational needs, and, if so, whether Student was denied a FAPE as a result?
On January 30, 2026, Arlington moved to dismiss the second and third issues identified in the January 30, 2026 Order supra on the grounds that the Parent has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and/or that the claims are moot (Arlington's Second Motion to Dismissor Motion). Arlington argued that the undisputed facts demonstrate that Student was not denied a free appropriate public education (FAPE), and that the District complied with all applicable procedural and substantive requirements under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and Massachusetts special education law.
On February 6, 2026, Arlington filed, in support of its Second Motion to Dismiss, the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education's (DESE) Determination Letter for Allegations Not Before the BSEA (PRS Re: PRS Intake 14938) issued on February 6, 2026 (Determination Letter), in which PRS concluded that the District was not obligated to conduct a bullying investigation in this matter; that the District met its obligations under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 603 CMR 26.00 in response to the Dean's use of "the N-word"; that the District provided copies of Student's disciplinary record and invited [Parent] to review video footage within the required time frame; and that the District provided Student and [Parent] with due process rights under Massachusetts disciplinary laws for the emergency removal issued to Student on November 13, 2025.[3]
On February 9, 2026, Parent responded via email, opposing the Motion and requesting that this matter proceed to hearing. In support of her objection, Parent stated as follows:
"The District has not demonstrated that the issues are resolved or moot. The District's motion does not rely on an adjudication of the issues on the merits. Instead, it suggests that meetings, discussions, or prior actions render the remaining issues inappropriate for hearing. That assertion is incorrect.No Hearing Officer has issued findings regarding whether the District:- failed to implement [Student's] IEP on November 13, 2025;- failed to provide required de-escalation and support strategies;- improperly disciplined [Student's] for disability-related behavior;- or imposed an emergency removal that failed to meet the substantive requirements of 603 CMR 53.07.These are material issues of fact and law that remain unresolved.Informal meetings do not substitute for IDEA due process. While resolution meetings and conferences are an important part of the IDEA process, they do not eliminate a parent's right to a due process hearing unless the parent affirmatively withdraws the hearing request or the issues are resolved through a binding agreement. Neither has occurred here. ... I seek determinations regarding denial of a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE), proper implementation of the IEP, and appropriate corrective and compensatory relief. This relief cannot be granted through informal discussions and has not been granted to date."
On February 10, 2026, Arlington filed its Motion for Summary Judgment[4], asserting that there are no genuine disputes of material fact as to the issues for hearing, since the undisputed facts establish that the Student's IEP was implemented prior to November 2025, that the District's disciplinary response did not deny the Student a FAPE, and that the District did not commit a procedural or substantive violation resulting in a denial of FAPE. As such, summary judgment should be issued in its favor on Issues 1, 2, and 3 identified for hearing and those issues should be dismissed with prejudice.[5]
On February17, 2026, Parent responded via email that the District's summary judgment materials contain "inaccuracies and misleading statements." Parent asserted that Student's IEP was not effectively implemented before the November 13, 2025 incident, as evidenced by ongoing social, behavioral, attendance, and academic struggles that interfered with progress toward IEP goals. Parent also contended that the District's disciplinary response to the November 2025 incident denied Student a FAPE because he was removed from school during an emotional crisis without proper implementation of IEP protocols and the District failed to convene a timely team meeting despite prior requests for additional supports due to the student's difficulties early in the school year.[6]
Because neither party requested a hearing on the Motion, and neither testimony nor oral argument would advance the Hearing Officer's understanding of the issues involved, this Ruling is issued without a hearing, pursuant to Bureau of Special Education Appeals Hearing Rule VI(D).
RELEVANT FACTS:[7]
Student is eligible for special education services pursuant to a fully accepted IEP, dated 04/9/25 - 04/8/26. (District Exhibit)
On November 13, 2025, Student was involved in a disciplinary incident at school. (Determination Letter)
Student was removed from school on an emergency basis from November 14 to November 17, 2025. (Determination Letter)
According to Parent, the District "improperly disciplined [Student] for disability-related behavior" and "imposed an emergency removal that failed to meet the substantive requirements of 603 CMR 53.07."[8] (Parent's Email Response to Motion to Dismiss)
On November 14, 2025, the District scheduled an IEP Team meeting which took place on November 25, 2025, at which time the Team reviewed Student's needs and considered whether any changes to Student's program or services were necessary. (District Exhibit)
A suspension hearing was held on November 17, and the Principal sent Student a Short-Term Suspension Notice on the same day, indicating that the violations warranted a two-day suspension, which was satisfied by the days Student had already served. (Determination Letter)
LEGAL STANDARDS AND APPLICATION OF LEGAL STANDARDS:
In applying the legal standards set out infrato the instant matter, I bear in mind that complaints filed by pro se parties, as in the instant matter, are to be construed liberally.[9] As explained by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, "[t]he policy behind affording pro se plaintiffs liberal interpretation is that if they present sufficient facts [to state a claim], the Court may intuit the correct cause of action, even if it was imperfectly pled."[10] This principle aligns with "[o]ur judicial system [, which] zealously guards the attempts of pro se litigants on their own behalf" while not ignoring the need for compliance with procedural and substantive law.[11]
Legal Standards:
Summary Judgment
Unlike a Motion to Dismiss, which requires the fact-finder to make a determination based on a complaint or Hearing Request alone, evaluation of a Motion for Summary Judgment permits the fact-finder to go beyond the pleadings to assess evidence. Pursuant to 801 CMR 1.01(7)(h), summary decision may be granted when there is "no genuine issue of fact relating to all or part of a claim or defense and [the moving party] is entitled to prevail as a matter of law."[12] In determining whether to grant summary judgment, BSEA hearing officers are guided by Rule 56 of the Federal and Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that summary judgment may be granted only if the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."[13] A genuine dispute as to a material fact exists if a fact that "carries with it the potential to affect the outcome of the suit" is disputed such that "a reasonable [fact-finder] could resolve the point in the favor of the non-moving party."[14] "As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted."[15]
The moving party bears the burden of proof, and all evidence and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.[16]
In response to a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."[17] To survive this motion and proceed to hearing, the adverse party must show that there is "sufficient evidence" in its favor that the fact finder could decide for it.[18] In other words, the evidence presented by the non-moving party "must have substance in the sense that it [demonstrates] differing versions of the truth which a factfinder must resolve at an ensuing trial."[19] The non-moving party's evidence will not suffice if it is comprised merely of "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation."[20]
Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to Hearing Rule XVI(A) and (B) of the Hearing Rules and 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3), a hearing officer may allow a motion to dismiss if the party requesting the hearing fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. These rules are analogous to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As such, hearing officers have generally used the same standards as the courts in deciding motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. To survive a motion to dismiss, there must exist "factual 'allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)' an entitlement to relief."[21] The hearing officer must take as true "the allegations of the complaint, as well as such inferences as may be drawn therefrom in the plaintiff's favor."[22] These "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level."[23]
Jurisdiction of the BSEA
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) grants the BSEA jurisdiction over timely complaints filed by a parent/guardian or a school district "with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child."[24] In Massachusetts, a parent or a school district, "may request mediation and/or a hearing at any time on any matter[25] concerning the eligibility, evaluation, placement, IEP, provision of special education in accordance with state and federal law, or procedural protections of state and federal law for students with disabilities."[26] Nevertheless, it is well established that matters that come before the BSEA must involve a live or current dispute between the Parties.[27] In addition, the BSEA "can only grant relief that is authorized by these statutes and regulations, which generally encompasses orders for changed or additional services, specific placements, additional evaluations, reimbursement for services obtained privately by parents or compensatory services."[28]
Application of Legal Standards
Summary Judgment is DENIED as to Issue #1[29].
According to Parent, Arlington failed to implement Student's IEP on November 13, 2025 by failing "to provide required de-escalation and support strategies." The District asserts that the IEP was fully implemented. Because a genuine dispute as to a material fact exists[30] with respect to the issue of implementation, summary judgment in favor of the District is not supported, and is DENIED as to Issue #1.[31]
Summary Judgment is ALLOWED in the District's Favor as to Issue # 2.[32]
A change in placement occurs when the removal is for more than 10 consecutive school days; or the child has been subjected to a series of removals that constitute a pattern because the series of removals totals more than 10 school days in a school year; because the child's behavior is substantially similar to the child's behavior in previous incidents that resulted in the series of removals; and because of such additional factors as the length of each removal, the total amount of time the child has been removed, and the proximity of the removals to one another.[33] Pursuant to 34 CFR 300.530(b)(2), after a child with a disability has been removed from his current placement for 10 school days in the same school year, during any subsequent days of removal, the public agency must provide services to the extent required under 34 CFR 300.530(d)[34]. However, 34 CFR 300.530(d)(3) provides that for students with disabilities removed for 10 school days or less in a school year, a school district is only required to provide services during the removal "... if it provides services to a child without disabilities who is similarly removed". In Massachusetts, pursuant to 603 CMR 53.13(1), any student who is serving an in-school suspension, short-term suspension, long-term suspension, or expulsion shall have the opportunity to earn credits, as applicable, make up assignments, tests, papers, and other school work as needed to make academic progress during the period of his or her removal from the classroom or school.
There is no dispute as to the following material facts relevant to the issue of whether the disciplinary response to Student's disciplinary incident in November 2025 denied Student a FAPE: 1) The District issued a two-day emergency removal pursuant to applicable disciplinary authority; 2) Student was not subjected to a removal exceeding ten school days; 3) Parent has not alleged that Student was not provided the opportunity to earn credits, as applicable, make up assignments, tests, papers, and other school work as needed to make academic progress; and 4) Student had not had any other suspension days this school year prior to his two-day suspension in November 2025. As such, Arlington was not required to provide Student with any other educational services during that period of suspension.[35]
Summary judgment in favor of the District is therefore supported on Issue #2.
Issue # 3[36] Must Be Dismissed As Moot.
Here, it is undisputed that the Team did in fact reconvene on November 25, 2025, following the short-term removal which lasted from November 14 to November 17, 2025.[37] Neither Parent's initial complaint nor her amended complaint raises any substantive claims regarding the appropriateness of Student's IEP or the appropriateness of the changes that resulted from the November 25 Team meeting that followed the short-term disciplinary removal. Because a Team meeting did in fact take place following Student's disciplinary removal (and Parent has not challenged the resulting changes or absence thereof resulting from said meeting), and because matters that come before the BSEA must involve a live or current dispute between the Parties,[38] Parent's third claim is moot and must be dismissed with prejudice.
ORDER:
Arlington's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED as to Parent's first issue identified in the January 30, 2026 Orders.
Arlington's Motion for Summary Judgment is ALLOWED as to Parent's second issue identified in the January 30, 2026 Orders.
Arlington's Second Motion to Dismiss is ALLOWED as to the third issue identified in the January 30, 2026 Orders, and that issue is dismissed with prejudice.
Accordingly, the sole remaining issue for hearing is whether Student's IEP was implemented prior to the disciplinary incident in November 2025.
By the Hearing Officer:
/s/ Alina Kantor Nir
Alina Kantor Nir
Dated: February 18, 2026
Footnotes
[1] Arlington filed a Sufficiency Challenge as part of this December 16, 2025 Motion to Dismiss which was addressed separately by a prior ruling.
[2] My Order dated January 30, 2025 stated, in error, the incident took place in December.
[3] On February 9, 2026, the Hearing Officer emailed the parties to ask whether, in light of the District's submission, the Motion to Dismiss should be treated as a motion for summary judgment, and to provide the parties with additional time to submit any documents in support of their respective positions. That same day, Parent responded by email opposing the Motion to Dismiss, framing her response, in part, as an opposition to a summary judgement motion, but did not submit any supporting documents.
[4] In support of its Motion, the District provided one exhibit consisting of an 11/25/2025 Team Meeting summary form, a Meeting Invitation dated 11/14/2025 for the meeting held on 11/25/2025, and the signature page of the IEP dated 04/9/25 - 04/8/26, reflecting Parent's signature dated 5/6/2025 (hereinafter, District Exhibit).
[5] On the same day, the Hearing Officer reminded Parent via email of the timeline for responding to motions and encouraged her to contact the BSEA for guidance.
[6] For the first time since filing her initial Hearing Request and subsequent Amended Hearing Request, Parent asserted in her February 17 email that the District offered Student only limited support (i.e., 10 hours of tutoring) without necessary interventions such as counseling, additional evaluations, or specialized services . Parent further alleged that a previously requested Team meeting that had already been scheduled was later rescheduled due to the Student's removal, and that the May 2025 IEP did not provide adequate support by fall 2025, was not properly implemented or adjusted, and that delays in addressing known concerns left Student without necessary services for several weeks, potentially contributing to the November 13 incident. None of these allegations was raised in Parent's initial Hearing Request or in her Amended Hearing Request. As such, none of these allegations is addressed in this Ruling. Should Parent wish to pursue these claims, she must file a motion to amend her Hearing request.
[7] The following facts are derived from the pleadings and exhibits submitted by the parties and are subject to change in subsequent rulings or decision. Where a factual dispute exists, I construe it in favor of Parent, as the party opposing summary judgment. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994). To the extent Parent and/or Arlington makes allegations in pleadings but there is no evidence before me to support those allegations, I specify the source of these factual allegations. I take those pled by Parent as true for purposes of Arlington's Motion to Dismiss, as well as any inferences that may be drawn therefrom (See Blank v. Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, P.C., 420 Mass. 404, 407 (1995)), but I do not consider these unsupported allegations for purposes of Arlington's Motion for Summary Judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (in response to a motion for summary judgment, opposing party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial).
[8] I note that Parent has not previously pled that Student's emergency removal failed to meet the substantive requirements of 603 CMR 53.07. As this is a new claim, I do not address it in this Ruling. However, Parent may file a motion to amend her hearing request to include said claim.
[9] See Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997).
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] CMR 1.01(7)(h). Hearing Officers are bound by both the Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeals (Hearing Rules) and the Standard Rules of Adjudicatory Practice and Procedure, 801 Code Mass Regs 1.01.
[13] Id.
[14] French v. Merrill, 15 F.4th 116, 123 (1st Cir. 2021); see Maldanado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994).
[15] Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
[16] See id. at 252.
[17] Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
[18] Id. at 249.
[19] Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir. 1989).
[20] Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990).
[21] Iannocchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).
[22] Blank v. Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, P.C., 420 Mass. 404, 407 (1995).
[23] Golchin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 460 Mass. 222, 223 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
[24] See 34 C.F.R. §300.507(a)(1).
[25] Limited exceptions exist that are not here applicable.
[26] CMR 28.08(3)(a).
[27] See In Re: Student v. Bay Path Reg'l Vocational Tech. High Sch., BSEA #1805746 (Figueroa, 2018).
[28] In Re: Georgetown Pub. Sch., BSEA #1405352 (Berman, 2014).
[29] Issue # 1 states: Whether Student's IEP was implemented during the time before his disciplinary incident in November 2025.
[30] French, 15 F.4th at 123.
[31] I found unconvincing the District's argument that a failure-to-implement claim under the IDEA requires a material failure to provide services required by the IEP that results in a deprivation of educational benefit and that minor deviations, short-term lapses, or missed services attributable to student absence or circumstances outside the District's control do not rise to the level of a denial of FAPE (See 20 U.S.C. §1401(9); 34 C.F.R. § 300.17) to be unconvincing. In the absence of a hearing on the merits the materiality of the alleged failure remains in dispute.
[32] Issue #2 states: Whether the disciplinary response to Student's disciplinary incident in November 2025 denied Student a FAPE.
[33] See 34 CFR 300.536. Emphasis added.
[34] CFR 300.530(d)(1) requires that the services include the right to "(i) Continue to receive educational services, as provided in § 300.101(a), so as to enable the child to continue to participate in the general education curriculum, although in another setting, and to progress toward meeting the goals set out in the child's IEP; and (ii) Receive, as appropriate, a functional behavioral assessment, and behavioral intervention services and modifications, that are designed to address the behavior violation so that it does not recur."
[35] See 34 CFR 300.530.
[36] Issue #3 states: Whether the District failed to convene a Team meeting in response to Student's disciplinary removal and changing educational needs, and, if so, whether Student was denied a FAPE as a result.
[37] Although the Team is not obligated to convene following a short-term suspension (i.e., under 10 cumulative school days), a school district's authority under the IDEA to implement short-term disciplinary removals does not negate its obligation to address whether the student needs new or different behavioral interventions and supports to receive FAPE in the least restrictive environment. See 34 CFR 300.324(b); see also Questions and Answers: Addressing the Needs of Children with Disabilities and IDEA's Discipline Provisions, 122 LRP 24161 (OSERS 07/19/22); Dear Colleague Letter, 68 IDELR 76 (OSERS/OSEP 2016).
[38] See In Re: Student v. Bay Path Reg'l Vocational Tech. High Sch., BSEA # 18-05746 (Figueroa, 2018).