COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPEALS
BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS
In Re: Student v. Leominster Public Schools BSEA # 2610128
RULING ON PARENT'S EMERGENCY MOTION FOR REDETERMINATION AND STAY
On March 23, 2026, Parent filed an Emergency Motion for Redetermination and Stay of the March 20, 2026 Ruling [On Parent's Request For Reconsideration, Motion To Vacate Order, And Motion To Advance Hearing And Establish Expedited Discovery Period], seeking reconsideration of the denial of accelerated status and a stay of that determination (the Emergency Motion). Specifically, Parent argued that the existing record established a likelihood of harm sufficient to warrant accelerated status and that requiring additional detailed evidence would violate Student's privacy rights under Massachusetts law and improperly force disclosure of sensitive information. Relying on Massachusetts case law addressing child protection and injunctive relief, Parent argued that the available evidence satisfies a preponderance standard and demonstrates irreparable harm. Parent also alleged that the March 20, 2026 Ruling was decided before all evidence was considered.
On March 24, 2026, Leominster Public Schools (Leominster or the District) filed an objection to Parent's Emergency Motion alleging, in part, that Parent's "ongoing filing of frivolous motions is, at this juncture, an abuse of the state's due process system resulting in waste of the District and the Bureau's valuable time and resources," and objecting to Parent's motion "for all the reasons stated in the District's March 11, 2026 Objection, March 12, 2026 Objection, and March 16 Objection filed with the Bureau."
Because neither testimony nor oral argument would advance the Hearing Officer's understanding of the issues involved, this Ruling is issued without a hearing, pursuant to Bureau of Special Education Appeals Hearing Rule VI(D).
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 11, 2026, Parent filed an Expedited Hearing Request alleging, in part, that the Leominster Public Schools (Leominster or the District) denied Student, a four-year-old student with an Individualized Education Program (IEP), a free appropriate public education (FAPE), when the District refused to include certain accommodations and/or services relative to safety concerns in Student's IEP (despite private evaluator recommendations); failed to convene a Team meeting; and failed to respond to Parent's request for an Independent Educational Evaluation (IEE). In response, the Director of the Bureau of Special Education Appeals (BSEA), Reece Erlichman, informed Parent that the request did not appear to meet the legal standard for an expedited hearing under the IDEA and BSEA Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeals (Hearing Rules). However, she noted that the matter might qualify for accelerated status under a different rule and advised Parent to contact the assigned Hearing Officer if they wished to pursue that option so the issue could be considered further.
On March 11, 2026, and again on March 12, 2026, Leominster objected to the request for expedited and/or accelerated status, asserting that the matter does not meet either standard.
On March 13, 2026, I issued Ruling on Parent's Request For Accelerated Status (the Ruling), finding that Parent's Hearing Request did not meet the expedited and/or accelerated standards.
On March 13, 2026, Parent filed Motion for Reconsideration, seeking reconsideration of the denial of accelerated status based on newly presented information. Parent argued that recent clinical documentation from the Lurie Center diagnosing Student with Level 3 autism requiring very substantial support and 1:1 supervision, combined with the District's January 2026 progress report showing an 85% failure rate in safe transitions, demonstrates an immediate health and safety risk. Parent further contended that the District failed to respond to the IEE deadline and has remained silent regarding the safety concerns, which Parent characterizes as a breakdown of the FAPE process. Parent asserted that the earlier reliance on a June 2025 profile describing Student as Mild/Moderate is no longer valid given the updated diagnosis, and she requested reconsideration and an order granting accelerated status due to the alleged risk of irreparable harm.
Also on March 13, 2026, Parent filed Notice Of Procedural Due Process Violation; Motion to Vacate Order, asserting that the Ruling denying accelerated status violated due process. Specifically, Parent contended that the BSEA failed to provide adequate notice of the clarification needed to support the request, issued the Ruling before Parent could follow the Director's suggestion to seek further inquiry from the Hearing Officer, and relied on an incomplete record by characterizing the alleged harm as speculative. Parent asserted that additional clinical evidence, such as the February 6, 2026, diagnosis from the Lurie Center indicating that Student required very substantial support, would have demonstrated an immediate risk. Based on these alleged procedural deficiencies, Parent requested that the BSEA vacate the Ruling and grant the pending Motion for Reconsideration.
On the same date, Parent also filed Motion To Advance Hearing And Establish Expedited Discovery Period, seeking to establish a shortened discovery period and to advance the hearing date on the grounds that the "'Standard Track' timeline, in conjunction with the District's history of non-responsiveness, creates an immediate risk to the Student's safety." Specifically, Parent asked the Hearing Officer to shorten the discovery response period to 7 calendar days, seeking production of school records, including daily transition logs, elopement reports, and internal emails regarding Student safety from September 2025 to the present. Parent also asked to waive the resolution session, arguing it would be futile, and contended that holding the hearing on April 15 would risk irreparable harm to the Student. Parent therefore requested an order requiring document production by March 20 and scheduling the hearing during the week of March 23.
On March 16, 2026, Leominster objected to Parent's Motion for Reconsideration, Motion to Vacate, and Motion to Advance Hearing and Establish Expedited Discovery, reiterating that there is no immediate and concrete threat to the Student's health or safety as the claims regarding skill deficit do not establish an immediate health or safety emergency, and the harm Parent asserts is speculative. In addition, the District indicated that it does not agree to waive the Resolution Session and objected to an accelerated timeline for discovery as this matter does not meet the standard for an accelerated track.
On March 20, 2026, I issued Ruling On Parent's Request For Reconsideration, Motion To Vacate Order, and Motion To Advance Hearing And Establish Expedited Discovery Period, denying all of Parent's motions. The Ruling was dated March 16, 2026, but was issued on March 20, 2026. As such, a Corrected Ruling was issued reflecting the issue date of March 20, 2026.
On March 23, 2026, the District filed a response to Parent's Hearing Request.
LEGAL STANDARD
A motion for reconsideration of a ruling may be allowed where a party alleges any manifest errors of law or fact, new information, or an intervening change in law that warrants reconsideration.[1]
APPLICATION OF LEGAL STANDARDS
Parent's Emergency Motion must be denied. The Motion reiterates that Student has significant needs, including a clinical characterization as requiring "very substantial support," and identifies data reflecting difficulty with transitions. Even accepting these assertions as true, they do not demonstrate that harm is likely to occur before the matter can be addressed through the ordinary hearing process.[2] Nor do allegations regarding the District's delay or non-responsiveness, even if true, satisfy the standard for accelerated status or justify a stay of the March 20, 2026 Ruling.
In addition, Parent's reliance on M.G.L. c. 214, § 1B is misplaced, as the statute does not alter the burden of proof or reduce the evidentiary showing required to meet the accelerated hearing standard. Similarly, Parent's reliance on Care and Protection of Robert, 408 Mass. 52 (1990)[3] and Packaging Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Cheney, 380 Mass. 609 (1980)[4] is unpersuasive. Standards governing child protection and judicial injunctive relief do not govern or modify the requirements of BSEA Hearing Rule II(D).
Parent's assertions of pre-judgment and failure to consider evidence are unsupported. The Ruling was issued based on the record before the Hearing Officer. The existence of earlier drafts or internal dates does not establish that subsequently submitted materials were not considered.
ORDER
Parent's Emergency Motion is hereby DENIED.
No further motions for reconsideration regarding whether the matter meets the accelerated standard will be considered.
By the Hearing Officer:
/s/ Alina Kantor Nir
Alina Kantor Nir
Dated: March 25, 2026
Footnotes
[1] See In Re: Student & Braintree Public Schools (Ruling on Parent's Requests), BSEA# 25-11326 (Mitchell, 2025) (citing to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60 and to Villanueva-Mendez v. Nieves Vazquez, 360 F.Supp.2d 320, 323 (D. Mass. 2005) (internal citations omitted) ("… a motion for reconsideration cannot be used as a vehicle to relitigate and/or rehash matters already litigated and decided by the Court. These motions are entertained by Courts if they seek to correct manifest errors of law or fact, present newly discovered evidence, or when there is an intervening change in law")).
[2] See BSEA Hearing Rule II(D)(1) ("hearings may be assigned accelerated status in the following situations: a. when the health or safety of the student or others would be endangered by the delay; or b. when the special education services the student is currently receiving are sufficiently inadequate such that harm to the student is likely; or c. when the student is currently without an available educational program or the student's program will be terminated or interrupted immediately").
[3] See 408 Mass. at 68 (finding that the judge's decision to apply a "reasonable cause" standard of proof was improper and holding that the decision must be made in the District Court based on a "fair preponderance of the evidence").
[4] See 380 Mass. at 617 ("What matters as to each party is not the raw amount of irreparable harm the party might conceivably suffer, but rather the risk of such harm in light of the party's chance of success on the merits. Only where the balance between these risks cuts in favor of the moving party may a preliminary injunction properly issue").