THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPEALS
BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS
In Re: Student v. Lawrence Public Schools
BSEA # 2605723
RULING ON LAWRENCE PUBLIC SCHOOLS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OR, IN
THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
AND ON
PARENT’S MOTION FOR STAY PUT
On November 24, 2025, the Bureau of Special Education Appeals (BSEA) received a Hearing Request against the Lawrence Public Schools (Lawrence or the District) filed by Parent, who is pro se, alleging that Lawrence violated Student’s rights under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) when it decided to revoke a variance that had been granted to her and remove Student from Parthum School, where she had been placed since first grade. According to Parent, Student, who is diagnosed with Autism, requires a stable, predictable environment, and revoking the variance constitutes an unlawful change in placement without consent, in violation of IDEA, Section 504, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and Massachusetts special education regulations. Parent asked the Hearing Officer to determine that the variance revocation was an unlawful change in placement, that the District failed to consider Student’s disability-related needs and history, that accessibility and family circumstances were not properly weighed by the District, that the proposed placement was not appropriate, and that Stay Put should be enforced. For relief, Parent requested an order reinstating the variance so Student may continue attending Parthum School; enforcing Stay Put to maintain Student’s current placement, services, program, transportation, and support during the pendency of this dispute; requiring the District to fully consider and address Student’s Autism diagnosis, her sensory, social, and emotional needs, her documented bullying history at a different school within the District, her long-term stable placement at Parthum, and Parent’s ADA accessibility factors and documented medical circumstances; and ensuring that any future placement decisions comply fully with IDEA, Section 504, ADA, and 603 CMR 28.00 et seq.
On April 6[1], 2026, Lawrence filed Lawrence Public Schools' Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Or, In The Alternative, For Failure To State A Claim (hereinafter, Motion to Dismiss), asserting that because Parent’s claim is a variance dispute governed by District policy, it is not a dispute within the BSEA’s limited jurisdiction. Specifically, Parent’s Hearing Request does not plausibly allege a dispute concerning eligibility, evaluation, placement, an Individualized Education Program (IEP), the provision of special education, or any denial of a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”). According to Lawrence, the Hearing Request rests on the revocation of a variance previously granted by the District to Parent, not to Student, and asks the BSEA to review and overturn an exercise of District policy; thus, it must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
On April 22, 2026, Parent filed Parent’s Opposition To District’s Motion To Dismiss, arguing that the dispute is not merely a general education “variance policy” issue, but instead involves a forced school transfer that constitutes a change in placement and directly affects Student’s right to a FAPE. Student, who has autism and a specific learning disability, receives services under an IEP, and revoking the variance and requiring a transfer will disrupt Student’s educational stability, and negatively impact her emotional, behavioral, and academic functioning. Parent asserts that a change in school can qualify as a change in placement when it significantly alters the student’s educational experience. Because the District’s actions affect Student’s placement, service delivery, and ability to make effective progress, Parent argues that the matter falls squarely within BSEA jurisdiction. In addition to asking that the BSEA deny the District’s Motion to Dismiss in its entirety and find that the BSEA has jurisdiction over this matter, Parent asked the Hearing Officer to determine whether the district’s action constitutes a change in placement or a significant alteration of Student’s educational program and to order that Student remain in her current school placement pending resolution of this dispute (Parent’s Motion for Stay Put). [2]
The District requested a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss. A motion hearing was held on April 30, 2026, in the presence of a court stenographer. The parties presented arguments on both the District’s Motion to Dismiss and Parent’s Motion for Stay Put.
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:[3]
1. Student is a 6th grade resident of Lawrence, Massachusetts. Student is receiving special education and related services pursuant to an accepted IEP under the Disability Categories of Specific Learning Disability and Autism. Her IEP calls for partial inclusion placement in the Lawrence Public Schools. Services include the following: Grid A: OT consultation (1x15 minutes/month), BCBA consultation (1x15 minutes/month), and PT consultation (1x15 minutes/month); Grid B: Academic Support ELA (60 minutes daily) and Academic Support Math (60 minutes daily); Grid C: SLP (30 minutes/week), specialized instruction reading (60 minutes daily), and specialized instruction math (60 minutes daily).
2. Student’s partial inclusion IEP, and all the services delineated therein, can be implemented in any of the Lawrence Public Schools.[4]
3. Student’s current neighborhood school, at which the District is proposing placement, is Oliver Middle School, a new school building that has wheelchair access.
4. Student is currently attending Parthum Middle School in Lawrence, Massachusetts. She began attending Parthum in academic 2020-2021, when Lawrence granted Student[5] a variance to attend Parthum School “because [Student’s] zoned school at that time lacked ADA accessibility, and [Parent is] а wheelchair user.”
5. During the 2023-2024 school year, Student attended Leahy School within the District, where, according to Parent, she experienced significant bullying.[6] The transition to Leahy School from Parthum Middle School was difficult, and Student suffered anxiety and school refusal and required medication.
6. At an undisclosed time, Parent was again granted a variance to have Student return to Parthum Middle School.
7. On or about November 2025, Lawrence revoked the variance. According to Parent, the variance was revoked “based on medical absences. However, these absences were medically documented and occurred during а period when [Student] was experiencing her own medical needs. At the same time, [Parent] was managing major medical challenges that required ongoing appointments and treatment.” Lawrence intended to transition Student to Oliver Middle School in January 2026 at the start of the new semester. To date, Student has not been transferred due to the ongoing dispute.
8. Parent believes that due to Student’s Autism diagnosis, she requires stability and should remain at Parthum Middle School until the end of her 8th-grade school year. Any transition to a new school would be “hard” on Student and will “affect her to the fullest.”
9. Lawrence seeks to transition Student at the start of the 2026-2027 school year after transition planning for the move takes place at the upcoming IEP Team meeting.
LEGAL STANDARDS AND APPLICATION OF LEGAL STANDARDS:
In applying the legal standards set out infra to the instant matter, I bear in mind that complaints filed by pro se parties, as in the instant matter, are to be construed liberally.[7] As explained by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, “[t]he policy behind affording pro se plaintiffs liberal interpretation is that if they present sufficient facts [to state a claim], the Court may intuit the correct cause of action, even if it was imperfectly pled.”[8] This principle aligns with “[o]ur judicial system[, which] zealously guards the attempts of pro se litigants on their own behalf” while not ignoring the need for compliance with procedural and substantive law.[9]
a. Legal Standards:
i. Stay Put
The IDEA’s “stay put” provision requires that unless the State or local educational agency and the parents otherwise agree, during the time that a parent and school district are engaged in an IDEA dispute resolution process, “… the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement of the child, or, if applying for initial admission to a public school, shall, with the consent of the parents, be placed in the public school program until all such proceedings have been completed.”[10] Preservation of the “status quo” assures that the student “stays put” in the last placement the parents and the school district agreed was appropriate for her.[11] In addition, the stay put provision reflects “the preference of Congress for maintaining the stability of a disabled child’s placement and minimizing disruption to the child while the parents and school are resolving disputes.”[12] Generally, the last accepted IEP is the stay[]put IEP.[13] To determine a child’s “stay put,” Courts often look for the “operative placement,” or the IEP that is “actually functioning at the time the dispute first arises.”[14]
It is established law that the “physical school alone does not constitute an ‘educational placement.’ [An] educational placement consists of the instruction and services spelled out in [Student’s] IEP.”[15] According to the Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP), case-by-case analysis is required to determine whether a change in location materially or substantially alters a student's program, thereby constituting a change in placement, with the analysis based on whether 1) the IEP is being revised concurrently; 2) Student will be educated with nondisabled peers to the same extent in the new program; 3) Student will have the same opportunities to participate in extracurricular and nonacademic services; and 4) the new location is the same option on the continuum of alternative placements.[16]
In general, Courts have held that a change in placement for this purpose occurs when "a fundamental change in, or elimination of, a basic element of the educational program has occurred,"[17] or when a change in location "results in dilution of the quality of a student's education or a departure from the student's LRE [least restrictive environment]-compliant setting."[18] "[M]inor decision[s] alter[ing] the school day" such as modifications to the method of transportation to and from school or replacing one teacher or aide with another do not constitute changes in placement that would violate the stay put provision.[19] Changes in programs or classrooms do not constitute changes in placement, either, where the school district provides "substantially similar classes."[20]
In deciding issues of stay put, Courts have examined the impact of the proposed change on the student rather than the precise classroom location.[21] Similarly, the BSEA has applied these principles to identify the “operative placement” and to examine the impact on the student of the proposed change.[22]
ii. Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to Hearing Rule XVI(A) and (B) and 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3)[23], a hearing officer may allow a motion to dismiss if the party requesting the hearing fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. These rules are analogous to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As such, hearing officers have generally used the same standards as the courts in deciding motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. To survive a motion to dismiss, there must exist “factual ‘allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)’ an entitlement to relief.”[24] The hearing officer must take as true “the allegations of the complaint, as well as such inferences as may be drawn therefrom in the plaintiff’s favor.”[25] These “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”[26]
a. Jurisdiction of the BSEA
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) grants the BSEA jurisdiction over timely complaints filed by a parent/guardian or a school district "with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child."[27] In Massachusetts, a parent or a school district, "may request mediation and/or a hearing at any time on any matter[28] concerning the eligibility, evaluation, placement, IEP, provision of special education in accordance with state and federal law, or procedural protections of state and federal law for students with disabilities."[29] The BSEA "can only grant relief that is authorized by these statutes and regulations, which generally encompasses orders for changed or additional services, specific placements, additional evaluations, reimbursement for services obtained privately by parents or compensatory services."[30]
In addition, the BSEA jurisdiction extends to IDEA-based claims.[31] The First Circuit held, in a case addressing exhaustion of claims filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that the BSEA is not deprived of jurisdiction by the fact that certain claims are not based directly upon violations of the IDEA, nor by the fact that the relief a complainant seeks cannot be awarded by the agency. The IDEA’s exhaustion requirement ensures that the BSEA is able to develop a factual record and apply its “specialized knowledge” in an IDEA-based claim.[32] The IDEA’s exhaustion requirement “applies even when the suit is brought pursuant to a different statute so long as the party is seeking relief that is available under subchapter II of IDEA.”[33] However, in Fry v. Napolean Community Schools, 137 S.Ct. 743, 752 (2017), the U.S. Supreme Court held that “exhaustion is not necessary when the gravamen of the plaintiff’s suit is something other than the denial of the IDEA’s core guarantee – what the Act calls a ‘free appropriate public education.’” Whether a claim is IDEA-based turns on whether the underlying claim is one of violation of the IDEA, or “where there are no factual allegations to indicate that a dispute exists concerning the individual student’s eligibility under the IDEA or Section 504 or the discharge of the School’s procedural and substantive responsibilities under the IDEA or [Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973].”[34]
b. Lawrence Public Schools’ Policy JFB “Inter-School Variance” (Variance Policy)
In this Ruling, I take administrative notice of Lawrence Public Schools’ Variance Policy, which states, in relevant part, as follows:
“The school assignment policy for Lawrence Public Schools is centered on neighborhood schools, assigning students to the schools closest to their homes, with minimal exceptions for substantially separate specialized learning programs, or when a school reaches maximum capacity for any grade.
... A student must meet one or more of the criteria outlined below:
1. The student will be entering the last grade of their current elementary or middle school and would benefit by remaining for the final year, even though s/he has moved outside of the catchment area for that school;
2. The student has a sibling who lives in the same household, but attends a different school and the parents would like the students to be assigned to one location for practical and engagement purposes; and/or
3. The requested school is physically located closer to the student’s home than the than the assigned school, as measured by walking distance via an online source such as Google Maps.
Rules for enrollment under a variance:
… 5. The granting of a variance is a privilege. As such, it can be revoked and students re-assigned to their neighborhood school at the end of any given marking period if:
a. A student’s attendance in school falls below Massachusetts’ definition of Chronic Absenteeism of at least 10% of days enrolled (e.g., 18 days absent if enrolled for 180)**
b. A student receives out of school suspension for a total of five or more cumulative days.
6. Requests will not be denied based on academic performance, special needs, or ELL status, provided the school (or program) can meet any mandated requirements. Schools are not required to establish services to meet the needs of students requesting variances.
*Absences due to significant illness, when documented by a physician’s note, will be reviewed by the principal on a case by case basis.”
b. Application of Legal Standards:
1. Motion for Stay Put is DENIED.
The threshold issue is whether the District’s revocation of the variance is a unilateral change in placement sufficient to trigger Student’s stay put rights. The first step in this analysis is to identify Student’s “then current” placement at the time when the dispute arose.[35] The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit defines “then-current placement” as “the last placement that the parents and the educational authority agreed to be appropriate.”[36] Here, the team had agreed that Student’s needs could be met in a partial inclusion placement within the Lawrence Public Schools. Even accepting Parent’s allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, [37] I cannot find that Student’s then-current placement is Parthum Middle School as it was not the placement “agreed to be appropriate” or selected by the IEP Team; rather, Student’s attendance there resulted from a variance that was independent of Student’s special education needs. In other words, the District and Parent did not agree that Student’s disability-related needs required placement outside the neighborhood school specifically at Parthum. Rather, it was Parent’s disability that necessitated Student’s attendance at a non-neighborhood school.[38]
In addition, it is well established that a physical location, standing alone, does not constitute an educational placement; rather, an educational placement is defined by the services and instruction set forth in the student’s IEP. [39] Here, the services delineated in Student’s partial inclusion IEP[40] can be implemented in any middle school within Lawrence Public Schools. Parent does not allege any fundamental change in, or elimination of, a basic element of Student’s educational program. [41] Instead, Parent argues that the revocation of the variance and the resulting transfer from Parthum Middle School will disrupt Student’s stability and negatively impact her emotional, behavioral, and academic functioning, particularly in light of her Autism diagnosis, prior bullying experiences, and need for a consistent educational environment. While I do not discount the importance of these concerns, they do not establish that the change in school location constitutes a change in educational placement within the meaning of the IDEA.[42] The inquiry is not whether Student may experience disruption or whether Parthum is preferable, but whether the proposed transfer would materially or substantially alter the services, supports, or program set forth in Student’s IEP. Although “[m]ore recent decisions in other circuits have elaborated on this [stay put] standard to emphasize the impact on the student,”[43] an examination of such decisions reflects an emphasis on the dilution of services[44] or the “impact of this change [in location] on [the student’s] education,”[45] not the impact of the change on the student herself or the possible exacerbation of student’s symptoms resulting from such transfer.
As such, I cannot find that Parthum is Student’s stay put placement, and Student is not entitled to remain there pending resolution of this dispute.
2. Motion to Dismiss is ALLOWED.
The District argues that Parent’s Hearing Request seeks review of an exercise of the District’s variance policy and therefore must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Having found that Student has no stay put right to Parthum, and, because the BSEA "can only grant relief that is authorized” by state and federal special education laws,[46] I find that I cannot order the relief sought by Parent (i.e., the reinstatement of the variance). As explained in Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. 154 (2017), if an
“accommodation is needed to fulfill the IDEA's FAPE requirement, the hearing officer must order relief. But if it is not, he cannot—even though the dispute is between a child with a disability and the school she attends. There might be good reasons, unrelated to a FAPE, for the school to make the requested accommodation. Indeed, another federal law (like the ADA or Rehabilitation Act) might require the accommodation on one of those alternative grounds. But still, the hearing officer cannot provide the requested relief. His role, under the IDEA, is to enforce the child's ‘substantive right’ to a FAPE.”[47]
Here, because the variance dispute is completely independent of Student’s eligibility for and rights to special education, the gravamen of Parent’s claims concerns not a denial of a FAPE, but rather the denial of a variance. Accordingly, Parent’s claims relating to the issuance and revocation of the variance are dismissed with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Parent has not raised any facts suggesting that Oliver Middle School is incapable of implementing Student’s IEP or meeting her disability related needs. Even liberally construing the Hearing Request, I cannot find that Parent’s references to Student’s diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder and her sensory, social, and emotional needs raise a separate issue of whether the IEP can be properly implemented at the neighborhood school. As such, the hearing request must be dismissed in its entirety for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Parent is not, however, precluded from filing a subsequent hearing request specifically raising FAPE issue(s) with regard to the change in placement from Parthum to Oliver.
ORDER:
Parent’s Motion for Stay Put is DENIED.
Lawrence’s Motion to Dismiss is ALLOWED. The Hearing Request is dismissed with prejudice as to jurisdiction (variance claim), but without prejudice as to any future FAPE/IEP-based claims.
By the Hearing Officer:
/s/ Alina Kantor Nir
Alina Kantor Nir
Dated: May 5, 2026
Footnotes
[1] The Motion to Dismiss was filed on Saturday, April 4, 2026, and, as such, it is deemed to have been filed on the next business day, April 6, 2026.
[2] Because Parent’s Opposition To District’s Motion To Dismiss seeks an order that Student remain in her current school placement pending resolution of this dispute, I interpret it as a Motion for Stay Put.
[3] The following facts are derived from the pleadings and are subject to change in subsequent rulings or decision. I take those facts pled by Parent as true for purposes of the District’s Motion to Dismiss, as well as any inferences that may be drawn therefrom. See Blank v. Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, P.C., 420 Mass. 404, 407 (1995).
[4] Parent presented no facts or evidence to the contrary in her pleadings and/or oral argument.
[5] Lawrence argued that the variance had been granted to Parent, not to Student. However, taking the facts pled by Parent as true, I indicate that the variance had been granted to Student but further indicate the uncontested fact that the variance was granted based on Parent’s disability related needs, not Student’s disability related needs. See Blank, 420 Mass. at 407.
[6] Parent asserts that “[r]eturning [Student] to that school [(i.e., Leahy School) is unsafe, inappropriate, and does not meet her disability-related needs.” However, based on the pleadings, Student’s neighborhood school currently is Oliver Middle School, not Leahy School, and no proposal has been made to reassign Student to Leahy, which was, at some point, Student’s neighborhood school.
[7] See Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997).
[8] Id.
[9] Id.
[10] 20 U.S.C. §1415(j); see 34 CFR §300.514; M.G.L. c. 71B; 603 CMR 28.08(7); see Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 325 (1988); Verhoven v. Brunswick School Committee, 207 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1999); M.R. and J.R. v. Ridley School District, 744 F.3d 112, 117 (3d Cir. 2014); see also In Re: Framingham Public Schools and Quin, BSEA # 1605247 (Reichbach, 2016); In Re: Abington Public Schools, BSEA # 1407763 (Figueroa, 2014).
[11] See Doe v. Brookline School Committee, 722 F.2d 910, 918 (1st Cir. 1983).
[12] Student & Concord & Natick Public Schools (Corrected Ruling on Mother’s Request for “Stay Put” Order), BSEA # 18-00182 (Berman, 2017).
[13] See 20 U.S.C. §1415(j); 34 CFR §300.514.
[14] Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 859, 867 (3rd Cir. 1996); Thomas v. Cincinnati Bd. of Edu., 918 F. 2d 618. 626 (6th Cir., 1990).
[15] D.K. v. D.C., 983 F. Supp. 2d 138, 146 (D.D.C. 2013).
[16] Letter to Fisher, 21 IDELR 992 (OSEP 1994).
[17] Sherri A.D. v. Kirby, 975 F.2d 193, 206 (5th Cir. 1992).
[18] A.W. v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 372 F.3d 674, 682 (4th Cir. 1991).
[19] G.B. v. Distr. of Columbia, 78 F. Supp. 3d 109, 116 (D.D.C. 2015).
[20] Weil v. Bd. of Elem. & Sec. Educ., 931 F.2d, 1069, 1072 (5th Cir. 1991).
[21] See A.W., 372 F.3d at 681–83 (concluding that educational placement referred to an “instructional setting” rather than to the “precise location of that setting” or the “precise physical location where the disabled student is educated”).
[22] See In Re: Agawam Public Schools and Melmark-New England (Ruling), BSEA # 1504488 (Berman, 2015).
[23] Hearing Officers are bound by the BSEA Hearing Rules and the Standard Rules of Adjudicatory Practice and Procedure, 801 Code Mass Regs 1.01.
[24] Iannocchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).
[25] Blank v. Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, P.C., 420 Mass. 404, 407 (1995).
[26] Golchin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 460 Mass. 222, 223 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
[27] See 34 C.F.R. §300.507(a)(1).
[28] Limited exceptions exist that are not here applicable.
[29] 603 CMR 28.08(3)(a).
[30] In Re: Georgetown Pub. Sch., BSEA # 1405352 (Berman, 2014).
[31] See Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 59, 64 (1st Cir. 2002).
[32] Id. at 60.
[33] Rose v. Yeaw, 214 F.3d 206, 210 (1st Cir. 2000).
[34] In Re Xylia, BSEA # 12-0781 (Byrne 2012); see Diaz-Fonseca v. Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13, 29 (2006).
[35] See In Re: Agawam Public Schools and Melmark-New England (Ruling), BSEA # 1504488 (Berman, 2015) (“The critical question is identifying the child’s ‘then current placement,’ because not every alteration in a child’s educational services constitutes a change in such placement”)
[36] Doe v. Portland Pub. Schs., 30 F.4th 85, 91 (1st Cir. 2022).
[37] Blank v. Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, P.C., 420 Mass. 404, 407 (1995).
[38] See 34 CFR 300.116 (b)(3) (Under the IDEA, a district must ensure that a student is educated as close as possible to home, provided the neighborhood school can implement the IEP); see also 34 CFR 300.116 (c) (A student with a disability should attend the school he or she would otherwise attend unless the IEP requires a different placement”).
[39] D.K. v. D.C., 983 F. Supp. 2d 138, 146 (D.D.C. 2013).
[40] The IEP services comprise OT consultation (1x15 minutes/month), BCBA consultation (1x15 minutes/month), PT consultation (1x15 minutes/month), General Education Academic Support ELA (60 minutes daily) and Academic Support Math (60 minutes daily) in the general education classroom, and SLP (30 minutes/week), specialized instruction reading (60 minutes daily), and specialized instruction math (60 minutes daily) outside of the general education classroom.
[41] Lunceford v. D.C. Bd. of Educ., 745 F.2d 1577, 1582 (D.C.Cir.1984).
[42] White ex rel. White v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 343 F.3d 373, 383 (5th Cir. 2003) (parents improperly “conflate[d] site selection and educational placement”).
[43] In Re: Agawam Public Schools and Melmark-New England (Ruling), BSEA # 1504488 (Berman, 2015). In In Re: Agawam Public Schools and Melmark-New England (Ruling), Hearing Officer Sara Berman cited to AW. v. Fairfax County School Board, 372 F.3d 674 (4th Cir. 2004), stating that “the Fourth Circuit reviewed several ‘stay put’ decisions and noted that important factors to be considered in deciding whether a change (in location, in that case) is a true ‘change in placement’ are whether the change impacts FAPE by “diluting” the quality of services or increasing the restrictiveness of the student’s program.” She also cited to Hale ex rel. Hale v. Poplar Bluffs R-I Sch. Dist., 280 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 2002), stating, “The 8th Circuit decided similarly … [finding] that providing identical services in a different setting constituted a change in placement under the facts of that particular case because of the impact of the change.”
[44] See AW, 372 F.3d at 681 (“changes in location do not violate the ‘stay[]put’ provision provided they do not result in a diminution of the educational services to which the student is entitled”).
[45] See Hale, 280 F.3d at 833-4 (agreeing with district court that the District's unilateral decision to change the location of Jeffrey's schooling from home to school violated the stay[]put provision because the court made “specific findings as to the impact of this change on Jeffrey's education”).
[46] In Re: Georgetown Pub. Sch., BSEA # 1405352 (Berman, 2014).
[47] 580 U.S. at 167–68.